RE: Why the vision argument is a very good one!
April 20, 2018 at 7:22 am
(This post was last modified: April 20, 2018 at 7:32 am by Edwardo Piet.)
(April 20, 2018 at 7:15 am)Jörmungandr Wrote: So how does this relate to the values argument? Well it points up that any representation of an objective value or reality is going to be inexact, unless of course that representation actually includes a one for one copy of the reality.
Right. If true values exist we cannot possibly perceive those values as they actually are unless Naive Realism is true... which it almost certainly isn't... as science shows.
(April 20, 2018 at 7:15 am)Jörmungandr Wrote: However, I think Mystic overlooks or undervalues a readily available explanation for these sensations of value within us. And that explanation is evolution.
I agree. And I take it further and say that those sensations of value within us are just as real as any values outside of us... but then I believe in ontological subjectivity, which you say John Searle 'made up'... but the point is that just because there wasn't a name for such a thing before, doesn't mean it doesn't point to something accurate. Our subjectivity is very real, unless you insist that nothing real can be imaginary and that that is a contradiciton in terms. There is no 'real seeming' as Dennett suggests. I disagree with him though. There's nothing outright wrong with having an ontology like that but I certainly prefer to say that there are two kinds of real: Real as opposed to imaginary and real as opposed to absent. Everything present is real, or exists, whether it is imaginary or non-imaginary. The imagination is present within our brain, in biochemical form. It would be silly to say that we didn't have an imagination, that our imagination doesn't exist because it 'isn't real' because it's 'imaginary', and therein lies the rub. I believe that people like Dennett or people who say ontological subjectivity is a contradiction in terms are at worst 1) Equivocating on two different definitions of 'real' or at best 2) Using an ontology that is more imprecise than mine and Searle's.