Subjective Morality?

[The Grand Nudger]

There are no physical facts about morality.  There are physical facts which one considers morally.

Show me any physical fact which is moral in nature.

............?

Right. I deny that there are moral facts. I will say only that there are physical facts upon which a subjective morality draws in establishing the complex of feelings and ideas which, taken as a whole, represent a moral system.

How about you show me which physical facts you think subjective morality draws on?  Again, facts about baseball are baseball facts, facts about boats are boat facts, facts about morality are...........what?  There needs to be some explanation for the inconsistent semantics upon which the statement above depends.  

That being said, the above is known as a non reductive interpretation, and it's open to moral realists as well..who explain that metaphysical reduction does not imply semantic reduction - and that moral terms and statements identify natural properties with appropriate causal relation to the terms and concepts themselves.   This is how some variants of moral realism escape criticism on the grounds of naturalistic fallacy.  

"I don't care, they're not people" isn't really that different than "I don't care, they're Japs," "I don't care, they're niggers" or "I don't care, they're Republicans."  Except in people's (purely subjective) minds.

-an objective correction to a subjective mistake.

I feel like most of your objections to objective moral systems and semantics are based on the fact that you see people selectively and subjectively employing moral statements and systems that are, themselves, often meaningfully subjective on a second pass. Moral realists also notice this. That, for example..some people say things like "those people aren't people". Obviously that can't be objectively true. While a moral realist does allow for the fact that those people -think- that this statement purports to report a fact and gets those facts right..and so is (internally) an attempt at realism - they contend that the second part of the qualifier is innaccurate in their case. They purport to report a fact, get that fact wrong..and so are wrong - even by the metrics of their own subjective rationalization. The same would hold in the case of legitimately non-human pain or harm (in a harm based appraisal, ofc). If they can be harmed, then the fact that the non-human are not people is irrelevant, whereas their ability to suffer is either a moral fact, or a fact salient to a moral appraisal. Whether we are comfortable with considering semantic equivalence here is..likewise... irrelevant, since the two phrases have a metaphysical equivalence. Personally, I like to play it straight, and not worry about what charges an opponent might levy if I use the plainer semantics of a moral fact - since that's what we're discussing, by any name.

This is the case due to the unavoidable implications of a harm based appraisal. If harm is what helps us identify the wrong or the bad, then those things which can be harmed can be wronged - bad things can happen or be done to them.

What deserves mention..at this point, is that a moral subjectivist can't refer to any fact at all in justification of their moral statement and remain true to the contention of moral subjectivity. A subjectivist contends that moral statements are - fundamentally- not fact based. That there is no mind independent anchor for moral statements. You find yourself stuck halfway between the two proposals - which is exactly where a moral realist expects you to be. Attempting an objective appraisal..but because of known (and unknown) flaws in human agency, getting your facts wrong. Possessing subjective claims rather than objective facts, to whatever degree that applies.

(and yes, yes, I get that "subjectivism to me is" and "objectivism to me is" is an avenue that the convo has taken before and probably seems open to you at this point, but it's just not. The positions are defined by these lines)