Subjective Morality?

[bennyboy]

There are no physical facts about morality. There are physical facts which one considers morally.

Show me any physical fact which is moral in nature.

[LadyForCamus]

There are no physical facts about morality.  There are physical facts which one considers morally.

Show me any physical fact which is moral in nature.

Pain hurts!


(I’m drunk, sorry.)

Edit: I know I’m drunk but I think I stand by my statement. It is true that pain is bad for the person who experiences it. So, very broadly speaking, “causing another person pain is wrong”, is a moral fact. Ofc, there are exceptions, but I’m talking in a very general, undifferentiated sense of the statement.

*goes for more booze and hopes no one notices this post*

[The Valkyrie]

Objective morality:

Some snivelling do-gooder: "Let's do this in a way no one gets hurt."

Valkyrie: "What the fuck?? I object!!"

[Foxaèr]

Objective moral facts

Interesting read.

[bennyboy]

There are no physical facts about morality.  There are physical facts which one considers morally.

Show me any physical fact which is moral in nature.

Pain hurts!


(I’m drunk, sorry.)

Edit:  I know I’m drunk but I think I stand by my statement.  It is true that pain is bad for the person who experiences it.  So, very broadly speaking, “causing another person pain is wrong”, is a moral fact.  Ofc, there are exceptions, but I’m talking in a very general, undifferentiated sense of the statement.

*goes for more booze and hopes no one notices this post*

I'd say three things about that:

1)  I feel that some people should be made to suffer.  Their suffering gives me pleasure because harm caused to them represents a great good.

2)  Suffering is not intrinsically bad.

3)  The distinction between human and animal species points to the fact that the moral narrative is dependent on the social contract.  What is intrinsically less bad about chickens suffering for your dinner, than about Jews getting roasted in an oven?

"I don't care, they're not people" isn't really that different than "I don't care, they're Japs," "I don't care, they're niggers" or "I don't care, they're Republicans."  Except in people's (purely subjective) minds.

[Foxaèr]

[The Grand Nudger]

There are no physical facts about morality.  There are physical facts which one considers morally.

Show me any physical fact which is moral in nature.

............?

Right. I deny that there are moral facts. I will say only that there are physical facts upon which a subjective morality draws in establishing the complex of feelings and ideas which, taken as a whole, represent a moral system.

How about you show me which physical facts you think subjective morality draws on?  Again, facts about baseball are baseball facts, facts about boats are boat facts, facts about morality are...........what?  There needs to be some explanation for the inconsistent semantics upon which the statement above depends.  

That being said, the above is known as a non reductive interpretation, and it's open to moral realists as well..who explain that metaphysical reduction does not imply semantic reduction - and that moral terms and statements identify natural properties with appropriate causal relation to the terms and concepts themselves.   This is how some variants of moral realism escape criticism on the grounds of naturalistic fallacy.  

"I don't care, they're not people" isn't really that different than "I don't care, they're Japs," "I don't care, they're niggers" or "I don't care, they're Republicans."  Except in people's (purely subjective) minds.

-an objective correction to a subjective mistake.

I feel like most of your objections to objective moral systems and semantics are based on the fact that you see people selectively and subjectively employing moral statements and systems that are, themselves, often meaningfully subjective on a second pass. Moral realists also notice this. That, for example..some people say things like "those people aren't people". Obviously that can't be objectively true. While a moral realist does allow for the fact that those people -think- that this statement purports to report a fact and gets those facts right..and so is (internally) an attempt at realism - they contend that the second part of the qualifier is innaccurate in their case. They purport to report a fact, get that fact wrong..and so are wrong - even by the metrics of their own subjective rationalization. The same would hold in the case of legitimately non-human pain or harm (in a harm based appraisal, ofc). If they can be harmed, then the fact that the non-human are not people is irrelevant, whereas their ability to suffer is either a moral fact, or a fact salient to a moral appraisal. Whether we are comfortable with considering semantic equivalence here is..likewise... irrelevant, since the two phrases have a metaphysical equivalence. Personally, I like to play it straight, and not worry about what charges an opponent might levy if I use the plainer semantics of a moral fact - since that's what we're discussing, by any name.

This is the case due to the unavoidable implications of a harm based appraisal. If harm is what helps us identify the wrong or the bad, then those things which can be harmed can be wronged - bad things can happen or be done to them.

What deserves mention..at this point, is that a moral subjectivist can't refer to any fact at all in justification of their moral statement and remain true to the contention of moral subjectivity. A subjectivist contends that moral statements are - fundamentally- not fact based. That there is no mind independent anchor for moral statements. You find yourself stuck halfway between the two proposals - which is exactly where a moral realist expects you to be. Attempting an objective appraisal..but because of known (and unknown) flaws in human agency, getting your facts wrong. Possessing subjective claims rather than objective facts, to whatever degree that applies.

(and yes, yes, I get that "subjectivism to me is" and "objectivism to me is" is an avenue that the convo has taken before and probably seems open to you at this point, but it's just not. The positions are defined by these lines)

[bennyboy]

What deserves mention..at this point, is that a moral subjectivist can't refer to any fact at all in justification of their moral statement and remain true to the contention of moral subjectivity.

Cannot use any fact at all? That's a really limiting criterion, dude, and I don't accept it.

If I feel that rape is bad, then the fact that I see a man on top of a woman, and she's screaming "Help help, get off me!" doesn't suddenly make my moral sense objective. Nor does it make the rape objectively wrong. What it does mean is that I'll get enraged, and possibly club the man into a quivering mess with whatever blunt object I find handy.

Nor, even if I'm drawing on objective facts to establish a moral system, does it make that system objective. For example, if I think causing suffering is immoral, and I look to brain scanning as a means of determining what causes suffering, this does not make my moral position objective. That's because no physical system or property can decide WHAT MATTERS.

Does it matter if someone is raped? If so, show me objective proof that this is true. Can't be done, because there's no such thing.

[The Grand Nudger]

What deserves mention..at this point, is that a moral subjectivist can't refer to any fact at all in justification of their moral statement and remain true to the contention of moral subjectivity.

Cannot use any fact at all?  That's a really limiting criterion, dude, and I don't accept it.

You may not, but moral subjectivism is defined by it.  I'm not saying that you can't use them as a statement of practicality or effect.  Clearly you can and do refer to facts (or at least what you take to be a fact).  I'm simply noting that by doing so you are acting contrary to the central contention of moral subjectivism.  That there are no mind independent anchors for moral propositions.  

If I feel that rape is bad, then the fact that I see a man on top of a woman, and she's screaming "Help help, get off me!" doesn't suddenly make my moral sense objective.  Nor does it make the rape objectively wrong.  What it does mean is that I'll get enraged, and possibly club the man into a quivering mess with whatever blunt object I find handy.

Correct, your feelings, as a floating justification, would not make something objectively wrong.  It is possible, however, for you to have feelings about something that is objectively wrong.  

Nor, even if I'm drawing on objective facts to establish a moral system, does it make that system objective.  For example, if I think causing suffering is immoral, and I look to brain scanning as a means of determining what causes suffering, this does not make my moral position objective.

Drawing on objective facts ( a bit redundant, but hey, lol) and leveraging a valid means of inference to arrive at a true conclusion is exactly what we take to be objective in any other sense.  Again, some explanation for inconsistent semantics is required.  Reasserting inconsistent semantics will not explain inconsistent semantics. The non-reductive approach is open to you..but if you fully stated it you would be agreeing with cornell realists, for example.

That's because no physical system or property can decide WHAT MATTERS. Does it matter if someone is raped?  If so, show me objective proof that this is true.  Can't be done, because there's no such thing.

Whether or not it "matters" is not the same question as whether or not it is subjectively or objectively immoral. The answer to that question can be subjective even if the moral proposition is (legitimately) objective.

(I want you to reconsider your earlier objection to my stating that no discovery of some fact x matters in a subjectivist framework...at this point, btw, lol)

It, whatever it may be in any given question..may not matter. This would make it an inconsequential truth, but it would still be true. So, for example, if rape were objectively wrong, the fact that this does not matter to the unapologetic rapist is moot. That is an example of selective and subjective compulsions and appraisals (and again a moral realist also notices this), but it's a statement regarding what some moral agent does or might do, not the underlying nature of the moral stricture against the act. Objective and subjective moral theory are about some (purportedly) moral act or system or proposition x - not binding comments on the moral agents who navigate them. If morality were objective, that doesn't mean that a moral agent wouldn't make meaningfully subjective decisions or that the moral agent would give a shit, or give a shit about the same things. Think about all the things you take to be wrong (subjectively or objectively)...that you do anyway.

On a more fundamental level, if by "deciding what matters" we are referring to moral criterion - then ofc we're the ones who decide that..we're just deciding what we're talking about when we use the word....and if we decide that what matters is our subjective appraisal we are endorsing moral subjectivity. If we decide that mind independent propositions...facts...matter..then we are endorsing moral realism. Obviously, it's not impossible for a person to make a claim to moral subjectivism while endorsing moral realism in their justification - here you are. I'm not telling you that your comments on what moral agents do, on their spotty agency, on moral systems as devised and practiced out in the world..are wrong. I'm noting that you are not disagreeing with moral realists on any of that, your ideas of objectivity and subjectivity and what those positions are....are not what they are talking about.

When a person can consistently and coherently agree with all of your objections to some position...then you aren't actually objecting to that position. Make sense?

[robvalue]

There are no physical facts about morality.  There are physical facts which one considers morally.

Show me any physical fact which is moral in nature.

I agree.

It’s a bit like the current trend of some people finding facts to be sexist or racist, or whatever. You’re not allowed to refer to how things actually are, but as they should be.

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PS: the weird thing is, Khem must ultimately be describing the same set of circumstances, but doing so in such a way that makes no sense to us. (I’m the spokesperson for subjective international.) So I suppose we're dealing with different uses of language and fundamental philosophical approaches.

It can’t be a matter of opinion whether or not there are facts about something; all that can happen is those facts, if they are real, being described through different frameworks.

I’m still not sure if we're dealing with scientific facts or logical truths, though. There’s the language problem: for me, a scientific fact cannot be moral in nature. It must by definition be amoral.