RE: First order logic, set theory and God
December 6, 2018 at 11:12 pm
(This post was last modified: December 6, 2018 at 11:23 pm by dr0n3.)
(December 5, 2018 at 8:36 am)polymath257 Wrote: Once again, what allows you to construct the system V in this 'proof'? What set theory are you using?
The problem is that sets of the type of V are *known* to not be constrictible in most standard set theories: they lead to inconsistencies like Russell's paradox or Cantor's paradox. They are 'too big' to be sets.
So, unless you give *first order* axioms allowing for the construction of your system V, you have no proof.
Good luck.
Next, your axiom of sufficiency is way, way too strong. In all likelihood, the *most* that we can say is that all *finite* phenomena have causes (whether themselves or another). But, if this is the case, then there is no guarantee your system V (even if you can construct it) will have a cause since it is likely that V is an infinite system.
Also, remember that constructing infinite systems is not a first order process in general.
The way the proof avoids Russell's paradox boils down to how concepts are defined and classified.
It is crucial to understand that with respect to composition, we have a hierarchy of complexity.
Let us define the words - componential as the attribute of being a component and composite as the attribute of having components.
1- At the lowest level is the componential non-composite entity A which is a component but does not have any component, such that x∉A∈B, for some B.
2- Next, are componential composite entity A which both have components and are components, such that E∈A∈B, for some E and B,
3- Finally, you have the non-componential composite entity A which have components but is never a component of anything, such that B∈A∉x, for some B.
Now according to the above definitions, V can be defined as the whole of reality which is that non-componential composite entity whose components are precisely all existing entities who are necessarily componential and can either be composite or non-composite.
Now according to Russell's paradox, the pertinent question to ask ourselves is if V as the set of all existing componential entities, a componential entity itself and therefore a member of that set?
Well no, since by the very definition of V, it has already been established that it is non-componential. But then one might ask " how can we know that V is non-componential and hence not a component of anything ? " Well because if we assumed V to be componential, then by definition it cannot be the set of all existing componential entities as one will commit the error of Russell's paradox where V becomes a member of the set of all componential entities. Therefore V∈V.
Alternatively we ask, can V as an non-componential entity be the set of all componential entities ? Yes, because non-componential and componential are two distinct categories and thus V can become the set of all existing componential entitities without becoming a member of that set. On that basis, we have completely disqualified V as a universal sets of all sets(and therefore Russell's paradox is not an issue anymore) by restricting V as a set of all sets that satisfies the property that every entity A of a set is componential.
As for your argument about the principle of suffiency - your notion V being an infinite system requiring no cause is a baseless assumption, and I would even further argue, that such an assumption can be nullified by the very fact that V is composite. Since we can admit that V does not even exist until all its components exist, then it begs the question as to when will V ever be formed if it would take an infinite amount of time for it components to come into existence ? Never. Thus to entertain V as an infinite system is tantamount to the denial of it's very existence.
(December 5, 2018 at 9:38 am)Mathilda Wrote:(December 4, 2018 at 9:34 pm)dr0n3 Wrote: There is nothing for me to demonstrate at this point - most of your arguments, did however, demonstrate a thinly veiled attempt to shift the paradigm to make it appear as if Hatcher's proof was trying to establish the complexity of reality, when the contention was that of substantiating the origin of reality. God damn it, learn to read. The O-R-I-G-I-N. Not the complexity and the physical laws that governs reality.
It's utterly laughable that you have gone at great length trying to establish that the laws of thermodynamics was more fitting at explaining reality than logic, when all of this was totally irrelevant. You've wasted your time arguing on notions that were completely extraneous to Hatcher's proof, and not worth considering in discussing.
So let's summarise here.
You are making an argument about how absolutely everything in the universe came to exist (because of your god) by using a rule that inadequately describes how things happen within this universe (causation) to explain how the universe was created by something external to it.
By doing this you are saying that the laws that govern this universe also exist in the larger external universe that this universe exists in (but without explaining how that external universe was created)
I point out how your argument does not adequately describe how things happen within this universe (causation abstracts over thermodynamics and continuous processes) and your response is you're only talking about the origin and not 'the complexity and the physical laws that governs reality'.
So is causation NOT a physical law that governs reality and explains complexity?
Why are you using causation but not thermodynamics?
Or are you arguing that how this universe functions says nothing about how it was created? In which case why refer to causation at all and just argue that the universe was created by magic?
" ... to explain how the universe was created by something external to it."
That's an ill-founded claim. I, neither Hatcher, have stated that the cause was external to V(universe or reality), if you had read carefully, you'd see that G is either a component or a subsystem of V and hence internal (part of) to V, while being different from V itself; G ≠ V. On that basis, your idea of a "larger external universe" containing another universe - is bogus, nonsensical and to be categorically dismissed.
The law of causality is a broad concept that can be applied and interpreted in almost any area, and as such there is a plethora of causality theories. However, fundamentally speaking, causality is a logical and relational principle. It's not a physical law, per se (although it could be extended to physics). The reason why casaulity is used in hatcher's proof is because it attempts to articulate the ultimate origin of existence. Thermodynamics doesn't. All it does is it explains the entropy of thermal energy and its conservation within the universe, and for that reason it falls flat at demonstrating the existence of a metaphysical reality.