Oh, sorry. I think I see.
Obviously, you're right. There is no reason a God should be necessary, eternal, etc.. Plenty of gods in the polytheistic religions aren't. And of course I don't know that god isn't a contingent being.
This argument is about what is often called the 'God of the philosophers' - that is, a being that is omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect and eternal. So the argument only works for a God that fits this definition. It aims to show that a God corresponding to this definition has to exist.
So the reason I haven't demonstrated that 'eternalness' is a property of God is that this argument doesn't require it. I can make up any definition I like - for example, I say a 'grumlin' is a small grey creature with large ears and red eyes. This can't be disputed, because it's my definition. Obviously, I'm making no claims at this point regarding the existence of a 'grumlin', but this isn't necessary (see my example of a unicorn above).
The argument works in a similar way, 'making up' a definition for God at the beginning. What the rest of the argument claims to show it that unlike the 'grumlin', the very concept of the philosophical God is such that it has to exist.
So a God needn't be eternal or noncontingent, as you say. But it is possible for one to be. And the argument says that that kind of God has to exist.
Obviously, you're right. There is no reason a God should be necessary, eternal, etc.. Plenty of gods in the polytheistic religions aren't. And of course I don't know that god isn't a contingent being.
This argument is about what is often called the 'God of the philosophers' - that is, a being that is omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect and eternal. So the argument only works for a God that fits this definition. It aims to show that a God corresponding to this definition has to exist.
So the reason I haven't demonstrated that 'eternalness' is a property of God is that this argument doesn't require it. I can make up any definition I like - for example, I say a 'grumlin' is a small grey creature with large ears and red eyes. This can't be disputed, because it's my definition. Obviously, I'm making no claims at this point regarding the existence of a 'grumlin', but this isn't necessary (see my example of a unicorn above).
The argument works in a similar way, 'making up' a definition for God at the beginning. What the rest of the argument claims to show it that unlike the 'grumlin', the very concept of the philosophical God is such that it has to exist.
So a God needn't be eternal or noncontingent, as you say. But it is possible for one to be. And the argument says that that kind of God has to exist.
