The absurd need for logical proofs for God

[R00tKiT]

I'm going to deal with this in reverse order because the main problem is that the latter argument, that the universe is likely designed because it looks designed is the main problem.  I noted in an earlier definition you gave for design that you had expanded it to the point that it included things which, in the colloquial sense, did not actually exhibit design in the sense you were implying.  Your definition also fit out-of-place artifacts which look like they were designed by an agent, but actually were the result of natural processes.  

Some artifacts are the result of natural processes.... so what? Is the understanding of natural processes an antithesis to design ? This is an argument from personal incredulity, an opponent of design obviously cannot conceive of design through long term processes of infinitesimal improvements, and thinks that this implies there is no designer...

This is the main obstacle in any design argument, defining design, and specifically what the indicators of design are, such that they don't yield false positives.  William Dembski has written  at length on the problem and is the foremost proponent of a framework which claims to be able to identify design.  Unfortunately his work is terribly flawed and faulty.  The result is that you can't establish premise #1 of your argument that there are clear aspects of design in the universe or in biological life forms, and if anything, the argument is much stronger in the case of biological life forms.  In particular, if you are suggesting that fine-tuning of the universe is the aspect which leads to a conclusion of design, one's argument gets recast as:

1. The universe appears fine-tuned which would be clear evidence of design, regardless of the process which led to it.
2. Design, as previously defined, is more probably than not the product of conscious, deliberate decision.
3. It is not necessarily the case that the universe is fine-tuned, as the universe's constants could have happened by chance.
4. If the universe is not designed as in 3, then it would still appear fine-tuned.
5. Therefore the appearance of fine-tuning is not evidence of conscious, deliberate decision.

The main problem is that premise #1 is not true.  With the failure of the design part of your argument, the prior main argument fails as well.

First of all, you didn't give any improved definition of design we can work with, and so this argument is unintelligible. If we adopt the definition I previously gave, then nature clearly displays aspects of adaptation of means to end, and this at least implies conscious design,.Besides, if we, as conscious agents, can't even reproduce some of nature's achievements, how come one can posit it all got there by blind coincidence.....
Second, I don't see how the argument from design becomes "much stronger" with biological life forms, it's not like opponents to this argument figured out how to come up with rocks and trees ex nihilo so they can move on to the last remaining theist fortress of life forms.

Or, as the Qur'an says : "Here is a parable set forth! listen to it! Those on whom, besides Allah, ye call, cannot create (even) a fly, if they all met together for the purpose! and if the fly should snatch away anything from them, they would have no power to release it from the fly. Feeble are those who petition and those whom they petition!"

In essence, we never managed to design anything, human machines are mere more or less clever combinations of existent matter.

Now, as to the first, it's important to note that an argument based upon analogy is neither inductive nor deductive and largely functions as a pedagogical tool rather than an argument.  The basis of an argument from analogy is that something displays similarity in aspects which it is known, therefore it's probable that said similarity extends to things that are unknown.  This is not a reliable assumption.  I can note that a car rests on four tires and argue from analogy that a three-legged stool likely has four legs because, after observing the first three legs, I conclude that the parallel between it and a car also having three points of rest also extends to it likewise having four points of rest, or four legs.  In essence, an analogy depends upon a form of uniformitarianism in our assumptions which we have no justification for assuming.  Thus it isn't probative of the probability of an analogical thing sharing a trait that hasn't yet been confirmed.  Some do, some don't -- and there is no information present to determine which class the analogized object belongs to, so the argument, as such, does not lead to a definite conclusion.  It's a non sequitur.

I never claimed these arguments lead to a certain conclusion. But again, arguments for other minds and for the external world don't, either. An argument based on analogy is clearly inferential. In the case of other minds, we work with a very very small sample (Me, one person) and reach a very ambitious conclusion : Everyone I observe who resembles me physically has a mind. And we are usually very confident in our conclusion.

And what about the external world, you literally have no example of an external world built within in, but you firmly believe there is one. Why didn't you request more samples of that ?

In your case, the analogy is so weak -- basically non-existent -- that one might be charitably inclined to agree that there appear indications of a mind behind the universe, there is little reason to suspect any mind behind it has the properties of a god rather than say aliens or a natural order which we are not yet cognizant of existing.  The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy makes this point in its argument from design article concerning a similar analogy, to that of Nicolas Caputo in an election in which cheating was involved.  In the case of Caputo, we have an agent who possessed the capabilities to bring about the results that the inference of design in that case was based.  In the case of other minds, we have an agent with confirmed similar capabilities.  In the case of God, we have no such exemplar.  If we don't know that things like gods are even possible, it makes no sense to conclude that they are probable based upon a design inference, as that would be a subtle form of begging the question, assuming the possible existence of God, to argue about the possible existence of God.  In any argument there are primary premises, typically those presented, and auxiliary premises, most of which end up being unspoken.  In the case of other minds, one primary premise is that minds, namely ours, which are capable of certain things, exist, at least one.  That becomes an auxiliary premise in the design argument if one is arguing that there is an analogy there, and says that gods exist, or, at least, are possible.  The fact of it being an auxiliary, unstated premise doesn't make it any less necessary to the conclusion for it being unspoken.  And when that part of the analogy is brought out, it's clear that either one is begging the question (circularity), or one's analogy is a false one (gods aren't analogous to humans).

Your objection as I understand it is, there is no guarantee this mind behind the universe has the properties of a god. But if this mind is not an uncaused cause, then you have a problem of infinite regress, that only stops with the mind which actually possesses these properties. Natural order isn't really a good solution to our problem, invoking some yet to discover mysterious order warrants itself a designer.

You are the one who invokes human designed objects as evidence of design in nature, dipshit. You can’t even agree with yourself on which definition of design you’re going with depending on the day. Quit before all your integrity is lost, guy.

Now you're resorting to lies ? I clearly stated that aspects of adaptation of means to ends around us are the evidence of design, not human designed objects.

So, let me try again : what's your definition of design ?