(June 25, 2021 at 6:13 pm)Klorophyll Wrote:(June 25, 2021 at 5:46 pm)Angrboda Wrote: P1 is not a sufficient condition for free will unless you include the proviso that choosing in P1 refers to freely choosing. However if it does, it begs the question and the argument is invalid. So P1 cannot be a sufficient condition for free will without begging the question. Free will implies that both P1 and not-P1 could be true. However P3 rules out the possibility of not-P1, so P3 rules out free will.
P1 obviously entails free will. There is no begging involved, I am not trying to prove free will based on P1, I already assumed D has free will by asserting P1.
And of course P1 is not a necessary condition of free will, let's not play this silly game, I am giving one example of free will (choosing some flavor of ice cream), obviously one can have free will and never eat ice cream in their life.
You say "P3 rules out free will", which is a claim you didn't prove. P3 is exactly equivalent to P2 as I proved before. omniscience mean knowledge of all true propostions. If P3 is true, then P1 is true at all times, and a fortiori, ten years ago, therefore P2. Inversely if P2 is true, then because God is omniscient, God knows about P1, therefore P3.
If P1 assumes free will, the argument is invalid. Let me put it another way. Let P1(b) be the proposition that the choice in P1 is fully determined and not free. Now one of two things is true: a) P1(b) is consistent with P1 and therefore P1 is not about free will and the argument fails, or b) P1(b) is inconsistent with P1 and therefore P1 assumes free will, thus begging the question, and making the argument invalid. You can't simply "assert" free will.
You don't seem to have the first clue about free will. Color me not surprised.
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