RE: Why God doesn't stop satan?
June 25, 2021 at 6:46 pm
(This post was last modified: June 25, 2021 at 6:56 pm by Angrboda.)
(June 25, 2021 at 6:37 pm)Klorophyll Wrote:(June 25, 2021 at 6:32 pm)Angrboda Wrote: If P1 assumes free will, the argument is invalid. Let me put it another way. Let P1(b) be the proposition that the choice in P1 is fully determined and not free. Now one of two things is true: a) P1(b) is consistent with P1 and therefore P1 is not about free will and the argument fails, or b) P1(b) is inconsistent with P1 and therefore P1 assumes free will, thus begging the question, and making the argument invalid. You can't simply "assert" free will.
You don't seem to have the first clue about free will. Color me not surprised.
Yes I can assert free will. Because this is not an argument for free will, but for compatibility between foreknowledge and free will. Meanwhile, keep playing mind games with P1.
And as I pointed out, her choice wasn't free unless she could have made a diffferent choice. But if she made a different choice, then P2 and P3 are false. That's an inconsistency. If P1 assumes free will, it's not necessarily consistent with P3 and the argument fails. All you're doing is dressing up the assertion that free will and omniscience are compatible in logic -- it remains a bald assertion unless you demonstrate that free will can exist after assuming omniscience. P1 doesn't demonstrate free will.
Is P2 and P3 true if she chooses something else? No they are not. So she couldn't have chosen from any "set" of actions and still be consistent with P2 and P3. Her choice is thus determined.