Another one.
Love thy Neighbour… or not: Christians, but not Atheists, Show High In-Group Favoritism.: https://www.secularismandnonreligion.org...4/snr.136/
Discussion section from the study:
The current study built upon the existing literature with respect to how atheists perceive other religious groups in the United States, as well as affirmed how religious groups perceive atheists. In support of prior research (Brown et al. 2018; Edgell et al. 2016; Franks & Scherr 2014; Ritter & Preston 2011), the general population of the United States rated atheists more negatively than all other religious groups (supportive of H1). This finding appeared to be driven by Christians specifically, who viewed atheists with a strong degree of animus relative to Christians and all other religious comparators (supportive of H2). In contrast, and in response to the posed research question, atheists and nonreligious atheists appeared to ‘like’ Christians, Buddhists, Hindus, and Jews as much as they liked the atheist comparator. However, both atheists and nonreligious atheists reported a lower evaluation of Muslims than of the atheist group, which aligns with the scant qualitative and quantitative research on this topic (Gerteis et al. 2019; Uzarevic et al. 2017). Our interpretation of these findings is that atheist show reduced in-group bias (as evidenced by the similar ratings of the atheist, Christian, Buddhist, Hindu, and Jewish groups), but may demonstrate a small degree of sporadic out-group denigration (as evidenced by the reported dislike of the Muslim group). Each of these findings will be discussed in turn.
While the reason for animosity towards atheists is contentious and disputed, there is an acknowledgement that factually, atheists are among the most disliked group within the United States (Edgell et al. 2016). Understanding the root of this out-group bias, stereotyping, and anti-atheist stigma is critical, as such beliefs may translate to enacted prejudice (Cook et al. 2015); for example, 42% of Americans stated that they would be less likely to vote for a qualified atheist president (Pew 2014) and 44% indicated that they would not want their child to marry an atheist (Edgell et al. 2016). Correspondingly, studies note that atheists in the US experience anti-atheist discrimination (Hammer et al. 2012), and that these experiences may have deleterious outcomes on mental health (Brewster et al. 2016) or employment status (Wallace et al. 2014). One of the rationales offered to account for anti-atheist prejudice is that atheists themselves are hostile towards religious groups (Meier et al. 2015; Uzarevic et al. 2017), implying that subsequent anti-atheist prejudice is responsive and justifiable. Functionally, atheists are perceived to be antagonistic towards religious groups and the dislike of atheists is ‘retaliatory.’ In other words, atheists are not victims, but instead, instigators who are disliked for their pugnaciousness. Such beliefs about atheists may have stemmed from the writings of key figures in the New Atheist movement (Dawkins 2006; Hitchens 2008) and have been used as a shorthand to characterize the stance of all atheists as antitheist or antireligious.
While the current study does not speak as to why negative perceptions of atheists are prevalent, it does suggest that stereotypes of atheists holding negative views of religious people may be unfounded. That said, the present study did not assess behavior toward other groups and it is possible that atheist individuals may still act in ways that are viewed as dismissive or critical, even if they do not espouse out-group bias or in-group favoritism. Moreover, a strength of the current study (its representative sample) may make direct comparisons with existing literature challenging, as many studies addressing atheism use atheist organizations to recruit participants.
When asked to rate themselves, nonreligious atheists evaluated their group as being in the weakly positive to neutral range (M = 3.54, SD = 0.83) which did not differ from their rating of Christian theists (M = 3.35, SD = 0.92). This finding does not appear to align with the extant qualitative research, which stereotypes atheists that display out-group bias toward organized religion (Brewster 2014; Christina 2012). Specifically, if atheists did display an out-group bias, we would expect to see at a minimum, limited propinquity across their evaluations of religious groups. If atheists do indeed feel systematic in-group preference and out-group bias, then atheists’ similar ratings of religious groups are puzzling. The outcome variable was, ‘What is your personal attitude towards members of the following religious groups…’, which leaves little room for ambiguity. As noted earlier, the null finding may be a product of Type II error, given that there was limited power to detect an effect less than *d ≈ 0.35. However, this would suggest that if atheists show an in-group bias, then it is likely at this threshold of detection. While we cannot say with certainty that the effect is not there, we can place a ‘upper limit’ on how large this hypothetical effect is. In all cases, the speculative ‘out-group’ denigration that atheists and nonreligious atheists may have, is markedly lower than the ‘anti-atheist’ bias that was actually observed. By contrast, Christian theists rated themselves very positively (M = 4.41, SD = 0.76) while simultaneously rating atheists in the neutral to weakly negative range (M = 2.90, SD = 1.17). Framed differently, the average nonreligious atheist is as favourable towards the average Christian as they are towards the average atheist; while the average Christian theist is much more favourable towards the average Christian than they are towards the average atheist. This discrepancy in attitudes is puzzling and prompts the question: why?
It may be the case that the discrepancy in attitudes is that atheists and nonreligious atheists are routinely exposed to examples of neutral or positive members of the Christian group, while theists and Christian theists are not. Drawing from the contact hypothesis (Dixon et al. 2005)—the belief that interactions between different groups reduces intergroup prejudice—it may be that atheists are not able to hold a consistent narrative of ‘oppressive’ Christians in their minds, as they interact with a diverse range of ‘out’ Christians in their daily lives (Guenther 2014). Seeing a broad range of representations of Christianity may dilute beliefs that ‘all Christians’ believe the same things or behave in the same manner. Although it would be nearly impossible for an atheist to move through life in the US without interacting with someone who is Christian, it is entirely plausible that many Christians have not directly met or engaged with an openly atheist person before. Similarly, other research suggests that anti-atheist prejudice can be ameliorated if a person believes atheism to be prevalent (Gervais 2011). Problematically, if Christians do not personally interact with atheists, they may assume that figureheads within the New Atheist movement are typical exemplars of the wider atheist group. As such, calls for atheists to ‘come out’ may indeed be a fruitful first step in eliminating extant atheist caricatures.
However, it may be that anti-atheist sentiment runs deeper than is solvable by good-natured intergroup contact. Indeed, these results were consistent with the notion that atheists produce an existential threat within Christian theists, which may help explain why they are more disliked than the ‘religious competitors’ were. Functionally, the notion of atheists being ‘right’ [i.e., with respect to the non-existence of god(s)] provides a greater problem to religious beliefs than if a Muslim or a Buddhist were ‘right’. Furthermore, if morality is believed to stem from a belief in god or adherence to religious doctrines, it is better to believe something rather than ‘nothing.’ From a perceived immorality perspective, it is not clear that meeting a nice atheist would necessarily combat a Christian’s anti-atheist prejudice—instead, the atheist may be tokenized as ‘a good one’ (i.e., subtyping) rather than representative of the larger population (Dixon et al. 2005). However, this theoretical framing is speculative and may not reflect the nature of this finding.
Lastly, while the difference was admittedly small, atheists were more likely to rate Muslims lower than their own in-group, as well as rate Muslims more negatively than all other religious groups (although these differences were not always practically significant). This finding is not entirely without precedent: several prominent atheists—such as Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, and late-night host Bill Maher—have all come under fire for espousing Islamophobic views (Amarasingam & Brewster 2016); specifically, perpetuating beliefs that Islam is ‘the motherlode of bad ideas’ and is the most dangerous of organized religions (Hansen 2015). It may be that the promulgation of these views within nonbelieving communities has translated into more negative opinions about Muslim people generally. However, this explanation is post-hoc and assumes the underlying Islamophobia of which those public figures have been accused. Alternatively, Islamophobic viewpoints may have emerged independently within the ‘atheist movement’ writ large and have simply been attached to those well-known figures, regardless of their veracity. An obvious confounding variable in the assessment of Islamophobia may have less to do with religion and more to do with a conflation of antitheism with ethnocentrism against, and racism toward, Middle Eastern individuals (Gerteis et al. 2019). Functionally, racism towards people of Middle Eastern descent may have inadvertently been ‘paired’ with the dominant religion within the Middle East.
Love thy Neighbour… or not: Christians, but not Atheists, Show High In-Group Favoritism.: https://www.secularismandnonreligion.org...4/snr.136/
Discussion section from the study:
The current study built upon the existing literature with respect to how atheists perceive other religious groups in the United States, as well as affirmed how religious groups perceive atheists. In support of prior research (Brown et al. 2018; Edgell et al. 2016; Franks & Scherr 2014; Ritter & Preston 2011), the general population of the United States rated atheists more negatively than all other religious groups (supportive of H1). This finding appeared to be driven by Christians specifically, who viewed atheists with a strong degree of animus relative to Christians and all other religious comparators (supportive of H2). In contrast, and in response to the posed research question, atheists and nonreligious atheists appeared to ‘like’ Christians, Buddhists, Hindus, and Jews as much as they liked the atheist comparator. However, both atheists and nonreligious atheists reported a lower evaluation of Muslims than of the atheist group, which aligns with the scant qualitative and quantitative research on this topic (Gerteis et al. 2019; Uzarevic et al. 2017). Our interpretation of these findings is that atheist show reduced in-group bias (as evidenced by the similar ratings of the atheist, Christian, Buddhist, Hindu, and Jewish groups), but may demonstrate a small degree of sporadic out-group denigration (as evidenced by the reported dislike of the Muslim group). Each of these findings will be discussed in turn.
While the reason for animosity towards atheists is contentious and disputed, there is an acknowledgement that factually, atheists are among the most disliked group within the United States (Edgell et al. 2016). Understanding the root of this out-group bias, stereotyping, and anti-atheist stigma is critical, as such beliefs may translate to enacted prejudice (Cook et al. 2015); for example, 42% of Americans stated that they would be less likely to vote for a qualified atheist president (Pew 2014) and 44% indicated that they would not want their child to marry an atheist (Edgell et al. 2016). Correspondingly, studies note that atheists in the US experience anti-atheist discrimination (Hammer et al. 2012), and that these experiences may have deleterious outcomes on mental health (Brewster et al. 2016) or employment status (Wallace et al. 2014). One of the rationales offered to account for anti-atheist prejudice is that atheists themselves are hostile towards religious groups (Meier et al. 2015; Uzarevic et al. 2017), implying that subsequent anti-atheist prejudice is responsive and justifiable. Functionally, atheists are perceived to be antagonistic towards religious groups and the dislike of atheists is ‘retaliatory.’ In other words, atheists are not victims, but instead, instigators who are disliked for their pugnaciousness. Such beliefs about atheists may have stemmed from the writings of key figures in the New Atheist movement (Dawkins 2006; Hitchens 2008) and have been used as a shorthand to characterize the stance of all atheists as antitheist or antireligious.
While the current study does not speak as to why negative perceptions of atheists are prevalent, it does suggest that stereotypes of atheists holding negative views of religious people may be unfounded. That said, the present study did not assess behavior toward other groups and it is possible that atheist individuals may still act in ways that are viewed as dismissive or critical, even if they do not espouse out-group bias or in-group favoritism. Moreover, a strength of the current study (its representative sample) may make direct comparisons with existing literature challenging, as many studies addressing atheism use atheist organizations to recruit participants.
When asked to rate themselves, nonreligious atheists evaluated their group as being in the weakly positive to neutral range (M = 3.54, SD = 0.83) which did not differ from their rating of Christian theists (M = 3.35, SD = 0.92). This finding does not appear to align with the extant qualitative research, which stereotypes atheists that display out-group bias toward organized religion (Brewster 2014; Christina 2012). Specifically, if atheists did display an out-group bias, we would expect to see at a minimum, limited propinquity across their evaluations of religious groups. If atheists do indeed feel systematic in-group preference and out-group bias, then atheists’ similar ratings of religious groups are puzzling. The outcome variable was, ‘What is your personal attitude towards members of the following religious groups…’, which leaves little room for ambiguity. As noted earlier, the null finding may be a product of Type II error, given that there was limited power to detect an effect less than *d ≈ 0.35. However, this would suggest that if atheists show an in-group bias, then it is likely at this threshold of detection. While we cannot say with certainty that the effect is not there, we can place a ‘upper limit’ on how large this hypothetical effect is. In all cases, the speculative ‘out-group’ denigration that atheists and nonreligious atheists may have, is markedly lower than the ‘anti-atheist’ bias that was actually observed. By contrast, Christian theists rated themselves very positively (M = 4.41, SD = 0.76) while simultaneously rating atheists in the neutral to weakly negative range (M = 2.90, SD = 1.17). Framed differently, the average nonreligious atheist is as favourable towards the average Christian as they are towards the average atheist; while the average Christian theist is much more favourable towards the average Christian than they are towards the average atheist. This discrepancy in attitudes is puzzling and prompts the question: why?
It may be the case that the discrepancy in attitudes is that atheists and nonreligious atheists are routinely exposed to examples of neutral or positive members of the Christian group, while theists and Christian theists are not. Drawing from the contact hypothesis (Dixon et al. 2005)—the belief that interactions between different groups reduces intergroup prejudice—it may be that atheists are not able to hold a consistent narrative of ‘oppressive’ Christians in their minds, as they interact with a diverse range of ‘out’ Christians in their daily lives (Guenther 2014). Seeing a broad range of representations of Christianity may dilute beliefs that ‘all Christians’ believe the same things or behave in the same manner. Although it would be nearly impossible for an atheist to move through life in the US without interacting with someone who is Christian, it is entirely plausible that many Christians have not directly met or engaged with an openly atheist person before. Similarly, other research suggests that anti-atheist prejudice can be ameliorated if a person believes atheism to be prevalent (Gervais 2011). Problematically, if Christians do not personally interact with atheists, they may assume that figureheads within the New Atheist movement are typical exemplars of the wider atheist group. As such, calls for atheists to ‘come out’ may indeed be a fruitful first step in eliminating extant atheist caricatures.
However, it may be that anti-atheist sentiment runs deeper than is solvable by good-natured intergroup contact. Indeed, these results were consistent with the notion that atheists produce an existential threat within Christian theists, which may help explain why they are more disliked than the ‘religious competitors’ were. Functionally, the notion of atheists being ‘right’ [i.e., with respect to the non-existence of god(s)] provides a greater problem to religious beliefs than if a Muslim or a Buddhist were ‘right’. Furthermore, if morality is believed to stem from a belief in god or adherence to religious doctrines, it is better to believe something rather than ‘nothing.’ From a perceived immorality perspective, it is not clear that meeting a nice atheist would necessarily combat a Christian’s anti-atheist prejudice—instead, the atheist may be tokenized as ‘a good one’ (i.e., subtyping) rather than representative of the larger population (Dixon et al. 2005). However, this theoretical framing is speculative and may not reflect the nature of this finding.
Lastly, while the difference was admittedly small, atheists were more likely to rate Muslims lower than their own in-group, as well as rate Muslims more negatively than all other religious groups (although these differences were not always practically significant). This finding is not entirely without precedent: several prominent atheists—such as Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, and late-night host Bill Maher—have all come under fire for espousing Islamophobic views (Amarasingam & Brewster 2016); specifically, perpetuating beliefs that Islam is ‘the motherlode of bad ideas’ and is the most dangerous of organized religions (Hansen 2015). It may be that the promulgation of these views within nonbelieving communities has translated into more negative opinions about Muslim people generally. However, this explanation is post-hoc and assumes the underlying Islamophobia of which those public figures have been accused. Alternatively, Islamophobic viewpoints may have emerged independently within the ‘atheist movement’ writ large and have simply been attached to those well-known figures, regardless of their veracity. An obvious confounding variable in the assessment of Islamophobia may have less to do with religion and more to do with a conflation of antitheism with ethnocentrism against, and racism toward, Middle Eastern individuals (Gerteis et al. 2019). Functionally, racism towards people of Middle Eastern descent may have inadvertently been ‘paired’ with the dominant religion within the Middle East.
Being told you're delusional does not necessarily mean you're mental.
