A "meta-argument" against all future arguments for God's existence ?

[BrianSoddingBoru4]

Let's not get sidetracked on a few quotes. I am aware that neither Kant nor Hume accept the TA, if that's what you want to know.

Back to the argument :

Let A be a new successful (valid and sound) argument for the God of classical theism, based on an uncontroversial set of premises, and discovered by someone (a philosopher, for example) at the date T. Here is now an argument (by reductio ad absurdum) against the very possibility of A.

1. Argument A wasn't known to (almost) anyone before the date T.
2. (From 1.) No one was rationally justified in believing in God before T.
3. (Restatement of 2.) God didn't make his existence known to anyone before T.
4*. God is willing, and was always willing, to make his existence known to everyone.
5. If God is willing, and was always willing, to make his existence known to everyone, then God was willing to make his existence known to anyone who lived before the date T.
6. (From the conjunction of 3. and 5.) God is both willing and unwilling to make his existence to everyone before T. Absurd conclusion. (3. and non-3. are simultaneously true, non-3. being: God made his existence known to at least one person. And 5. entails non-3.)

Therefore, there is no date t at which belief in the God of classical theism suddenly becomes rationally justified.

So, is premise 4 the only controversial premise? If 4. is conceded, is the argument valid ?

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As noted, Kant's testimony is rather moot, but where did he say that?

http://www.epistemology.pe.kr/kant/Criti.../ideal.htm

Ctrl+F and type "with respect"

3 doesn’t follow from 2, nor can it be called a ‘restatement’ of 2. One can be ‘rationally justified’ in believing in God without God making his existence known. 

Boru