RE: Russia and Ukraine
March 4, 2022 at 11:19 am
(This post was last modified: March 4, 2022 at 12:21 pm by Anomalocaris.)
(March 4, 2022 at 6:27 am)BrianSoddingBoru4 Wrote:
(March 4, 2022 at 5:44 am)Anomalocaris Wrote: I wouldn’t be so sure about that.
Well, let's take a look.
Putin's pretexts for the invasion:
-Protect Russian lives: failure
-Stop the eastward expansion of NATO: failure (Sweden and Finland)
Putin's goals for the invasion:
-Restoration of 'Greater Russia' as Russia/Belarus/Ukraine: failure (significant numbers of ethnic Russians in Ukraine no longer support Russia)
-Fracture NATO: abject failure (the invasion has sped up healing the splits in NATO caused by Trump)
Putin's expectations for the invasion:
-It would be done in 100 hours (his promise to the oligarchs): failure
-The world would do nothing: epic failure
-It would serve as a showcase for Russia's military might: failed in terms of morale, logistics, planning and execution
The above aside, can Russia eventually take Ukraine? Probably. But there's a huge difference between taking a country and holding a country. Putin doesn't have the military or economic resources to hold Ukraine in the face of determined opposition by the West. The invasion has already cratered the Russian economy. Sadly, though, Putin's megalomania won't ever allow him to withdraw. Over the next few years, the situation for the average Russian is going to get more and more dire, and Putin is likely to be remembered as the man who removed Russia as a player on the world stage.
Boru
no. all the bullshit and political fluff are for propaganda. This balls on which his eyes are really fixed are these:
1, his one single overriding aim is to ensure no non-russian offensive nuclear weapon, or other weapons that threaten russian nuclear deterrence, such as launch stage ballistic missile defence, can be deployed to Ukraine, ever. He will drag the war on for as long as it takes, inflict and take as much casualty as it takes, and absorb any economic cost to achieve this.
the political corollary to this aim is russia must ensure whatever postwar political reality eventuates in ukraine, it is such that Ukrainian government can’t effectively scheme to overturn this situation.
2. his second aim, far down in importance, is to make it possible for russia to deploy Russian offensive nuclear weapon or defensive anti-ballistic and anti-cruise missile weapons to western ukraine in retaliation against EU for America pulling out of the INF treaty. He is doing this to the EU because he can’t deploy these weapons to cuba to hold the US under the same threat that US withdraw from INF puts Russia under. but that is probably optional. if the first is achieved, the second would be weighed against the cost of acquisition, and if achieved, can be used as bargaining chip for postwar negotiations with the EU at the appropriate time. When it dawned on the EU that US withdraw from INF puts the EU, but not the US, under added nuclear threat, we’ll see if NATO remains as United as before.
3. His third aim, similarly far down the importance, is to expand political control in postwar Ukraine beyond what is required for the political corollary to his number one priority stayed above. That is easy to achieve for area around crimea and large parts east of the Dniper because ethnic and linguistic closely to russia. it would be rather difficult to achieve for ukraine west of the Dniper, so he would probably push for a divided ukraine. But so long as it does not undo his objective 1, this is likely also negotiable.
militarily it does not look like he is really stalked despite talking heads whose antagonism to putin cause them to paint every event in the worst possible light fit russia rather than really carefully consider what the russian plans probably were.
1. undoubtedly Russians hoped ukrainian government would fall quickly. All military invasions have an dream outcome, and not a few embarrassed themselves by clearly having a window to achieve a better outcome than they planned, but lacking forethought to plan for such a happy contingency, they missed the opportunity to capitalize it. the US planned for saddam just folding and leaving the country in 2003, that too didn’t happen.
2. but importantly the russian operation didn’t depend on the dream outcome falling on their lap. clearly they had an effective and robust plan to take down ukraine against heavy resistance and are putting it into operation.
3. Much hay has been made about the detailed defects of the Russian army. An effective plan is a plan which would work given the defects of the army, and it appears to be working well. compare how much progress russia has made with other recent combined arms land invasion, such ad 1991 and 2003 US led invasions of iraq. By day 4-5, With broadly comparable amount of ground forces as in 1991 iraq invasion, but without the benefit of a 3 week air campaign to soften up defences first, the russians have actually made deeper amount of total combined penetration depth into enemy territory, and captured substantially larger area of enemy territory, than either the 1991 or the 2003 allied invasions. When george HW bush proclaimed victory in 1991, the coalition for had neither penetrated as deeply, nor taken as much territory, nor had to take towns, cities and other built up areas as the Russians have done.
I would say the Russians have conducted an effective operation, and it is probably going according to previously determined plan. Maybe plan B, but certainly a serious and robust plan.