Russia and Ukraine

[Pat Mustard]

You're too kind, thanks.

I get your point about SEAD, though I think that would be very difficult anyway given that most Ukrainian AD is in the form of MANPADs. For this reason, I was thinking more along the lines of attacking Ukrainian airfields harboring combat planes or repair facilities with stand-off missiles in the opening minutes of the war.

They may well be husbanding their more advanced aircraft in order to address any potential NATO intervention, too.

I'd have to go digging through the toobs, but one of the people I watch semi-regularly from before the war when he was doing his analysis pointed out the fact that the Russian airforce are doing all their sorties at low altitude, indicating that quite a lot of Ukrainian long range and high altitude air defence is still active. They picked off the fixed point radar installations early on, but that's no real achievement, any airforce with superiority in numbers should be able to do that. But Russia look to be absolutely cack at taking out mobile air defence and at taking out airfields.

PS I'm sceptical about the idea that Russia are holding back their more advanced aircraft because, a) they know NATO won't involve themselves directly without nukes falling, and b) they've put in their best units and equipment in every other department (which got absolutely spankered as a result) so why keep their planes back (unless they've nobody to fly them)?

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It's the difference between applying combat power at the point of contact, and applying mobility to decide the point of contact.

The organic logistical resources for a Russian division are paltry enough that without combat, they can expect to move maybe 150 miles off the railhead/jump-off before having to pause or regroup. Without combat. Once they apply their artillery, which is a major part of their ground doctrine, that mileage shrinks.

Here's a detailed look at the issues the RF Army has with organic transport. It's in the context of a Russian invasion of NATO, granted, but it still presents problems in the face of the determined Ukrainian defense we've seen, and bears reading. If you find the time to do so, I'd sure appreciate your ground-pounder's opinion on the points it makes. Its summation:

Good read.  

From a ground pounders perspective, the way that russia has been trying (and apparently failing) to solve those problems is a dream come true.  Even with a halt they seem ineffective, as that convoy sitting on the road made clear for these many weeks.

Say they managed to solve that basic challenge of getting enough trucks (which they appear to be trying to do by seizing vehicles at buy here pay here lots......) - there's still the issue of inexperienced armor crews trying to turn out and run from close infantry ambush as they lead those formations down skinny roads - that ends in tears and broken metal and no supplies delivered.  Of russian infantry being too busy looting commandeered civilian homes to properly support their armor that ends up destroyed or abandoned in a field worth precisely jack shit being towed by fierce ukrainian..checks notes...farm tractors.  Of the complete lack of close air support.....which blows my fucking mind.    

I was completely wrong in my expectations at the outset - but, in fairness, I'd been told a whole bunch of shit about russian equipment and soldiers and tactics that may have been representative of the russian forces sometime in the 90's when it was all put together...but it's clear that -that- russian army can be found nowhere on the battlefield in ukraine.  I could have saved myself trouble typing much of this by saying that from a ground pounders perspective, russian forces..operating the way they have been... are a loot pinata at a murder party.  That shit makes mech infantry rock hard.

John Deere must be absolutely loving it.  As this war has proven, it's not spear beats tank (), but tractor beats tank.