RE: Russia and Ukraine
April 2, 2022 at 10:47 pm
(This post was last modified: April 2, 2022 at 11:28 pm by Anomalocaris.)
(April 2, 2022 at 10:24 pm)Thumpalumpacus Wrote:(April 2, 2022 at 8:03 pm)Anomalocaris Wrote: The western sanction will not end just because Ukrainian war ended. It is clear Putin has already written off removal of the sanctions as an attainable objective.
He also clearly is taking EU’s word that it will reduce reliance on Russian gas by 2/3 this year, and have concluded there is no really long term revenue stream potential from European gas sales anyway. So he can make the most out of the gas that Russian still has to deliver, not by trying to enhance and draw out the remaining revenue stream, but by using it as a lever to squeeze the EU in the short run to maximize acute pain to force short term political concessions out of the most gas dependent EU states at the some expense of the remaining revenue stream.
If one looks at the fates the US allowed to descent on autocrats who succumbed to our bidding, such as Hussein and kaddhafi, there is nothing in it for Putin or Russia to not play the hardest possible ball with the west, particularly the US. At this point, Russia probably feels that given the sanction will not be lifted in the foreseeable future, Russia can get a much better deal from China, particularly if the US and EU continue to play hard ball with China in west pacific. So long as the US play hardball with China, and the EU follows along, Putin has plenty of bargaining power over China.
For one thing, right now Chinese nuclear arsenal is minuscule compare to those of Russia and the US. Regardless of the conventional balance of power over Taiwan, the US could blackmail china out of any thoughts of seizing Taiwan by force by simply implying the US will go nuclear to stop China. China has no counter to this at all, and won’t for at least 5-10 years, because if China retaliates by using nuclear weapons as well, she would be crushed in the resulting exchange. By the end of the period when China could build up a really credible nuclear umbrella of her own, a US led alliance could have made Taiwan impregnable to China. Putin can immeasurably improve China’s bargaining power and strategic position in the next 5-10 years by offering to extend the Russian nuclear umbrella to cover China.
If China proper is secured by the Russian nuclear umbrella, then China can freely respond to any american nuclear escalation over Taiwan by escalating as well and nuking American naval forces and bases in the west pacific, knowing America’s overwhelming strategic nuclear force is nullified because the US would not dare to escalate by nuking targets in China proper.
So Russia is not nearly as much at china’s mercy as the west would like to imagine if the relationship between the west and Russia remains in the currently state. The choice before Russia is not back down totally before the west or be china’s bitch. Rather it is Russia can give China instant nuclear parity with the US, in addition to limitless natural resources. How much will China pay?
None of that means deliberately prolonging Russia's war on Ukraine would be a smart strategy on Putin's part, which is what I was discussing.. Don't think he's not very well aware of the role the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan played in the downfall of the USSR.
Also, China has over 300 nukes, including warheads mounted on ICBMs and SLBMs. They do not need Russia's arsenal nearly so much as Russia needs Chinese money.
I think as a KGB lieutenant colonel who served through the period, as well as head of Russian government for 22 years, Putin likely knows a lot more about the action behind the scene that led to the downfall of the Soviet Union than any historian. The reason why he would consider prolonging the war is that enables Russia to achieve its primary purpose more decisively, as well as enable Russia to also achieve the secondary purpose. If the war is stopped in earnest, as opposed to stopped merely for a tactical ceasefire, Russia at most achieve its primary purpose only partially, and if anything receive a setback on its secondary purpose.
With sanctions essentially in full force and not likely to be slackened if the war is stopped in earnest, Russia now has essentially no incentive to stop the war, especially if the war in Ukraine can be portrayed without too much hyperbole as Russia resisting the persecution of Russia by the US, which was hard to do with the war in Afghanistan.
China’s 300 warheads are mostly tactical. Only maybe 50 are on intercontinental ballistic missile that can reach the US. Their SLBMS are relatively short ranged so they must venture out into open pacific to strike at continental US. Chinese SSBNs have never conducted a open sea deterrence patrol, nor have their SSNs conducted many long endurance missions much beyond the 1st island chain. So Chinese ballistic missile submarines’ ability to penetrate US ASW cordon that would certainly be in place during times of high tension, and reach the petrol area suitable for launching a strike on the US, IS not credible. So that leaves china with a total of maybe 50 nuclear warheads that can strike continental US compared to 1500 US nuclear warhead that can strike China proper form just US land based ICBM force alone. So China has no credible ability to resist threat of US nuclear escalation.
Russia, on the other hand, does. Which is why she can afford to fight this war in Ukraine in the first place. So extending Russia’s nuclear umbrella over China is an seismic game changer for the balance of power in the west pacific. while the Chinese hold a lot of cards, Russia held the ultimate high card in the relationship between the two states. In fact this card is so high it presents risk just by inserting it into the deck. So in normal circumstances it would not even be in play. But circumstances for Russia is not normal, nor its it for China. So that may well be in play.