RE: Russia and Ukraine
March 16, 2023 at 1:39 pm
(This post was last modified: March 16, 2023 at 1:43 pm by Thumpalumpacus.)
(March 16, 2023 at 9:47 am)The Grand Nudger Wrote: To give some perspective to people who aren't junkies - the area being discussed is 3x wider than it is deep (using the coast as our frame of reference) with glocs along the 3x span currently held by ukraine and the terminus (at the x to crimea) @ 300m from uncontested russian borders. A single tank of fuel in any western mbt or ifv can make that run to the coast (and back) multiple times. This was the main limitation in their fall offensive - not russian defense..which was nonexistent even though russia had many more troops stationed along that front than they do along the southern approach. They took everything their fuel lines would easily allow for. Roughly 90 minutes from the word go forward elements in ifvs and armor support in hunter killer formation could be on the coast, behind russian lines, attacking back with enough fuel to disengage and return "home" through the russian blocking elements. The supply lines on the russian end mean that any assault anywhere along that 3x line (however narrow) cuts off everything to the west of where it occurs. The big takeaway here is that ukraine can either mass forces or use a relatively small force to cut a slice. Light pink to the south - crown jewel (from ukraines pov) being mariupol. What would stop them? All the armor at...(checks notes) vuhledar....?
Going beyond just the possibilities, let's imagine a world where russia lost crimea. They don't even want luhansk and donbas. I know that sounds counterintuitive - but, recall, they straight up annexed crimea - but hoped that the recruitment and support of proxy forces in those two regions would be enough to keep ukraine from retaking what they'd stolen. They already operate on a "fuck you" basis with separatists in those two regions, just ask the separatists. The occupation of both began as a diversionary measure in response to a ukranian military column moving south to retake crimea before russia had a chance to reinforce it and it worked, back in 2014. The column split, more than half heading ne, and not a shot was fired.
The military and administrative situation in ukraine has changed, and changed vastly, since then.
The other thing is this: urban battles have a way of sucking in resources, be those resources men, ammo, or food. Because of the ongoing struggle for Bakhmut, I'd be willing to bet a good proportion of Russian logistic ability -- shaky even before it got shredded last year -- is tied up supplying the forces (ISW's estimate today, most of three divisions) assaulting the city. Prigozhin has already been complaining loudly for weeks now about ammo shortages.
Three conclusions, and perhaps others, I'm all ears, could possibly be drawn from that group of facts: 1) the Russians are truly running short on ammo and other supplies; 2) the Russian logistics train is overworked, meaning that they probably want to or already are bringing more transport assets to bear for the fighting units; and 3) that the Russians may (stress may) be pulling troops from the flanks in order to keep up the pressure on the city.
In that context, a Ukrainian drive to the south could (again, stressing could) face: 1) a southern front more weakly manned and more poorly supplied; 2) Russian forces stripped of logistical transport in order to support the eastern battle; and/or 3) Russian forces short of ammo that has been sent to Bakhmut.
If the above speculation -- and that's all it is, speculation -- holds true in one or more of the possibilities, this may be the Ukrainians preparing the conditions for an offensive a la Operation Uranus that the Russians pulled on the Germans at Stalingrad: suck the Russians into Bakhmut, force them to commit reserves into the cauldron, running low on supplies and experiencing transport difficulties, and then hit them on the flanks for envelopment.
Or the Ukrainians could simply, as noted above, hit the coast and from there decide to wheel north to roll up the eastern front, or wheel south and liberate Crimea. That has the advantage of simplicity.
Again, this is all speculation on my part, putting together pieces I've read both in current news and readings of history. But I'd be willing to bet that this has been at the least considered by the Ukrainian general staff, even if they've since decided on different operational plans.
Comments and critique welcome from all.