RE: Russia and Ukraine
August 26, 2023 at 2:46 am
(This post was last modified: August 26, 2023 at 3:09 am by Anomalocaris.)
The fact that amongst Prigozhin’s supporters were senior active Russian military officers, who possibly knew of the upcoming coup and may even have directly or indirectly participated in it, means in the immediate aftermath of the coup Putin could not have been completely certain of his own control over the Russian military, intelligence and internal security. So putin’s first priority must have been to make absolutely sure of the loyalty of key state apparatus and purge all suspected officers and officials. That must take absolute precedence over killing or apprehending Progizhin.
Once Putin and Russian Security services turned their attention to Prigozhin, they must contend with the fact that a man like Prigozhin could never have lived as long as he did without access to extensive, effective and loyal personal security resources. So if Prigozhin wasn’t actually in Russia where he and his security detail could be surrounded and overwhelmed in a coup de main, then it would take time and preparation to locate and isolate Prigozhin, narrowing his options, close off his avenue of escape, and deny him his access to his security and financial resources.
An additional complexity is no doubt the fact that the collapse of the coup found Prigozhin in Balerus. Although Balerus’s dictator Alexander Lukashenko is often portrayed as Putin’s stooge, in reality he is likely a equally cunning and ruthless autocrat in his own right, and quite as capable of playing the hand he is dealt to a nicety as Putin. So knowing prigozhin is a most wanted man in Putinland, Lukashenko no doubt protected prigozhin as long as he believed he could continue to raise the asking price for cutting prigozhin loose. Part of the price he demanded is probably the deployment of Russian nuclear forces to Balerus to,increase his own leverage and bargaining power with respect to Poland and NATO, as well as increase his chances of getting something out of any eventual peace or cease fire in Ukraine.
Once Putin and Russian Security services turned their attention to Prigozhin, they must contend with the fact that a man like Prigozhin could never have lived as long as he did without access to extensive, effective and loyal personal security resources. So if Prigozhin wasn’t actually in Russia where he and his security detail could be surrounded and overwhelmed in a coup de main, then it would take time and preparation to locate and isolate Prigozhin, narrowing his options, close off his avenue of escape, and deny him his access to his security and financial resources.
An additional complexity is no doubt the fact that the collapse of the coup found Prigozhin in Balerus. Although Balerus’s dictator Alexander Lukashenko is often portrayed as Putin’s stooge, in reality he is likely a equally cunning and ruthless autocrat in his own right, and quite as capable of playing the hand he is dealt to a nicety as Putin. So knowing prigozhin is a most wanted man in Putinland, Lukashenko no doubt protected prigozhin as long as he believed he could continue to raise the asking price for cutting prigozhin loose. Part of the price he demanded is probably the deployment of Russian nuclear forces to Balerus to,increase his own leverage and bargaining power with respect to Poland and NATO, as well as increase his chances of getting something out of any eventual peace or cease fire in Ukraine.
