Finally an atheist proper, with views and questions

[Lucian]

Hey Grand Nudger, thanks for the nudge. I don’t see any direct link between atheism and moral error theory, merely that is is a view that is consistent with it and makes a lot of sense to me. I recognise there are a bunch of moral realist positions by atheist - something I have had to constantly point out to my friend.

Not sure of exact questions just yet, just an opening post to see what the deal is here

Sure, atheism is consistent with any metaethical position.  When you say error theory makes sense to you are we talking passive "we could get things wrong" or the more comprehensive abolitionist view that we do get everything wrong?  

If you thought about arson and gift giving is it that you think we may be too hard on arson and too soft on gift giving, or that there's truly nothing indecent about arson or decent about gift giving?

So for me the strong form of error theory is what I currently hold to whereby a) moral talk makes claims about mind-indendent normative properties, b) no such properties exist, therefore c) all moral claims are in error. I don't think that necessitates abolitionism whereby we aim to jettison all moral talk at the minimum, and all moral thinking at the most. I think that moral thinking has been hugely helpful in the development of societies, so would favour a more conservationism approach.. I am currently working through the book "The End of Morality: Taking Moral Abolitionism Seriously". It lays out a number of different views to the "what now" question that are fun to tackle with

Re. your arson and gift giving question. Denying that moral properties as described above exist doesn't mean that I don't have strong views one way or the other. I believe arson isn't morally bad, but that doesn't entail that it means I think it is morally good or acceptable either (not suggesting you were saying that, but felt it needed saying). I have the same emotional reaction to people being injured, or property of people being damaged as the next man, and for me that suffices for me to criticise, prevent, punish etc. It would damage people and society if we let that happen, and I happen to not want such damage to society or people to occur.
Error theory to moral properties is often regarded as similar to atheism towards gods. If I say a) claims about god are claims about mind-independent facts b) gods do not exist, therefore, c) all claims are in error it helps to see the analogy. To say that god loves people is in error is not to say that god does not love people. It is to deny that there is anything to do the loving. Similar, to claim that god is good would be in error, but that is not to say that therefore god is bad. Some great discussion of this in the book "A World Without Values: Essays on John Mackie's Moral Error Theory"

Questions about companions in guilt arguments are intriguing at the moment. I have Terence Cuneo's "Normative Web" lined up to read, and also Cowie and Rowland's "Companions in Guilt: Arguments in Metaethics". Current reading on epistemic error theory isn't a convincing parallel to me, although some do lean into that such as Bart Streumer in his "Unbelievable Errors"