I think I need to be really careful to restrict the scope of my error theory to a tentative hypothesis (pending more conclusive empirical evidence) about what lay folk mean with their moral judgements.
If someone claims to be a non-cognitivist I should not be claiming they are in error about their semantic claims. That would smack of “you really believe in god” which my friend has told me (unsurprisingly).
I also need to be careful not to slip into the tribalism that I engaged with when a Calvinist. That just leads to overreactions and entrenchment.
Relating this back to atheism, I do think the error theory can be useful when applied to Christian claims of “objective morality” regardless of how they define that.
Already useful pondering on here, so thanks for feedback so far
If someone claims to be a non-cognitivist I should not be claiming they are in error about their semantic claims. That would smack of “you really believe in god” which my friend has told me (unsurprisingly).
I also need to be careful not to slip into the tribalism that I engaged with when a Calvinist. That just leads to overreactions and entrenchment.
Relating this back to atheism, I do think the error theory can be useful when applied to Christian claims of “objective morality” regardless of how they define that.
Already useful pondering on here, so thanks for feedback so far
