(June 9, 2024 at 4:54 pm)The Grand Nudger Wrote: I wouldn't get too caught up or concerned in the idea of defending this or that. We're just talking. I was pointing out that abolitionism doesn't really care what kind of statements moral statements are. They could be subjective, relative, objective. They could be true or false in each of those contexts. It may be that there is a metaethically objective reality -and- it's counterproductive to conflict resolution.I tried so hard to not argue for a view myself that I started to argue for the view that I am not arguing for a view. Forums have as yet to come naturally to me.
The abolitionism I am thinking of is an explicit response to the Now What Problem of error theory as I am myopically focussed on that broader theory and wasn’t aware it existed outside that context. Useful to know it is a wider concept though, I will dump that onto my “must expand range of input” pile as well to see it applied outside.
Regarding your wider points about atheism and compatibility with a range of metaethical views, I think I am just about in agreement with. But that said, I still find myself feeling that antirealist ones may be the only that don’t require me to adopt something that entails some metaphysical claims that I still want stronger evidence for (not saying you have to provide it). That scepticism there applies just as well to the theist position that is often a lot less objectivist than claimed as you point out.
I also recognise that my reluctance to accept claims with metaphysical implications that I don’t find strong argumentation for has wider reaching implications even outside normativity…