Atheism and Ethics

[Lucian]

IDK if that's specific to moral objectivity.  The two parties may be subjectivist or relativist and still in conflict, both believing they are right in-fact when neither of them are...or.....they may be realists and they may both have a case.  Hell, we don't even need two parties.  A personal may be in internal conflict between what is true and what is in their best interests, between what is true and what society expects, or between two hard and antithetical truths.  The latter in either case is called an exclusively sub-optimal decision field and represents the majority of our tough calls by any moral metrics.

Amusingly enough, the hypothetical abolitionist in this has made an implicit normative claim.  That a thing is "bad" because it doesn;t help or hinders conflict resolution.  Some abolitionist.

The whole question of how to justify the abolitionist concerns is one that came up in a phd thesis I was listening to the other day. The author argued, rightly I think, that the case isn’t made for it and the proposed benefits are too speculative. 

To be an abolitionist is not to jettison all thoughts of what to do and reasons for why to do it. It is to say that there are no objective moral properties against which such actions can be measured and that we ought to stop talking and thinking like that. 
They might be able to adopt the language of bad and good but gut of all moral connotations and simply have as a locution for something more pragmatic, not too sure on that though. Main thing here is that they are no abolishing acting in ways that have been described with moral terms up to now, nor abolishing reasoning about how they want society to be and how to achieve that.

[Silver]

Regarding the title to this thread, my ethics are not associated with my atheism. Rather, my ethics are quite grounded in sociology.

[The Grand Nudger]

Same. Gods are a null value in moral consideration. It's right there on the tin. Moral consideration, not god consideration.

@Lucian
We could also add that moral abolitionism as described might be a pragmatic way to do things even if there are objective moral truths...and it should not be lost on an observer that the means and aims of abolitionists tend to align with the same content in objectivist metrics. Semantic rather than content difference. Here's where moral objectivism is really insidious. The very minute a person makes a non-novel fact claim - say that there is..objectively...some better™ way to deal with an issue, they've already let the black cat in...it's only a matter of time until it puts it butt-tongue in the cereal bowl.

(underneath it all, btw, I think that most human beings really are motivated towards factual appraisals. Biological intersubjectivity as a product of dinner seeking behaviors. The conflicts tend to arise when the facts as we apprehend them are not the same as the facts as we wish for them to be.)

[Lucian]

Regarding the title to this thread, my ethics are not associated with my atheism. Rather, my ethics are quite grounded in sociology.

Apologies for the confusing title. I definitely wasn’t trying to say that ethics should be grounded in atheism. I am trying to understand ethics having come out of Christianity where I saw it, erroneously or not, as grounded in the will of God. Trying to think through what the options are now that that is no longer the case for me. I could have titled it as “ethics without reference to the god thing” but it seemed less snappy 

@The Grand Nudger I am not trying to defend abolitionism, just felt I should defend the definition of it that I think those who adopt it use.

[Questor]

Many xtians are not able to admit that what they believe could be considered nonsense, at least to those who do not subscribe to the same underlying belief structure. Thus, when told that they are spouting nonsense, cannot rustle up a coherant answer. They will state that you are wrong, or that you are an idiot, or get rather red in the face, and huff and puff.

Caring about the accuracy of a statement, though . . . is that not a moral question?

Much like maaminim, then.

Boru

Not always. There are many believers even amongst the orthodox, however earnest in what they believe, that care little for the accuracy of what they propound. They repeat what they have heard because it appeals to them, or had it pounded into their heads from childhood, and never investigate the source or meaning behind the ideas they now adhere to.

[The Grand Nudger]

I wouldn't get too caught up or concerned in the idea of defending this or that. We're just talking. I was pointing out that abolitionism doesn't really care what kind of statements moral statements are. They could be subjective, relative, objective. They could be true or false in each of those contexts. It may be that there is a metaethically objective reality -and- it's counterproductive to conflict resolution.

In a similar way, atheism is ethics neutral. There is no metaethical position that doesn't fit with atheism..and all of them are at least valid or coherent. Even the "god based" morality you believed in, which you think you cannot believe in now as an atheist, is just moral subjectivism with a god. You could continue to be a moral subjectivist as an atheist. That's a specific error - and you won't have any trouble whatsoever pointing out that it is at least descriptively true. We often make moral pronouncements as though they are facts of a matter when they are..more accurately, facts about ourselves. This moral intransigence is counterproductive to conflict resolution.

[brewer]

[Lucian]

I wouldn't get too caught up or concerned in the idea of defending this or that.  We're just talking.  I was pointing out that abolitionism doesn't really care what kind of statements moral statements are.  They could be subjective, relative, objective.  They could be true or false in each of those contexts.  It may be that there is a metaethically objective reality -and- it's counterproductive to conflict resolution.  

I tried so hard to not argue for a view myself that I started to argue for the view that I am not arguing for a view. Forums have as yet to come naturally to me. 
The abolitionism I am thinking of is an explicit response to the Now What Problem of error theory as I am myopically focussed on that broader theory and wasn’t aware it existed outside that context. Useful to know it is a wider concept though, I will dump that onto my “must expand range of input” pile as well to see it applied outside. 

Regarding your wider points about atheism and compatibility with a range of metaethical views, I think I am just about in agreement with. But that said, I still find myself feeling that antirealist ones may be the only that don’t require me to adopt something that entails some metaphysical claims that I still want stronger evidence for (not saying you have to provide it). That scepticism there applies just as well to the theist position that is often a lot less objectivist than claimed as you point out.


I also recognise that my reluctance to accept claims with metaphysical implications that I don’t find strong argumentation for has wider reaching implications even outside normativity…

[The Grand Nudger]

Yeah, I get that. Sort of like cleaning your place up after you give a bad boyfriend the boot.

[Lucian]

Yeah, I get that.  Sort of like cleaning your place up after you give a bad boyfriend the boot.

Yeah, and brings the risks of overreaction. Best I can hope for at the moment is to at least not be too ignorantly wrong if I do claim things and aware that I am likely wrong nonetheless