The Reasons to Believe in Yahweh

[Angrboda]

Getting back to the OP, the question was not what makes your evidence (*) compelling, but what makes it compelling in a way that the accounts of other gods are not compelling.

Are you suggesting that the prophets are better attested than those in any other religion, as prophets (having miraculous prophecy), or as men? The latter gets you nothing.

Moreover, it seems that you are redefining the grounds for belief to be those specifically suited to Christianity, thereby simply defining Christianity as more believable in a rhetorical slight of hand. If you consider these evidences more compelling than say the stories in the Edda or the Vedas, replete with their own miraculous things, you need to show how this evidence is categorically superior. If it rests on the testimony of the prophets having been shown to be prophetic, that's likely topic for another thread; to summarize though, most who aren't already blinkered into believing them prophetic do not find the accounts of the prophets as credible evidence of miraculous prophecy, at least not without accepting a whole slew of other claims which validate those claims in the bible as genuine. (Seems Min was right, we're getting back to, "Because the bible says so.")

ETA: Oh, and my understanding of the "extraordinary evidence" complaint is that it comes out of statistics, namely the question of setting the boundaries for Type I and Type II errors. Type I errors being mistaking an example of the null hypothesis as a positive result due to chance; Type II is similar, but for negative results. I don't know the specifics of the statistical reasoning, but I've read that "where the hypothesized mechanism is either unknown or implausible" it is acceptable to increase the statistical threshold upwards so that a chance result is not likely to yield a false positive. I think many theist conceptions founder though, long before extraordinary evidence, by ruling out confounding explanations (like, people make shit up, and lying, two things for which we have considerable evidence, and which occur at a much higher rate than miracles; they just assume a priori that these factors do not apply). Victor Stenger points out that different scientific fields may use different bounds for Type I and Type II errors, with a result in medicine often using a rho of 0.05 for example, whereas an experiment in the physical sciences may use a much more stringent bound. The reasoning behind this is not known to me, but likely has to do with the practical uses of the results, and the consequences of getting it wrong (and it being corrected later). If the consequences of getting it wrong are the issue, that would seem to suggest we set the bounds for religious claims very, very high.