(August 27, 2013 at 6:42 pm)discipulus Wrote:(August 27, 2013 at 2:08 pm)Cthulhu Dreaming Wrote: Also - you are correct in that I reversed the meaning of "valid" and "sound" with respect to logical arguments. Mea culpa. That error does not detract from the point of my post that P1 and P2 of the KCA are not known to be true, for the reasons I gave.
With respect to your argument that premises one and two of the KCA are "not known to be true", it will suffice to say that they do not need to be known to be true unless you require that the premises be absolutely certainly known.
If you take this view, then there are at least two conspicuous issues you must deal with:
1. You must admit that not only does the KCA fail to be persuasive, but every other argument that has been formulated or ever will be formulated that does not have premises that are known to be true beyond all doubt i.e. absolutely known. Surely you do not want to go to such epistemically restrictive lengths just to avoid the conclusion of an argument would you?
2. In addition to the above, your objection is based upon a misconstrual of what the requisites or criteria that a premise in an argument must meet. You wrongly reason that in order for a premise to be considered "true" that it must be proven and or known with absolute certainty. This is clearly false.
In a good argument, the argument will have premises that are more plausible than their contradictories or denials .
For an argument to be a good one , it is not required that we have 100% certainty of the truth of the premises. Some of the premises in a good argument may strike us as only slightly more plausible than their denials; other premises may seem to us highly plausible in contrast to their denials. But so long as a statement is more plausible than its contradictory (that is, its negation), then one should believe it rather than its negation, and so it may serve as a premise in a good argument. (Moreland, James Porter; William Lane Craig (2009-11-08). Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (pp. 29-30). Intervarsity Press - A. Kindle Edition.)
First of all, I wouldn't look to douche bags like William Lane Craig for your information. There's a reason people like Craig and Plantinga push such ideas. I suggest that you find out what it is.
If one is arguing that your conclusions are logically necessary, one is invoking the model of a deductive syllogism in which case, yes, your premises have to be known to be true (or stipulated as such) or else your conclusions aren't known to be true. If the plausibility of the premise is unknown, then the plausibility of the conclusion is unknown. You don't get something for nothing by higgledy-piggledly mixing Toulminesque epistemological models with classical logic. All you end up with is a mess.
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