Monist vs. Dualist Experiment?

[bennyboy]

Because I don't know for sure that function is the only determinant of actual qualia.

The only reason you are not sure is because you start with the assumption that there is something else involved in determining qualia, i.e. you start by assuming dualism.

The reason I'm not sure is that there are multiple possibilities , and I do not know which one represents truth. I'm agnostic.

Now, clearly brain function and brain structure are related to the existence and nature of qualia. However, whether it is a property of an organic brain, or of a certain kind of data processing, or something else entirely, is not known to me, and I suspect may not be knowable.

The only way brain function could be exactly replicated is by making an actual brain. But then you'd have a brain, not a robot.

Not necessarily - function doesn't depend on the material constituents.

It depends what you mean by brain function. I refer to the total mechanism of the brain: the release and absorption of neurotransmitters in large numbers, the way in which neurons branch out to form networks of communication, the interaction between chemical properties and the flow of electricity, etc.

Since I don't know which of these mechanisms are required for qualia, then it's not safe just to say that "the machine saw a red traffic light and stopped. Therefore it is experiencing qualia." Maybe it is, and maybe it isn't.

So you're talking about function of a certain NATURE-- self-reference, etc. but not of an identical mechanism. Just because we think certain kinds of data processing are involved in qualia doesn't mean wherever that kind of processing occurs there IS qualia. That pretty much defines a false syllogism.

Actually, I am talking about an identical mechanism. I'm not saying that a specific form of data-processing is involved with qualia - I'm saying that a specific form of data-processing IS qualia. Or qualia IS a specific form of data-processing. Which means, replicating that particular function would result in existence of qualia in machines.

You can define things however you want. But the real question is this-- can you demonstrate that your idea represents reality? You are throwing around a lot of "IS" statements, as though your ideas are foregone conclusions. That is, quite simply, not the case.

What does "understand" mean? If you mean, process input and give a consistent output, fine. Otherwise, understanding implies qualia. But how are you to know which kind of understanding the robot exhibits? By asking it if it's "really feeling?"

I made it quite clear in the preceding sentence what I mean by "understand". If it can communicate intelligibly about the qualitative nature of the inputs it receives and processing of those inputs then it is displaying a kind of "understanding" that implies qualia.

I think we're back to our stand off, here. I do not accept your definition of qualia, as that word is quite specifically reserved to talk about the subjective experience of an entity, rather than its behaviors. It doesn't matter what a machine says or does, what matters is whether it experiences as I do.