Monist vs. Dualist Experiment?

[bennyboy]

Have I made this claim? I don't think I've ever made a positive assertion about the nature of things.

As for AI-- genkaus and I have had several long discussions about this. How would you distinguish between an AI system that seems to experience (based on its behavior, for example), or actually experiences?

The same way you distinguish it in a biological system.... I guess.

The way I distinguish qualia in a biological system is by starting with my own qualia. Then I look in the mirror and see a human body. Then I see other human bodies walking around and talking with each other, and it seems super likely that they experience qualia, too.

I can't use that process of like association with something which is so unlike me as a computer.

[pocaracas]

The same way you distinguish it in a biological system.... I guess.

The way I distinguish qualia in a biological system is by starting with my own qualia. Then I look in the mirror and see a human body. Then I see other human bodies walking around and talking with each other, and it seems super likely that they experience qualia, too.

I can't use that process of like association with something which is so unlike me as a computer.

Errrr.... so you base it on the fact that you are addressing another human being?.... what was that about zombies a few days ago?

I'm back at defining qualia as something purposefully unreachable, and as a consequence nothing more than mental masturbation...

[genkaus]

This is indeed a brute fact.

I accept this, but only in the context of the assumption that there is in fact a physical world (i.e. we're not in the Matrix or the Mind of God). This leaves us with either physical monism or substance dualism, but excludes idealism (which I also accept as possible). I think for the purposes of this thread, I'm okay doing that.

Yes. It's hard to argue that mind is unique from the brain when you can poke a brain and smell smoke, or take drugs and have your whole perceptual experience completely collapse. It would be disengenous not at least to agree that much or all of the content of mind and experience seem to be of and by the brain.

Right. It would be like showing "Casablanca" but with no screen to catch the light.

I agree. I think the intuitive response that people show in their interactions with their environment is that there's a mental "I" interacting with physical objects, and that when people communicate, two mental "I" entities must interface through their body-objects.

I can't speak for all humanity, but I think whatever people SAY about "I," they generally act as though they think "I" is distinct from the rest of the universe in some way.

That doesn't mean that view is correct, though.

That's the problem I have with duality. It seems to me either a monism or a ternary system would work better.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but all I'm seeing is agreement here. Given that, do you agree that the philosophical zombie is likely to be a nonsensical concept?

But this is not how we arrive at knowledge of the existence of mind. No machine came along and inferred qualia from either brain function or the mechanics of the body (like frowning and smiling). It is because we are already familiar with qualia that we make assumptions by like association: when I smile, people ask what I'm feeling happy about. They seem to recognize my qualia based on my behavior. So when other people smile, I extend that recognition back to them, and believe that they are feeling happy and therefore experience qualia.

I don't think that is a scientific process. It's a mediation between social instincts and philosophical pragmatism. Basically, we accept the consciousness of others because it feels right, and because it's the way things need to be for most of our instinctive behaviors to make any sense at all. And we want them to make sense.

The only problem here is that the process of gaining knowledge doesn't have to be strictly scientific. We make knowledgeable inferences in our daily lives by association everyday.

Is it necessary to infer qualia to explain the behavior? I don't think so, since muscular activity traces back through neural activity, not through qualia. Maybe qualia ARE just the experience of certain kinds of neural activity, but if they are not more than that, then referencing them, rather than just the brain function itself, seems redundant at best. What does it really add to an explanation worded purely in the function of neural systems? I think the answer is this: because we already know about qualia, and the subjective experience of a person matters more to us than the biological systems which arrive at a behavior.

I don't think it is redundant at all. The kind of explanation required depends upon the level at which you are examining the process. For example, I can give you details about how the hardware works and what signals it sends and it won't help you understand what functions does the software perform.

[bennyboy]

Correct me if I'm wrong, but all I'm seeing is agreement here. Given that, do you agree that the philosophical zombie is likely to be a nonsensical concept?

I can't assign likelihood to that thesis. You already know, though, that given a robot which behaves identically to a human, I'd be suspicious of whether it was really experiencing qualia or seeming to.

As for my skepticism of dualism, there are quite a lot of tries I accept as valid:
-mind is intrinsic to matter, rather than an emergent property of it. i.e., physical monism is true, because physical reality isn't what I think it is
-idealism is true, and all "physical" things (including QM particles) are part of some great mind
-plurality is true, but not duality (i.e. you'd need a soul to reconcile the brain and mind)
-duality is true, because the apparently completely different substances, while unique, are reconciled by a framework (i.e. the universe)
-ambiguism is true: mind is BOTH viewable as totally physical and non-physical, depending not on its own reality, but on the way it's being examined.

I'm skeptical of all these, not only of physical monism. However, the idea that mind is an emergent property of non-mental matter doesn't work for me, because mind doesn't just seem to be a property-- it's also a new framework, in which ideas may exist and interact. And to me, that feels like something "extra" is being created out of nothing-- much like God creating the universe. And that idea doesn't ring true for me.

The only problem here is that the process of gaining knowledge doesn't have to be strictly scientific. We make knowledgeable inferences in our daily lives by association everyday.

Gaining knowledge doesn't have to be scientific. But what about proving the validity of the knowledge you've aquired? I know, for example, that I experience qualia. How could I prove that to others, if they weren't willing on principle to take it as given?

What, for example, if I was a robot, and I woke up on the assembly line knowing the wonders of qualia? How could I convince that bennyboy guy I wasn't just blindly acting on my Windows 2043 programming?

I don't think it is redundant at all. The kind of explanation required depends upon the level at which you are examining the process. For example, I can give you details about how the hardware works and what signals it sends and it won't help you understand what functions does the software perform.

What is software but ideas imbued into a physical mechanism? It is exactly BECAUSE the people who make Windows are already sentient, and already experience qualia, that they can formulate such a thing and imprint it onto the mechanism of a computer, which could normally not do anything. Basically, it's the story of Genesis, with the human mind as God.

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Errrr.... so you base it on the fact that you are addressing another human being?.... what was that about zombies a few days ago?

I'm back at defining qualia as something purposefully unreachable, and as a consequence nothing more than mental masturbation...

Right. My acceptance of the qualia of others is a philosophical assumption, based on my social instinct and philosophical pragmatism. It's not something I was able to infer by objective means.

As for qualia being "purposely unreachable," I didn't make the universe, or the human mind. I didn't decide that my qualia would be unreachable by others-- I have just noticed that it is the case.

[pocaracas]

What is software but ideas imbued into a physical mechanism? It is exactly BECAUSE the people who make Windows are already sentient, and already experience qualia, that they can formulate such a thing and imprint it onto the mechanism of a computer, which could normally not do anything.

hmmmm, it seems computers are able to learn... software can evolve beyond it's original programming...
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Machine_learning

Maybe the current technology is still lacking somewhat, but it seems clear that someday... someday, we'll have our skynet.

---

Errrr.... so you base it on the fact that you are addressing another human being?.... what was that about zombies a few days ago?

I'm back at defining qualia as something purposefully unreachable, and as a consequence nothing more than mental masturbation...

Right. My acceptance of the qualia of others is a philosophical assumption, based on my social instinct and philosophical pragmatism. It's not something I was able to infer by objective means.

As for qualia being "purposely unreachable," I didn't make the universe, or the human mind. I didn't decide that my qualia would be unreachable by others-- I have just noticed that it is the case.
[/quote]
Well, my position is based on the fact that nothing like such qualia can be found... as you say, it cannot be measured on others, it's just your own.... it is never found out of a brain... hence it must be a result of that brain's functioning.
How so? I can't tell.
Like I said long ago, the brain is way too complex for us to measure it accurately.
Even if we would measure it, it would take quite a feat of reverse engineering to make sense of the humongous amount of information that would come from that.
It would then be possible to distinguish low lever tasks, from higher level ones, discern all the ways that those tasks or processes intermingle to produce sensations, memories, recalls, reasoning, instinct, reflex, awareness, etc...

Until such technology is available, this is an open question. My intuition points to monism, yours to dualism.
Perhaps we'll be fortunate to live long enough to see which one of us has the right intuition.
Most likely, it will come in the form of a realistic android, at least a realistically thinking one.

[genkaus]

I can't assign likelihood to that thesis. You already know, though, that given a robot which behaves identically to a human, I'd be suspicious of whether it was really experiencing qualia or seeming to.

Assuming that you happen to know that all the brain functions of humans have been replicated in the robot - why would you be suspicious?

Gaining knowledge doesn't have to be scientific. But what about proving the validity of the knowledge you've aquired? I know, for example, that I experience qualia. How could I prove that to others, if they weren't willing on principle to take it as given?

What, for example, if I was a robot, and I woke up on the assembly line knowing the wonders of qualia? How could I convince that bennyboy guy I wasn't just blindly acting on my Windows 2043 programming?

Compare a blind man trying to relay visual information or a deaf man trying to relay auditory information. Without direct experience of the subject, talking intelligibly about it's qualitative experience is not possible. If the entity can understand what you mean when you say things like "I feel" and reply in similar terms, that is a good reason to assume its capacity for subjective experience.

What is software but ideas imbued into a physical mechanism? It is exactly BECAUSE the people who make Windows are already sentient, and already experience qualia, that they can formulate such a thing and imprint it onto the mechanism of a computer, which could normally not do anything. Basically, it's the story of Genesis, with the human mind as God.

And how is that relevant to the analogy?

[bennyboy]

Assuming that you happen to know that all the brain functions of humans have been replicated in the robot - why would you be suspicious?

Because I don't know for sure that function is the only determinant of actual qualia. The only way brain function could be exactly replicated is by making an actual brain. But then you'd have a brain, not a robot.

So you're talking about function of a certain NATURE-- self-reference, etc. but not of an identical mechanism. Just because we think certain kinds of data processing are involved in qualia doesn't mean wherever that kind of processing occurs there IS qualia. That pretty much defines a false syllogism.

Compare a blind man trying to relay visual information or a deaf man trying to relay auditory information. Without direct experience of the subject, talking intelligibly about it's qualitative experience is not possible. If the entity can understand what you mean when you say things like "I feel" and reply in similar terms, that is a good reason to assume its capacity for subjective experience.

What does "understand" mean? If you mean, process input and give a consistent output, fine. Otherwise, understanding implies qualia. But how are you to know which kind of understanding the robot exhibits? By asking it if it's "really feeling?"

[genkaus]

Because I don't know for sure that function is the only determinant of actual qualia.

The only reason you are not sure is because you start with the assumption that there is something else involved in determining qualia, i.e. you start by assuming dualism.

The only way brain function could be exactly replicated is by making an actual brain. But then you'd have a brain, not a robot.

Not necessarily - function doesn't depend on the material constituents.

So you're talking about function of a certain NATURE-- self-reference, etc. but not of an identical mechanism. Just because we think certain kinds of data processing are involved in qualia doesn't mean wherever that kind of processing occurs there IS qualia. That pretty much defines a false syllogism.

Actually, I am talking about an identical mechanism. I'm not saying that a specific form of data-processing is involved with qualia - I'm saying that a specific form of data-processing IS qualia. Or qualia IS a specific form of data-processing. Which means, replicating that particular function would result in existence of qualia in machines.

What does "understand" mean? If you mean, process input and give a consistent output, fine. Otherwise, understanding implies qualia. But how are you to know which kind of understanding the robot exhibits? By asking it if it's "really feeling?"

I made it quite clear in the preceding sentence what I mean by "understand". If it can communicate intelligibly about the qualitative nature of the inputs it receives and processing of those inputs then it is displaying a kind of "understanding" that implies qualia.

[bennyboy]

Because I don't know for sure that function is the only determinant of actual qualia.

The only reason you are not sure is because you start with the assumption that there is something else involved in determining qualia, i.e. you start by assuming dualism.

The reason I'm not sure is that there are multiple possibilities , and I do not know which one represents truth. I'm agnostic.

Now, clearly brain function and brain structure are related to the existence and nature of qualia. However, whether it is a property of an organic brain, or of a certain kind of data processing, or something else entirely, is not known to me, and I suspect may not be knowable.

The only way brain function could be exactly replicated is by making an actual brain. But then you'd have a brain, not a robot.

Not necessarily - function doesn't depend on the material constituents.

It depends what you mean by brain function. I refer to the total mechanism of the brain: the release and absorption of neurotransmitters in large numbers, the way in which neurons branch out to form networks of communication, the interaction between chemical properties and the flow of electricity, etc.

Since I don't know which of these mechanisms are required for qualia, then it's not safe just to say that "the machine saw a red traffic light and stopped. Therefore it is experiencing qualia." Maybe it is, and maybe it isn't.

So you're talking about function of a certain NATURE-- self-reference, etc. but not of an identical mechanism. Just because we think certain kinds of data processing are involved in qualia doesn't mean wherever that kind of processing occurs there IS qualia. That pretty much defines a false syllogism.

Actually, I am talking about an identical mechanism. I'm not saying that a specific form of data-processing is involved with qualia - I'm saying that a specific form of data-processing IS qualia. Or qualia IS a specific form of data-processing. Which means, replicating that particular function would result in existence of qualia in machines.

You can define things however you want. But the real question is this-- can you demonstrate that your idea represents reality? You are throwing around a lot of "IS" statements, as though your ideas are foregone conclusions. That is, quite simply, not the case.

What does "understand" mean? If you mean, process input and give a consistent output, fine. Otherwise, understanding implies qualia. But how are you to know which kind of understanding the robot exhibits? By asking it if it's "really feeling?"

I made it quite clear in the preceding sentence what I mean by "understand". If it can communicate intelligibly about the qualitative nature of the inputs it receives and processing of those inputs then it is displaying a kind of "understanding" that implies qualia.

I think we're back to our stand off, here. I do not accept your definition of qualia, as that word is quite specifically reserved to talk about the subjective experience of an entity, rather than its behaviors. It doesn't matter what a machine says or does, what matters is whether it experiences as I do.

[Angrboda]

The only reason you are not sure is because you start with the assumption that there is something else involved in determining qualia, i.e. you start by assuming dualism.

The reason I'm not sure is that there are multiple possibilities , and I do not know which one represents truth. I'm agnostic.

Now, clearly brain function and brain structure are related to the existence and nature of qualia. However, whether it is a property of an organic brain, or of a certain kind of data processing, or something else entirely, is not known to me, and I suspect may not be knowable.

I can appreciate your position of agnosticism, given current development in the cognitive sciences, but on what basis do you "suspect" that it may not be knowable at all? That seems a somewhat intellectually dishonest agnosticism if you're willing to kibitz on the matter that you say you intend to keep at arm's length.