Terrible Atheist Argument #1

[Vincenzo Vinny G.]

Those are the objections that came to my mind when making that argument, hence why I prefer the one that does not go the Plantinga route, because it does not have to be true in all possible worlds.

However, I earlier mentioned (a few pages back) one possible reason why even that reformulated argument might work (though I don't prefer it), namely that metaphysical truths would seem to necessarily be trans-possible world true. What sense would it make to say that mathematical Platonism is not true in all possible worlds, for example? Given the transcendent nature, it would seem their truth in any state of affairs necessarily entails.

But, I guess an on-the-spot supporting argument could be:

P1) If a possibly necessary truth is metaphysical in scope, then it is necessarily true (i.e true in all possible worlds).

P2) Naturalism is a possibly necessary truth which is metaphysical in scope.

C) Therefore, if naturalism is possibly necessarily true, then it is actually true.

Of course, I could just misunderstand metaphysics, which would put me in great company with like everyone ever. :p

Do you mean to say metaphysical truths are necessary in all possible worlds? I can understand why mathematical Platonism might seem like a good candidate for your claim, because the consistency of mathematics across all possible worlds seems intuitively true. But what if we used a simpler, less obvious example: Say, solipsism. Isn't that possible in some worlds but not others? Or is that not a metaphysical claim?