Self-evident truth is a thing

[Angrboda]

This is from a previous incarnation of the argument. I'm repeating it because I think it is relevant to a question about affirming the consequent which Cato asked me earlier.

The universe began to exist.
Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
Therefore the universe had a cause.

I've done my research on this, and as far as I can tell, it's a true argument.
Yes, people have tried to refute it a thousand times, but none of these attempts, as far as I have seen, have been successful. So anyone who thinks this argument is false, please tell me why.
Avodaiah

Then you haven't done enough research.

The argument contains at least 3 fallacies.

1. The fallacy of equivocation.

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The argument equivocates on the meaning of 'begins to exist'.

In the first premise, 'begins to exist' is being used to mean, existence out of nothing.

This is existence ex nihilo'.

In the second premise, 'begins to exist' is being used to mean that things we observe in the universe that begin to exist are a rearrangement of existing matter and energy. Trees, tables, animals, iPhones begin to exist by rearranging existing matter and energy.

In other words, existence 'ex materia'.

The argument is using 2 different meanings for the same term.

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2. Fallacy of composition.

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Just because something is true of part of a system or part of a whole, does not mean it is true for the entire system.

The argument claims that, because cause and effect are true for all the things we observe withing the universe, they also must be true for the entire universe. This is false.

Example: Because large objects are made of atoms, large objects have the properties of atoms.

I'm sure you can see why the previous example is flawed, for the same reason the Cosmological argument is flawed.

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3. Circularity.

(This failure could also be considered, 'affirming the consequent', because it smuggles the conclusion into the premises.)

Dan Barker states it well,

"The curious clause “everything that begins to exist” implies that reality can be divided into two sets: items that begin to exist (BE), and those that do not (NBE). In order for this cosmological argument to work, NBE (if such a set is meaningful) cannot be empty, but more important, it must accommodate more than one item to avoid being simply a synonym for God. If God is the only object allowed in NBE, then BE is merely a mask for the Creator, and the premise “everything that begins to exist has a cause” is equivalent to “everything except God has a cause.”

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It also contains the fallacy of special pleading. But that one is too obvious to mention.


So, no, the argument is logically invalid. The modus ponens of your argument fails on multiple levels.

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(emphasis added, in purple)

I think Simon may be mistaken about the affirming the consequent charge, but maybe I'm just misunderstanding.

Let me redraw the original argument in more formal terms:

The universe began to exist.
Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
Therefore the universe had a cause.

If we restate this formally, we have:

A1. The set of all things has property BE {began to exist...}
A2. For all y, if y has property BE, then y also has property HC {has cause...}
A3-Conclusion. The set of all things has property HC

Additionally, though not stated, I think the following may be being implied:

B1. God does not have property BE
B2-Conclusion. For y=God, y does not have property BE, therefore y=God does not have property HC {by A2}

The form here, if true, is similar to affirming the consequent, but crucially different. Affirming the consequent says, given, "If P, then Q", Q, therefore P. However if one is deriving B2 from A2, for B2 to follow from A2, given "If P, then Q", then "not-P, therefore not-Q" would have to follow. However, "not P, therefore not Q" doesn't follow from "If P, then Q". I don't know if there's a specific name for this fallacy, but if this is what Simon Moon was drawing attention to with his remark about affirming the consequent, the error is structurally similar but not an example of affirming the consequent (AFAIK).

Additionally, there are multiple flaws with the premises as cast in my terms, but I'll leave that to another post. I'll simply point out that defining God as not beginning to exist does not, in itself, guarantee that God himself is not caused. {This is where the stronger versions of the PSR, assumed at the beginning of Kalam, become problematic. If the PSR is restated as "everything that exists requires an explanation for its existence" then God himself gets caught in Kalam's snare.}