Does it make sense to speak of "Universal Consciousness" or "Universal Intelligence"?

[Chas]

Non sequitur, equivocation.
To equate the local complexity of a brain with the complexity of all brains is truly fallacious.

Latin debatey words aren't a good substitution for either ideas or evidence. It has been said that mind is supervenient on complexity. I've pointed out that the universe is more complex than a brain. However, this idea has been met with what appears to be special pleading: "No no no. Only the LOCAL complexity of the brain spawns qualia." Therefore, the assumption that mind supervenes on complexity must have been either incorrect or incomplete.

Not special pleading. The evidence supports minds existing in brains, and one mind to one brain. That is why your comparison fails.

I think what you meant to say is that the mind supervenes on a very special kind of complexity. But what, pray tell, might be the exact nature of complexity required? Given that the brain is the ONLY entity known to have qualia,

I think it more correct to say the mind has qualia, not the brain. Brains are the only things know to be complex enough for mind, but there is no good reason to believe that different hardware can do the same job.

how are we to determine what exact properties of the brain are responsible, and which are incidental?

With science - the only known way to get knowledge.

Does qualia require:
-exactly and only the brain, including all its organic structures, the exact same neurotransmitters, etc?

Not known - no reason to believe it is.

-only a special relationship of information about the universe-- specifically, encoded past states of the environment being compared with present states?

No reason to suppose that.

-only the ability to receive information from the "outside" universe?

There is no reason to believe that is even possible, or that there is an "outside".

The first of these is specific to the brain, the second is specific to any complex processing of data which is self-referential over time, and the last is intrinsic to all matter.

You have yet to support that, let alone demonstrate it.

If the first is true, qualia cannot generalize to non-brains no matter how complex-- for example very complex computer systems. If the second is true, qualia generalizes to all structures which interact with the universe in a particular way.

Maybe - but there is no reason to accept either premise.

In the third, qualia generalizes to all matter.

No. Until you can demonstrate consciousness in 'all matter', you can't ascribe qualia to it.

So tell me-- in what way has any scientist established control over these variables to such a degree that you are confident that system X may be said to experience qualia, and system Y not so? You make a positive assertion about the nature of mind-- where's YOUR evidence?

I haven't made that assertion.