Does it make sense to speak of "Universal Consciousness" or "Universal Intelligence"?

[bennyboy]

Believe you? I don't even understand what you are asking.

We are in a thread about mind, and you've stated many times that the evidence favors a particular view of mind. I've stated many time that since the mind of others cannot be directly observed, evidence about it is rooted in one or more philosophical assumptions for which there cannot be meaningful evidence.

I want you to specify what evidence you actually have, and in what way you are confident that it supports your positions, rather than simply repeatedly saying you have evidence. You say there is neurological evidence that supports monism. Please provide it.

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I don't think I ever said I'm a dualist.

Sorry, I must have confused a comment by ChadWooters with yourself. YOU said you're an agnostic idealist, yes? Just out of curiosity, why idealism rather than realism, in your view?

Realism means a lot of things, so you'll have to specify what it means in the context of this question.

I can summarize my position, though: maybe the answer to your question will be in there somewhere.

First, about dualism. I think a philosophical substance dualism is impossible. If you have mind and brain, and they are interacting, then there is a serious problem explaining how they interact. What's the bridge? I contend that it would necessarily be at least a third susbstance. But this third substance would have to have "roots" in both mind and the physical universe. Other than a mystical soul, don't have any good ideas about what this third substance could be.

So let's say for now that a physical monism and an idealistic monism are our two main contenders. Which is better?

To me, the problem of mind is the thorn in physical monism's paw. There is no good physical theory of mind, and mind is not normally considered a physical property (except by monists who want to support their monism). You can't see the minds of others, measure it, or in any capacity interact with it. You're required simply to believe that it exists, and to believe that it is "somewhere in the brain," which completely ignores the important philosophical question of why mind exists, rather than not existing. At best, the physical monist position requires redefining what it means for something to be physical, to the point that the physical/mental semantic distinction is meaningless. But I do have qualia, and that means something to me, and collapsing qualia down to brain function is an avoidance of real inquiry, not a method of inquiry.

There's no such problem in an idealism. Physical properties like color and form are perfectly-well represented as ideas. Gravity, microscopes, scientific methodolgy, talking to professors etc. are all NECESSARILY experienced as ideas by us, and the source of those experiences is not ultimately knowable. They could come from a BIJ, the Matrix, the Mind of God, etc.-- or a physical universe. But even if there is an objective physical reality, we do not experience it-- we experience ideas about it.