Does it make sense to speak of "Universal Consciousness" or "Universal Intelligence"?

[Cato]

I see.

You are quoting something from an earlier context. The past couple pages, I've been operating with it given that brains make minds, i.e. I'm looking at the OP through the perspective of physical monism. Here's a summary of the progression:

1) (original) It is not knowable whether any physical system, including other people, has qualia, because the qualia aren't accessible, and because brain function (with or without actual experience of qualia) is sufficient to explain behaviors. Therefore, the science of mind is rooted in a philsophical assumption, not an observable reality.
2) (later) GIVEN THAT a person with a brain who seems to experience qualia really does (and doesn't just seem to), it is still not knowable whether the existence of some form of mind is local only to complex brain structure and function, or is generalizable to simpler physical exchanges of information (like a single photon from a distant star being absorbed by an atom, for example).
3) In discussion of brain parts, I'm trying to define how precisely we can narrow down the relationship of "the brain" (really a name for a lot of separate parts with different effects on experience) to the existence (not the content) of qualia. What minimal neural system would be sufficient for the existence of the most simple "mind" or experience?

1. Solipsism
2. Definitional problem (more below)
3. Work in progress

If you want me to present a single thesis, I'll take my stand on this question, which seems to be unanswerable:

-How, non-arbitrarily, can we determine that a physical system has qualia?

Nobody has yet given even a plausible answer to this question. And until we answer it, there's really no good answer to the OP.

This and number 2 above are similar. What I think is happening is that the idea and definition of consciousness is being expanded to include every conceivable physical process. If the definition of consciousness includes everything, so to speak, then it can mean nothing.

To be given serious consideration and to make a reasonable attempt at discovery and explanation, the 'other minds' problem must be given some boundary. Invoking the photoelectric effect in order to surmise that metallic atoms experience qualia is a bit premature given that we are still struggling with #3 above. With no independent means of verification we are already making assumptions regarding other humans; a reasonable assumption in my opinion based on observed behavior and the predictive power that comes with assuming other minds in humans.

Let the particle physicists work the problem from the bottom up and the neuroscientists work from the top down. Philosophers should do their part by attempting to make sense of it all and even provide some guidance to future inquiry; however, what-ifs run amok only frustrate the endeavor.

Don't get me wrong, I love imagination and speculative thinking; however, I disdain when too much merit is given to flights of fancy that attempt to go straight to the core without a means to get there rather than understanding and working within our capabilities to peal back the layers. Keep the speculations at arms length, they might very well be needed as we learn more.