Proving the Bible is false in few words.

[Caecilian]

3. Yeah, you've made this point a number of times. Why is uncertainty so important?

Because without it we have no option of believing : God wouldn't be giving us a choice.

So why is that so important? We don't have a choice about believing in other things, notably the existence of the material world. So why it is so important for us to choose to believe in god (or not, as in my case).

Caecilian Wrote:
Sorry about the philosbabble. I find it alarmingly easy to slip into it.

No problem, sorry for my ignorance

You know more about philosophy than I do about theology.

Which leads me to another question. In one of your previous posts you describe god as a 'positive entity'. In the same post you say that 'God is goodness', which makes god sound like a concept, i.e. not an entity at all. This has me genuinely puzzled. Please explain.

Caecilian Wrote:
Microphysical facts are the facts re. very low-level physical states- think of quantum mechanics and you'll be close enough. P is the complete set of microphysical facts that describes the universe in terms of low-level physics. Obviously, it isn't (and will never be) a practical proposition to actually know P, but we're talking metaphysics here, so practicalities aren't an issue (one reason why I'm not so keen on metaphysics).

Phenomenal facts are the facts re. higher-level phenomena such as objects, stars and also conscious states, social institutions etc. Q is the complete set of phenomenal facts that describe the universe on higher levels of analysis. It explicitly includes facts about phenomena that aren't normally thought of as physical - i.e. mental and social phenomena.

Materialist monism says that P necessarily entails Q. In other words, given P there is no other way that Q could be.

Sound good to you?

Metaphysics entails musings of the human mind. So human musings are merely that?

You're stretching beyond knowable boundaries, even using the word 'fact' in there. What is logically suggested is unknown, so what is extraneous to that is even more so.

So if that's the case, I disagree.

Yeah, your comments pretty much sum up everything thats wrong with metaphysics. Not my favourite branch of philosophy- its just way too speculative for my liking.

Still, I tend to assume materialist monism, not because theres any compelling case for it, but because I find it much more plausible than the alternatives.

Having said that, I think that theres a real problem for your position if materialist monism isn't true. I'll try not to lapse too far into philosobabble:

Lets call the set of divine facts about the universe G. If god exists, then presumably G would be known by god and only by god. Now the above formulation of materialist monism doesn't rule out the existence of god or of G- it simply says that G can't make any difference to Q, the set of phenomenal facts. But what if this is wrong?

Lets consider:

(Entailment statement) P + G -> Q (Q is jointly entailed by P and G)

Now in materialist monism, G is effectively empty, at least as far as Q is concerned. So if G changes ( represented by G*, a new state of G), and P remains the same, then Q remains the same:

P + G = P + G* in terms of the entailment to Q.
So:
P + G -> Q
and
P + G* -> Q

But if materialism monism is false, then G* could lead to a different Q (represented by Q*). So:

P + G -> Q
P + G* -> Q*

Which would open the door to empirical evidence for G, and G having explanatory value. Both of which you clearly want to avoid.