On naturalism and consciousness

[Angrboda]

Your theory of meaning doesn't only have to account for how matter is not inherently about things,

That would be trying to prove a negative. How can I show you that no matter how you arrange atoms, you won't ever form my belief that "these nachos are tasty"?

That's your problem for taking on the claim that matter can never have intentionality. It's not my fault you've chosen to make extraordinary claims.

it must also explain how thought is inherently about things.

Well, like I stated, I thought it was quite intuitive. I mean, "thoughts" are just that: a metaphysical relation between the 'soul' and some aspect of the universe. If they're not that, then I don't know how we as conscious beings would go about business seeing as this is our *only* way of acting upon this universe.

(emphasis added)

Then you simply don't know. You don't know how matter does it, and that the soul "just does" is a lousy argument. You're simply at an impasse.

Until you can do that, you're left with the rather unsatisfying "it just is." If that's all the explanation you have, then I'd suggest that all you've done is push the question one step back. Like dualists who assert that souls "just do" have free will, what you've done is little more than beg the question. You've given a respectable sheen to your argument from ignorance; you've distracted your interlocutor from the fact that you lack as much in the theory of meaning department as she does.

If we have shown that consciousness from matter "just isn't", then what's left on the table?

And we're back to arguments from ignorance. You haven't shown this. That you personally don't know how matter can solve the problem gets you nothing.

I'll defer on laying out my theory of meaning just yet, other than to say that I think meaning is a property of systems, not isolated parts. So "qū xiàn" isn't inherently about curved objects, its meaning is a consequence of it being embedded in a system; the word itself has no meaning apart from the system. In short, nothing is "inherently" meaningful or inherently "about" something else. That's an illusion.

Like I said, I think language is a different topic altogether.

I was talking about both. And I think it's the same problem in both. If you can't show with rational argument how a thought is "inherently about" something else, you're simply at an impasse. You don't know how souls do it, and you don't know how matter does it. Maybe it's because your "intuition" about intentionality is simply wrong.

Basically, you have a theory of meaning. You need to demonstrate that your theory about thoughts having inherent intentionality is correct before you go banging on your neighbor's theory. You haven't done this. You've just assumed it. That's pretty much begging the question. I think talking about the language question makes sense because it's a smaller version of the same problem, without all the distraction of folk psychological theories about "consciousness."