RE: Are Theists Illogical for Believing in God?
June 6, 2010 at 5:03 pm
(This post was last modified: June 6, 2010 at 5:07 pm by Purple Rabbit.)
@Caecillian
I think it is fair to say that Leibniz's contention was that our world is the best of all possible worlds. He inferred this from two traditional god attributes (all-knowingness and omnibenevolence) which renders the argument unfalsifiable for humans. But he thus logicallly ensured that our world must be the best of all possible worlds. In fact his argument boils down to the conclusion that another version of our world, for instance a version without kid cancer, would necessarily harbour an evil greater than kid cancer.It is therefore unclear to me how you suddenly can claim to bypass this and state that another possible world must be better.
When you restrict your argument to nomologically possible worlds you place additional conditions on the set of all logically possible worlds. For instance, correspondence rules between the different possible worlds are needed in a nomological set, because that's how they are defined. This means that measurability must be garanteed of aspects of all possible worlds. But that is not something we can arrange from our point of view in this universe. We have no access (yet) to other universes.
Are you still following? It means that:
1) the set of nomologically possible worlds is a subset of all logically possible worlds
2) we cannot construct any set of nomologically possible worlds that contains more than only our present universe
3) you cannot arrive at the conclusion that there is another nomologically possible world that is better than ours
Oh, and forget the usual frodonian drool, it's not worthy of your attention ;-)
I think it is fair to say that Leibniz's contention was that our world is the best of all possible worlds. He inferred this from two traditional god attributes (all-knowingness and omnibenevolence) which renders the argument unfalsifiable for humans. But he thus logicallly ensured that our world must be the best of all possible worlds. In fact his argument boils down to the conclusion that another version of our world, for instance a version without kid cancer, would necessarily harbour an evil greater than kid cancer.It is therefore unclear to me how you suddenly can claim to bypass this and state that another possible world must be better.
When you restrict your argument to nomologically possible worlds you place additional conditions on the set of all logically possible worlds. For instance, correspondence rules between the different possible worlds are needed in a nomological set, because that's how they are defined. This means that measurability must be garanteed of aspects of all possible worlds. But that is not something we can arrange from our point of view in this universe. We have no access (yet) to other universes.
Are you still following? It means that:
1) the set of nomologically possible worlds is a subset of all logically possible worlds
2) we cannot construct any set of nomologically possible worlds that contains more than only our present universe
3) you cannot arrive at the conclusion that there is another nomologically possible world that is better than ours
Oh, and forget the usual frodonian drool, it's not worthy of your attention ;-)
"I'm like a rabbit suddenly trapped, in the blinding headlights of vacuous crap" - Tim Minchin in "Storm"
Christianity is perfect bullshit, christians are not - Purple Rabbit, honouring CS Lewis
Faith is illogical - fr0d0
Christianity is perfect bullshit, christians are not - Purple Rabbit, honouring CS Lewis
Faith is illogical - fr0d0