On naturalism and consciousness

[The Grand Nudger]

"The most fundamental component of mind is the gate (or at least a mechanism which can be theoretically represented by a collection of gates).

Pretty much, some architecture that allows for one or more logical functions to be performed.

So the difference between 'stuff' and 'data' is that the data have served as the input into a gate or gate-like mechanism.

With regards to mind, yeah. Stuff can be data, and data is stuff, but mind requires a particular type of stuff, we can call it data.

A percept is a collection of data which represent a property of a thing being observed: color, shape, etc.

Negatron, a percept is a collection of data about the states of the various constituent "gates"

It can only represent the systems function/data (because that's all that's available for the system). The system passes or fails a test based upon how representative it's abstractions are, but it can and will do work even when they aren't.

An idea is a complex interrelation of processed data which can be said to be 'about' something, involving both symbolized percepts and relationships between them.

"About" the above, yes.

The mind is the interrelation of new ideas, stored ideas and currently-observed percepts.

We could probably finesse this one, but again, yeah.

Any mechanism capable of collecting percepts and forming ideas by filtering data through a collection of logic gates is thinking, and should be said to have a mind."

That would depend upon where we put ourselves on the possible scale of thought. If we're a basic model than everything "beneath" us is computing, sure, but doesn't have "mind". If we're the top of the line model, we might reasonably assume that other things also have "mind"

Personally, I'd split the difference between myself and a mollusk and say that somewhere along that continuum lies "mind". To me, "mind" is a designation for a system of computation with a long list of possible logical functions - memory , and to some extent- higher level programming.

Amusingly, given my take on the matter - the resolution is not binary for me. I would be willing to say that any computer is "thinking" (I see no difference between thought and computation) - but I wouldn't be willing to say that any thinking thing has "mind". That's on a good day, mind you, other times I try to imagine ways that a random process could achieve the effect of boolean gates and I say "fuck - am I even thinking? Does all of this "whatever" actually amount to a mind?" Now, if we scrub alot of the things we find compelling in our own "minds" as criteria -for mind-..then some of my objections might fade away. It's all tangled up in architecture imo.

Is this a fair representation?

For the most part, yeah, I'd say so.

@Pickup

are "things" and "thoughts" of the same "substance," say, pure experience, but the former "externally given" while the latter are simply "internal" in origin?

There can be the assumption in a computational system that external objects or "things" -actually are "externally given", but it isn't a requirement. As in "we assume" that the idea we have about what we see in front of us roughly corresponds to what actually -is- in front of us in order to do work. We don't have to (many of us have found ourselves in the horrible position of doubting our eyes, I'm sure), there's good reason not to - but the assumption does seem to be a feature, not a bug.

Assuming that there is an external, I can go you one step further in that. I would say that thoughts -are- the the structure of the "gate". They are just as physical as the "external" thing, and could very well be made -literally- of the same "substance" (we'd just have to put the right jars in front of some poor labrat).