Are Theists Illogical for Believing in God?

[Caecilian]

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I encounter only one problem,

a) We exist in our universe, and we're thinking about the possibility of other universes with possibly different axioms.
b) If so, how can we use our axioms (ex. a=a) for many universes? Since we're saying that they have different axioms.
c) Arguing about a universe (A) is different from universe (B) but as the same as universe © demands the very basic axiom, since: A=C≠B.
d) We can't use our axioms for multitude universes, unless all of them share at least one fundamental axiom, in this case (a=a).
e) Therefore the discussion of many universes without any single axiom is totally useless.

Here comes another question, whether those universes are in a system with each others or are totally set apart from each others?
There is no evidence for something to be totally separated, since every known and predicted entity is in a system.
Even if a universe appears to be totally isolated, you can think of it and compare it to another. Its existence is possible because you're comparing it to others by using axioms. Therefore that universe should be in a system.
If those universes are in a system, then all of them should share at least one fundamental axiom.

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I don't think that it is particularly fruitful to talk about universes with different (or no) axioms. Apart from anything else, its extremely difficult to do so, since its difficult/ impossible to actually conceive of what such universes would be like. And given this, its hard to see what role they can play in philosophical discussions.

Ime, philosophers are concerned with 2 sorts of possible world/ universe:

- Logically possible worlds. That is: worlds that share our logic, but not necessarily our physical laws.

- Nomologically possible worlds. That is: worlds which have the same physical laws as ours, but may be different in other respects.

Clearly, the set of nomologically possible worlds is a subset of the set of logically possible worlds.