(August 31, 2010 at 4:32 pm)The Omnissiunt One Wrote: This argument isn't particularly strong, because it presupposes that only materialistic mechanisms for action are possible. We know no others, but that doesn't mean that we can say there aren't any a priori.The need for a material action in a material unievrse is a very strong inductive inference. Nothing else has ever been observed. I don't see how it could be written off as weak? Infact I can't think of a stronger inductive inference. Are you saying that the problem of induction undermines all such inferences? That can't be surely.
Secondly I am positing that material actions only happen in a material universe and cannot happen in or from a proposed supernatural realm via an immaterial being. This to me seems logical.
The undermining of either of these premises would fault the argument, but I am not convinced your refutations work.
"I still say a church steeple with a lightning rod on top shows a lack of confidence"...Doug McLeod.
