RE: Hello, Anyone interested in a debate?
May 22, 2015 at 5:13 pm
(This post was last modified: May 22, 2015 at 5:15 pm by Anima.
Edit Reason: Missing word
)
[quote pid='949209' dateline='1432327088']
As I understand Atheism Personhood, the noun, the thing, would need to have proof to be recognized as existing. By proof what is meant is direct empirical evidence. Personhood is metaphysical. As such it may not be proven by direct empirical evidence. At best it may only be "proven" by circumstantial empirical evidence (just like the matrix; because it seems to exist does not mean it actual does exist). Since personhood cannot meet the common threashold of proof expressed by Atheist than under Atheism it (or any scientific knowledge) must not exist .
As such, under Atheism, any reference to the self, sentience, the conscience, or your person either directly or indirectly would be assertions that are not based on objective observations and thereby largely imaginary .
Subjective assertions are any assertions made by the subjective observer or person, which as expressed above does not exist due to lack of sufficient "proof" according to atheism.
[/quote]
I do not mean solely solipsism. Rather I am referring to the more general idealistic view that the object existence is dependent upon the subject.
In regards to your matrix analogy (which I found enjoyable) establishing a communal understanding of thing by communicating about them does not determine objectivity of the thing. Your analogy is predicated on the observations of Joe, sally, and us all being inherent similar; you changed our perspectives, but you held the object and its definition as fixed. In so doing you assure that we are all talking about "car" and that the summation of our varying perspectives of said car may be accumulated to approach an objective observation.
However, you have no idea what the perceptions of any participant are, much less that they may be similar to one another. Joe may see a "car" as I suspect you define it. Sally may see car as a hole in space. I may see car as duckbill platypus. None of us have any idea what the other sees. We only know that we each see something different (under the argument of idealism). We cannot then say that we are all agreed on what a car is and thus say we see car from different perspectives. That would be doing just what I wrote. Saying that each person has a unique view, but that their view are so similar as to not be unique.
Perhaps it may be easier to think of it in terms of color. My blue is not your blue, which is not their blue. We assume all of these blues are similar and that we thus are all speaking of the same thing. But the truth is that while we all refer to something as blue that does not mean we all see the same color or shade of color. Under idealism all it means is that what ever color or shade of color we see at that time we have called blue. Thus there is no correlation of the knowledge such that the summation of that knowledge approaches objectivity.
Quote:bennyboy
No, not the idea of personhood. Ideas ABOUT personhood. If pressed, I might be tempted to start defining terms: "self" as the general sense of sentience and awareness, and "personhood" as ideas about the self and its relationship with reality, perhaps.
As I understand Atheism Personhood, the noun, the thing, would need to have proof to be recognized as existing. By proof what is meant is direct empirical evidence. Personhood is metaphysical. As such it may not be proven by direct empirical evidence. At best it may only be "proven" by circumstantial empirical evidence (just like the matrix; because it seems to exist does not mean it actual does exist). Since personhood cannot meet the common threashold of proof expressed by Atheist than under Atheism it (or any scientific knowledge) must not exist .
Quote:I'd say any assertions not based on objective observations would be expressions of one's (largely imaginary) ideas about one's personhood, yes.
As such, under Atheism, any reference to the self, sentience, the conscience, or your person either directly or indirectly would be assertions that are not based on objective observations and thereby largely imaginary .
Quote:I'm not sure what "subjective assertions" are. Nor am I sure that the self is, at its essence, imaginary. Could you elaborate?
Subjective assertions are any assertions made by the subjective observer or person, which as expressed above does not exist due to lack of sufficient "proof" according to atheism.
Quote:I don't consider idealism and objectivism to be mortal enemies. If by idealism you mean solipsism, in which everything is a projection of the self, then the idea of communal agreement is moot. If by idealism you mean that what appears to be objective reality is really all ideas under the hood, then you'd have sets and subsets, some of which overlap and some of which don't.
Consider the Matrix. From the perspective of the normal Joe Schmoe in the Matrix, a car is a car and being hit by one will kill you. Would Joe's observations of "car" be subjective or objective? You and I, standing outside the system, know there's really no car there; however, since Joe doesn't have access to that perspective, he "knows" the car is really there. Now add Sally, Joe's wife. She has access to a view of objects in the Matrix that is different than Joe's. They can establish a communal understanding of things by communicating about them; specifically, that neither one of them has invented "car." That they are both wrong about the ultimate nature of "car" (it exists only as a collection of ideas) is irrelevant to whether their observations are objective or not.
[/quote]
I do not mean solely solipsism. Rather I am referring to the more general idealistic view that the object existence is dependent upon the subject.
In regards to your matrix analogy (which I found enjoyable) establishing a communal understanding of thing by communicating about them does not determine objectivity of the thing. Your analogy is predicated on the observations of Joe, sally, and us all being inherent similar; you changed our perspectives, but you held the object and its definition as fixed. In so doing you assure that we are all talking about "car" and that the summation of our varying perspectives of said car may be accumulated to approach an objective observation.
However, you have no idea what the perceptions of any participant are, much less that they may be similar to one another. Joe may see a "car" as I suspect you define it. Sally may see car as a hole in space. I may see car as duckbill platypus. None of us have any idea what the other sees. We only know that we each see something different (under the argument of idealism). We cannot then say that we are all agreed on what a car is and thus say we see car from different perspectives. That would be doing just what I wrote. Saying that each person has a unique view, but that their view are so similar as to not be unique.
Perhaps it may be easier to think of it in terms of color. My blue is not your blue, which is not their blue. We assume all of these blues are similar and that we thus are all speaking of the same thing. But the truth is that while we all refer to something as blue that does not mean we all see the same color or shade of color. Under idealism all it means is that what ever color or shade of color we see at that time we have called blue. Thus there is no correlation of the knowledge such that the summation of that knowledge approaches objectivity.
