(May 22, 2015 at 5:39 pm)Jörmungandr Wrote:(May 22, 2015 at 3:51 pm)Anima Wrote: In order to stipulate that such a thing as sensus communis one must contend; as the realist schools; that there is an objective reality to which the subjectivity of subject A and the subjectivity of subject B correspond. The correspondence of subjectivity to the object, which is not dependent upon the subject, is what allows one to stipulate that there is sensus communis that exists among the subjects regarding the reality of the object.
Postulating realism is not sufficient in and of itself to ensure sensus communis. I may see color X as 'a' while you see color X as 'b'. In order to achieve communality, I must believe that I see what you see, and that you know that I see what you see, and that I know that you know and so on in regress. The assumption of objectivity doesn't solve the problem of independent subjectivities, as it cannot guarantee that the psychological state when viewing X for you is the same as it is for me. Postulating essences that are independent of subjectivity does nothing to synchronize those subjectivities. Again, we're left resorting to communication to attempt to bridge the gap between independent subjects.
(May 22, 2015 at 5:13 pm)Anima Wrote: Perhaps it may be easier to think of it in terms of color. My blue is not your blue, which is not their blue. We assume all of these blues are similar and that we thus are all speaking of the same thing. But the truth is that while we all refer to something as blue that does not mean we all see the same color or shade of color. Under idealism all it means is that what ever color or shade of color we see at that time we have called blue. Thus there is no correlation of the knowledge such that the summation of that knowledge approaches objectivity.
Postulating realism does resolve the issue. Under realism the object exists independent of the subject. As such it may be said that the object effects the subject rather than the subject effects the object. Thus we may now say that any given perspective of the object is indeed a perspective of that self same object, since the object is independent of the subjects. Thereby any given perspective is a subjective observation of the independent object. Now we may make summation of those perpectives to account for every possible observable perspective to gain a pure objective observation of the object. We may only do so because the object is not changed by the observes.