(May 22, 2015 at 5:45 pm)Anima Wrote:(May 22, 2015 at 5:39 pm)Jörmungandr Wrote: Postulating realism is not sufficient in and of itself to ensure sensus communis. I may see color X as 'a' while you see color X as 'b'. In order to achieve communality, I must believe that I see what you see, and that you know that I see what you see, and that I know that you know and so on in regress. The assumption of objectivity doesn't solve the problem of independent subjectivities, as it cannot guarantee that the psychological state when viewing X for you is the same as it is for me. Postulating essences that are independent of subjectivity does nothing to synchronize those subjectivities. Again, we're left resorting to communication to attempt to bridge the gap between independent subjects.
Postulating realism does resolve the issue. Under realism the object exists independent of the subject. As such it may be said that the object effects the subject rather than the subject effects the object. Thus we may now say that any given perspective of the object is indeed a perspective of that self same object, since the object is independent of the subjects. Thereby any given perspective is a subjective observation of the independent object. Now we may make summation of those perpectives to account for every possible observable perspective to gain a pure objective observation of the object. We may only do so because the object is not changed by the observes.
Let's take an ordinary pencil, dipped partly into a bowl of water. From the side, it looks like the pencil is bent. Viewed from overhead, it appears straight. Viewed from directly behind it, it appears to be little more than a dot of eraser. All three perspectives yield perceptions of an objective fact, yet there is no way to create an objective view that is merely a summation of the independent views. That all three are perceiving the same object does not remove the obstacle of the independence of each perception. Postulating realism simply asserts that there is a fact of the matter as to which is the 'real' object being perceived; it does nothing to reconcile the divergent subjectivities.