Hello, Anyone interested in a debate?

[Anima]

As noted in the analogy to science, we never have a universal set of particulars, so we are left assuming the particulars are representative of the whole.  In the case of actual moralities, there aren't sufficient number to presume representativeness; each morality is divergent in its particulars.  Aristotle may presume, but as in science, presumption of perfection in particulars fails to prevent you from falling into error by relying on those particulars.  We saw it with Galen's medical treatises, with Ptolemaic cosmology, with Newtonian physics — the reality is that you cannot guarantee a glimpse at what is hidden underneath simply by presuming you have a set of trustworthy views.  That's begging the question.  

First, I would disagree with your assertion that morality is divergent in the particulars. Generally speaking, moralistic determinations across a broad spectrum of societies and cultures tend to lead to the same result for the same causes. This is not to say there are no differences, only that the majority of the systems are functionally the same while the semantics (thanks benny) of the systems differ.

Second, particular perfections may not be contend to be assumptions. A particular perfection is akin to the thing being what it is (everything is perfect in and of itself, though not perfect objectively). To state particular perfections do not exist is to state the object is not what it is (or is not properly being itself). Now realism does indeed contend the particular perfections are part of some universal set. For any subjective observation or morality to have credibility it must be part of a universal set which thereby allows for correlation and correspondence of the information contained in the given particular with other particulars of the same object to approach certainty. As those particulars approach infinity the knowledge approaches certainty or objectivity.

To say otherwise is to state any subjective observation or morality is the complete and universal set in and of itself, thereby removing any correlative or correspondent with any other observation or morality. Thereby asking us to accept that any subjective observation or morality is inherently correct because it cannot (and does not need to be) related to any other. (this seems less subject to scrutiny than what i am proposing). Again referring to the drawing I made before:

Realism:
A ==> X <== B such that X=Xa+Xb+Xn
or
A1 ==> X <== A2 such that X=Xa1+Xa2+Xan where 1,2 denotes A at a different perceptive orientation.

Idealism:
A ==> X; B ==>Y such that X=Xa and Y=Yb

Where it is made observable that the definition of X under realism must satisfy I greater level of scrutiny than the definition of X under idealism where a single subjective observation by A is held to define X completely.

How does an individual get multiple views as to whether some specific moral fact is truth?  Do they not only have their own moral judgement to fall back on?  That's getting back to individual morals being 'composited' by them voting with their own particular sense of morality as being the only perspective they can contribute.  Again, the question is "how do we test" that a given moral hypothesis belongs to objective morality or not?  In the end, the only test is our individual judgement about the truth or falsity of the moral hypothesis.  We don't have multiple personalities that we can look at tentative moral facts with multiple perspectives.  The only test is the assent or dissent from the hypothesis; that leads us right back into morality simply being a matter of counting heads, which is the relativism you're trying to avoid.

The individuals facilitates various views by imagination or variable experiences. For example in any given situation imagine your are the victim, the perpetrator, the bystander, the dependent, the individual, the state, etcetera. As the individual considers the moral situation as if they were different persons (while in fact being the same person) they are effectual changing their perspective orientation around the phenomena (it is like they are walking around the problem to look at it from different angles). The individual may further change the means by consideration of other similar situations or what others have stated is the moral solution to the given moral dilemma.

The problem here is one familiar in science, namely the underdetermination of theory.  If you postulate that a set of moral truths is only imperfectly representative of the hidden reality, how do you determine which of the set is truly reflective of the reality, and which part of it is in error?  Do we simply take the intersection of all moral views and call that our set of hidden truths?  How do we know any better to trust the intersection rather than the differences?  Surely this is no way to arrive at objective moral truth.  More importantly, it obfuscates the reason why an objective moral fact is moral.  Am I not to kill because it angers God, or because it incurs bad karma, because it is contrary to my sense of empathy, because living persons have inalienable rights?  How do I determine why what is immoral is immoral from an incompatible set of explanations?  This revisits the question of multiple views by individuals: how does the Jew, Hindu, etcetera gain 'different angles' from looking at incompatible views?

Once again I do not quite see how these are incompatible as all are held as bad (angering god, incurring bad karma, acting contrary to my sense of empathy). As per my original argument it would appear we are arguing which imaginary friend will be offended. I would argue that people do not have an inalienable right to life on the contention that as a theist and philosopher my existence does not cease upon the separation of my biological life and that such a right to life would be in contradiction to the natural law and the billions of living organisms we have killed today alone if not over our lifetimes (think bacteria which are living and would have an inalienable right to life as well).

It appears you are interjecting the continuum fallacy stating that unless a definitive finite number of observations may be stipulate as constituting representative of the objective reality than we must assume there is no number of observations which will be considered representative and thus the objective reality may not be known. As noted we know this logic is fallacious and may even be used in a contra point to state unless specification can be made of how many non-representative points are required to stipulate there is no representation of the objective hidden reality than we must assume there is no number of observations which will be considered non-representative and thus the objective reality is known.

It appears we have reached the point of Cartesian dualism. Either we contend that nothing may be considered as representative of the objective reality and thus we cannot know the objective reality; thereby negating everything including our person. Or we contend that everything may be considered representative of the objective reality upon which knowledge may be predicated upon as consisting of normitives and outliers.