RE: Hello, Anyone interested in a debate?
May 26, 2015 at 8:20 pm
(This post was last modified: May 26, 2015 at 9:20 pm by Anima.)
(May 25, 2015 at 9:43 pm)bennyboy Wrote: Tell that to the blind guys with the elephant.
I've got to say that my Spidey-sense is tingling. You seem to be doing a lot of horizontal groundwork here, laying a foundation as it were. Maybe your patience reflects a sincere interest in how people arrive at truth. However, methinks under that giant tarp up ahead I see the outlines of a crucifix. When do we get to the punchline?
(May 25, 2015 at 9:52 pm)Stimbo Wrote: He doesn't have to and he won't go to the bother. He's just going to point to the empty space above his foundation and say, "look at my god - isn't it magnificent?" Followed by "all you have to do is believe and you'll see it!" on the way to "you're just pretending you can't see it because you don't want it to be true."
Maybe I'm wrong in this assessment. Maybe Anima'll surprise us and come out with something original. I await with baited breath and vodka cocktail.
(May 26, 2015 at 4:00 am)robvalue Wrote: I await with baited cock and vodka tail-breath.
You may all relax. At best argument may be made to an objective reality which may then be consolidated into a single entity (similar to all of our reality being part of a single universe). One may come to the god of philosophy, but not the god of the bible (no they are not the same thing). However, as Kant points out in his critique of Aristotle's ontological causal argument for the existence of god, even when it is possible to argue a single entity/thing by means of ontology or epistemology what that thing is cannot be specified. In which case your belief in the flying spaghetti monster (or nega monster) is safe.
I am truly making an argument to truth and not necessarily to God or Christianity. As my original argument stated, morality requires an imaginary friend. Meaning it needs a least one imaginary friend. I cannot limit that argument to only one imaginary friend beyond an argument to efficiency or redundancy. Though I may argue that imaginary friend must have sufficient sentience to understand our intentions as well as te objective truth I cannot specify that imaginary friend is an omniscient god or gods.
(May 26, 2015 at 12:40 pm)Jörmungandr Wrote: The way in which moral systems differ is more than a semantic difference. Take the Jewish view of murder and the Hindu view. The Jew seeks not to offend God while the Hindu seeks to avoid incurring bad karma. Each of these constitutes a theory as to why something is immoral. It is these theories that make up the 'pictures' of what objective morality consists in. Contrary to your assertion, moralities do differ in both particular and more importantly they differ in the theory on offer as to why certain things are immoral. It is these theories which you must reconcile as they are the models of what is lying underneath, that being the objective reality. You are trying to reconcile the particulars rather than the theories, whereas it is the theories which constitute the nature of morality.
Ah. I see what you are saying. If i may make reference to the floating bowling ball again. What I am saying is that upon observation of the floating bowling ball there may be many theories of why it is floating (not a bowling ball but a balloon, suspended form the ceiling, counter opposing magnets, etcetera). You are saying that I am trying to meld all of these hypothesis (you called them theories) together. What I am saying is efforts will be made to verify each hypothesis as the particular observations account establish the validity of each hypothesis the hypothesis will be abandoned, modified, or amalgamated in order to make a theory (more than an educated guess) approximating the objective reality of the floating bowling ball.
In like manner I would be saying that the jewish hypothesis(pleasing god), the hindu hypothesis (next life points), the subjective hypothesis (what i think is good/bad) may be supported by the moral data acquired. Now we apply the moral situation of the subject lying for their own sake. Does this lying satisfy Jewish hypothesis as moral conduct? No. The Hindu hypothesis? No. The subjective hypothesis? Yes.
Next we change the moral situation to gain a varying perspective. Being lied to by another who is lying for their sake. Does this lying satisfy each hypothesis as moral conduct? No, No, No. Now based on this limited data (naturally I would recommend more scenarios of varying complexity, but I do not want this to get too long). It is determined the subjective hypothesis of morality leads to an answer which is not applicable to multiple persons at the same time. As such definition holding conduct of any given subject as moral by their own standards while being immoral by the standards of another subject at the same time is leading to a contradictory answer. So we may say the subjective hypothesis of morality is to be discarded (aka the floating bowling ball is not a balloon)
We then proceed to continue to verify the remaining hypothesis Jewish and Hindu by various moral situations and perspectives (test to see if there is a wire on the bowling ball, if there are any magnets, etcetera). As you stipulate correctly I am starting from the particular and not presupposing any specified hypothesis will be supported by the moral data to be considered a theory. With each moral scenario and variable perspectives hypothesis will remain, appear, or be discarded.
(May 26, 2015 at 12:40 pm)Jörmungandr Wrote: I find this a wholly impractical suggestion. Moral theories aren't perspective dependent like you suggest. A person operating from a theory of karmic law will view all the different roles of the actors through that same lense. You haven't multiplied the number of views at all. All you've done is create pseudo-observations which poison the picture of the objective whole.
It is assumed that a person may observer a moral situation from the same hypothesis. However, this does not exclude them from considering that hypothesis from a different role. And then relating the answer expressed by the hypothesis in each role to one another to determine consistency or a point of further analysis for explanation. See the subjective hypothesis example above.
(May 26, 2015 at 12:40 pm)Jörmungandr Wrote: We are dealing with the question of discovering the metaphysical truths about objective morality, the theory so to speak. It is not merely an empirical question, but one of matching up observations with specific models of that underlying reality. Since the number of those models is extremely limited and sharply divergent, I am arguing that you have yet to present a method for reconciling them in order to arrive at one view which is the metaphysical truth. This is not a question of the vagueness of the boundary between true and false views of morality, it's pointing out that you have no way of distinguishing them. Period. Until you propose a method for reconciling Jew with Hindu theory, with Jain theory, with Confucian, you are left making noises about pencils and other empirical cases which are unlike the case with morals.
Once again. I do not think the theories are as divergent as you are stating. However, as with the subjective hypothesis above we may verify if said hypothesis is self contradicting. Then we may proceed to determine where there is conflict between theories and make further analysis regarding why the conflict. For example Jewish (pleasing god) and Hindu (points for the next life) come to me as two theories that may be amalgamated. If it may be argued that the purpose of pleasing god is to have a better existence in the next life than we may say that pleasing god = points for the next life, in which case we may now treat those to theories as congruent as we continue our investigation and pit the theory of pleasing god/points for the next life against our next theory.