Do Humans Have Compulsary Will? Which best describes your take on 'will'?

[bennyboy]

I don't think mind, under the definition I've given, is vague, although determining what systems have it is wayyy beyond vague and bordering on impossible.  But with the baby example, you are still talking about psychology rather than psychogony.

I don't know what your definition has to do with it.  It seems you are conflating having mind with experiencing qualia.  If so, my earlier example of cerebral achromatopsia, where an individual can have visual qualia without the color of ordinary visual qualia, is good evidence that qualia isn't an all or nothing proposition.  Regardless, I'm not arguing about qualia.  Mind (or subjectivity) could be either vague, or it could be that there is a definite boundary between mind and no mind.  Your continually repeating that you think there is a definite boundary does nothing to settle the matter.  I don't personally see any reason why there has to be a definite boundary, which is why I question you as to the basis of your belief.  Why do you feel there has to be a definite boundary?  I don't think that mind is a result solely of complexity - it needs to be complexity of a specific kind.  But if animal's nervous systems evolve incrementally, I see no obvious argument that subjectivity or mind wouldn't also have evolved incrementally.

I've defined the term "mind" as the existence of a subjective perspective as I mean the term in a discussion of evolution.  I certainly would agree with you that qualia is not all or nothing-- it involves the blending of different kinds of patterns, shapes, textures, etc., as well as the integration of different senses.

I've changed my position about your quote and comment to follow-- mind can be defined in different ways-- for example, as the processing of complex stimuli.  And given different definitions of mind, I'd be more than happy to see grey area.  But I don't think there is a "kind-of subjective": either something has that perspective or it doesn't.  I think there really must be some kind of elemental qualia that would represent the minimum possible stimulus that could meet that definition: perhaps the transmission and reception of a single photon, or perhaps the firing of a single neuron, or perhaps a neural chain which feeds back on itself at least one time.

It's not an assertion.  HOWEVER you define mind, either it exists or it doesn't, under the definition I gave: that where there is even the vaguest subjective perspective, there is mind.  If you want to argue that mind means something more complex, that's fine-- but since we're talking about evolution, I want to start with the simplest possible definition, and look at how it relates to the development of the nervous system and then the brain throughout our evolutionary history.

(bold mine)
Did you really just say that?  My point is that I believe there will likely be cases where, under any criterion, it's not clear whether the organism does or does not possess mind.  Given that, your continued insistence that it either is or isn't present is just an assertion, one which you keep repeating to no effect.

See above.  I'm going to have to stay with my definition, which is tailored with a view to looking at how mind would first have evolved.  I no longer want to claim that under any possible definition, any aspect of mind is necessarily boolean.

Here your assumption about the non-vagueness of mind resurfaces.  If you could grant that the boundary between mind and no-mind is not distinct, the origin of mind would make a lot more sense, as it wouldn't have to be there all at once.  This is analogous to the case of cerebral achromatopsia, where one can have partial qualia.

The problem comes down to semantics: "mind" is so vague that many would ascribe it to things I would never attribute it to: computers, for example.  But you are still talking about quality of qualia, which I'd call psychology, whereas I'm really interested in getting at pschogony-- the origin and explanation of mind vs. not-mind.