Hello, Anyone interested in a debate?

[Anima]

Regarding the self contradiction of subjective morality we made reference to the Subject A lying for their own benefit to Subject B.  Under subjective morality the moral quality is to be determined according to that of Subject A.  As such the action of lying for ones own benefit is held as moral.  Now if we are to continue to view the situation from the perspective of Subject A, but swap the actors to Subject B lying for their own benefit to Subject A.  From the perspective of Subject A the action would be immoral.  So in the same respect (moral quality of lying for personal benefit) as perceived by same person (Subject A) the action is both moral and immoral at the same time (since the act is not designated as time dependent and may be held at anytime).  

So, you're saying that according to Subject A, lying would be considered immoral when it is done by Subject B to the detriment of A, but it would not be viewed by A as immoral when done by his being against others, such as B? That's not a self-contradiction because it is not in the same respect. Subject A is simply modifying the "moral quality of lying for personal benefit" when it's an action performed by him against others rather than others against his own person. It may be a terribly inconsistent position as it constantly changes with respect to who is lying and who is being deceived, i.e. who is benefiting from the lie, but that's not really how anyone, at least among those I've come across, understands subjective morality. It's subjective only because Subject A values certain facts that may differ from Subject B, not because Subject A believes certain actions under similar circumstances and with regards to different persons changes the moral quality of what it is he values.

Under the logic of subject morality it is dependent upon the determination of the subject A about the given action X.  Thus, inconsistency is made apparent by variance of the subject being the perpetrator or the victim.  In both cases the perspective is of Subject A and the action is X.  Now if the quality of X is modified according to whether A is the perpetrator or the victim than this would say that the quality of X as determined by subjective morality is entirely variable and may never be determined.  Particularly because even if the perspective and active role of Subject A remain the same the quality of the action will vary depending on how Subject A perceives or accepts the act.  Thus, if Subject B were to lie to Subject A in such a manner that was intended to benefit Subject B, but was viewed by Subject A as beneficial than it is moral.  Which again is an contradiction allowing for no determination of the right/wrongness of the action.

Your expression of subjective morality only being subjective because the Subjects A and B value different facts.  Does not exclude a subject who defines terms respective to themselves.  Such defintion is very common in our day today activities which is why I used lying as the example.  There are a great many times where we feel we are justified, even right in lying to others.  But we do not feel the same way when others lie to us.  Under subjective morality the particular Subject determines the quality of the action.  If we were to argue that the quality of action is determined by the actor we would have to say the act is always moral (no matter how horrible) as the actor considered the action of sufficient rightness to engage in said action.  While not contradictory in regards to the specific Subject it will be rendered contradictory when implemented for multiple Subjects as the single Subject is not the only Subject that exists.

1. If you have in mind the likes of Blaise Pascal or William James, I must say that while I admire their deeply felt need for postulating God as a means for creating a definition of meaning or novelty in the universe that really appears meaningful or novel to them, I'm not in the least bit persuaded that they've accomplished anything... well... particular meaningful or novel. 
2. While Kant's Critique is a masterful dissection of reason that demonstrates the limits of our ability to ascertain infallible knowledge, I don't really know what conclusions you think can be drawn from it that are relevant here. You seem to imply that if something like positivism is unsustainable than we are required to accept claims that fail to meet a criteria of demonstration which is both logically valid and empirically sound, and I think history is a museum of colossal mistakes that has proven such clumsy grubbing wrong time and time again. I'm not under the impression that everything we think we know about the world can be demonstrated, but given that, I also don't think we should put forward dogmatic assertions that deny others admitted justification for rejecting them... and lack of any evidence (explicit or implicit) or clarity of definition certainly satisfies that justification as far as I'm concerned.

1.  Actually I had more in mind the likes of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Newton, Einstein, and so on. Now if you do not consider what they have said meaningful or novel while other have we must state one of several possible conditions exist. Either it is not meaningful/novel, its meaning/novelty is not being comprehended by you, they are apply meaning/novelty where there is none, or its meaning/novelty is not missed by them. None of which I want to waste time arguing.

2.  The threshold of proof or evidence (Chas) being set for the existence of God would classify as analytic apriori (to which only tautologies lie).  Now if God were proved or evidenced tautologically the response would be that it is not sufficient as it is simply begging the question (were the conclusion is assumed in the question).  However, it is stated by Kant that knowledge is predicated upon either analytic apriori (tautologies), synthetic apriori (inferred from logic without experience) or synthetic aposteriori (inferrence from experience).  As such the only proof or evidence, that is not circular, to which anything (including God) may satisfy shall be implicit and circumstantial leading to an inference.  This is a summary of Kant's 500+ page argument.  Thereby I am saying that it is impractical to set a threshold of proof or evidence for God that is beyond a threshold that may be meet by any form of knowledge we have.

What could be more direct than experience? That's all consciousness is... what it is to experience something. Indirect empirical evidence would be a threshold we define in terms of third-person observation that coincides with expected behaviors analogous to our own experiences and like-behaviors which ensue. Less indirect evidence would be the capability to translate brain patterns into a language that allows an experimenter to read the subject's thoughts and feelings back to them before they were able to verbally inform anyone as to what it is they were actually experiencing... an experiment that, due to the annual exponential growth of technology, no longer appears destined to forever be relegated to the realms of science fiction. Surely you're aware of the Turing test? That's a rough start for determining whether or not a body possesses consciousness. One can reject the existence of deity for lack of empirical evidence, as well as the internally inconsistent logic of definitions put forth for god, without losing the ability to claim positive, albeit perhaps at best probable, knowledge of... anything??? Your claim to the contrary is nothing but a non-sequitur. We must admit that our knowledge is only such in the paradigm we have to go on... BUT even if that paradigm itself must to some extent be taken for granted (such as the assumption that I'm not a brain in a vat), it doesn't require that we view others as equally valid or fruitful, or that all other claims within that paradigm are equally justified.

Regarding the Directness of Experience by Kant (bolded):

"Truth is said to consist in the agreement of knowledge with the object. According to this mere verbal definition, then, my knowledge, in order to be true, must agree with the object. Now, I can only compare the object with my knowledge by this means, namely, by taking knowledge of it. My knowledge, then, is to be verified by itself, which is far from being sufficient for truth. For as the object is external to me, and the knowledge is in me, I can only judge whether my knowledge of the object agrees with my knowledge of the object. Such a circle in explanation was called by the ancients Diallelos. And the logicians were accused of this fallacy by the sceptics, who remarked that this account of truth was as if a man before a judicial tribunal should make a statement, and appeal in support of it to a witness whom no one knows, but who defends his own credibility by saying that the man who had called him as a witness is an honourable man." - (Immanuel Kant)

So as the physical object is external to your metaphysical consciousness within you it may not act directly upon your person or consciousness, but upon your senses and then your sensibility and consciousness. This is to say the object is implicitly inferred (as synthetic aposteriori) by the consciousness. A consciousness itself which may be rejected for lacking in direct empirical proof or evidence.

Now as a matter of maintaining varying thresholds which people keep bring up. If we are to say that we subject an assertion regarding X to a certain threshold of proof or evidence for the sake of practicality, but we subject another assertion regarding Y to a different threshold of proof or evidence also for the sake of practicality; we are then compelled to ask what is the practicality. While argument is then made to probability (which I naturally find hilarious as the probability of any person or thing existing is so astronomical as to be considered impossible) vs possibility. However, under that answer is the reality that in order to justify our own bias or desired position we need what is asserted regarding X, but not what is asserted regarding Y. In this manner we set variable thresholds for each by which assertions of X are met by a lower standard than assertion for Y. This is to say while I am ready to say my person exists and accept proof or evidence of it which is implicit and circumstantial I am not as ready to admit that God exists and will not accept proof or evidence of that which is implicit and circumstantial.

Any effort to argue around that will ultimately prove futile because decisions to set variable thresholds are of a subjective nature and not objective. Which is why I do not endeavor to make such distinction. I hold all knowledge to the same threshold of proof or evidence which is implicit circumstantial evidence. I do not even require it to be empirical as knowledge may be synthetic apriori (inferred without experience commonly by logic) or synthetic aposteriori (inferred from experience), or analytic aprior (tautological).

Even if I were to agree that all we have for asserting the existence of consciousness is "circumstantial implicit empirical proof"---which I'm not sure I do as that is a mouthful which I'm not entirely sure I understand in the context you seem to be using it in---why wouldn't that be sufficient for positing something as probable even if only vaguely defined or apprehended, with the qualifier that more research is required and that our future knowledge of it is likely to require a change in our current perspective?

I would not state that circumstantial implicit empirical proof is insufficient for positing something as probable even if only vaguely defined or apprehended. Not at all. But I would have to tell you that God meets this threshold and thus may be posited as something probable even if only vaguely defined or apprehended. Which is why most, (not all as they are not a monolith) of atheistic thought will not accept circumstantial implicit empirical proof as sufficient. There position is denial of, which they may endeavor to support by argument. Argument which is most easily made regarding the threshold of proof or evidence to posit something as probable as existing (or if more nuanced arguments to redundancy, where if duplicated than superfluous and effectively not existing even if actually existing). Since circumstantial implicit proof or evidence does allow for positing the existence of God a probable the level of proof or evidence is elevated in order to exclude allowing the positing the existence of God as probable. The side effect of this elevation of proof or evidence is the unintended exclusion of all knowledge proven or evidence by the lower level of proof/evidence which is circumstantial and implicit.

Ha ha!!  As compelled by the Atheistic threshold of proof: "What proof do you have that the environment contains others capable of thought and communication?" other than reactionary meat responding to stimuli in a manner that implies thought and communication.

What you rudimentarily call "reactionary meat responding to stimuli" is exactly what is meant by a more refined definition of beings which exhibit conscious behavior. You can try to change the meaning of words so as to always retain an appearance of mysteriousness for certain dearly held concepts, but it won't make them any less unintelligible or useless in discussion.

Considering that a great many arguments have made utilization of the reactionary meat model of people I woudl disagree that it is unintelligible or useless in discussion. Remember I do not consider people to be reactionary meat. I support that consideration by implicit circumstantial proof/evidence in the same manner that I support god as existing by implicit circumstantial proof/evidence.

If such a level of proof/evidence is in sufficient then it may not be state that consciousness or persons exist. To which a viable explanation for the machinations of people may be described as reactionary meat (see the zombie squid post earlier).

If history has taught us anything, one lesson should most definitely be not to underestimate the ingenuity of human beings.

To true, to true. The only crux being that ingenuity is not solely limited to being cleaver and inventive in regard to factual realization. One may be ingenious in imaginary things as one is in factual things. (Generally factual things have been understood first as an imaginary thing. Also known as Hypothesis).