Hello, Anyone interested in a debate?

[Mudhammam]

Under the logic of subject morality it is dependent upon the determination of the subject A about the given action X.  

Correct. I'll go further and say that this is precisely the situation we find ourselves in, evidenced by the observation that people have strong views pertaining to what they think is right, these views oftentimes contradict, and there being no standard measure for appeal except the opinions of ourselves and others when evaluating the correctness of them.

Thus, inconsistency is made apparent by variance of the subject being the perpetrator or the victim.

Such not need be the case, however. A could acknowledge that B acted morally (per his standard) while personally disliking the consequence (being lied to).

 In both cases the perspective is of Subject A and the action is X.  Now if the quality of X is modified according to whether A is the perpetrator or the victim than this would say that the quality of X as determined by subjective morality is entirely variable and may never be determined.

Morality that is limited to a subjective determination cannot be determined objectively. Right. Objective morality implies that there is a set of values to which everyone is obliged in consideration of their moral quality being unaffected by any single individual's regard for them. Facts about the world, such as the correctness of Newton's law of universal gravitation, have such an objective quality---it doesn't matter if you agree with Newton or not when you jump from the roof of a skyscraper---whereas the values a person holds, shaping their perceived justification for slaying infidels, for example, have no necessary bearing on how others define value.

 Particularly because even if the perspective and active role of Subject A remain the same the quality of the action will vary depending on how Subject A perceives or accepts the act.  Thus, if Subject B were to lie to Subject A in such a manner that was intended to benefit Subject B, but was viewed by Subject A as beneficial than it is moral.  

Yeah... According to A.

Which again is an contradiction allowing for no determination of the right/wrongness of the action.

No. The determination of the right/wrongness depends on what Subject A values. If he values the Aristotelian conception of the good life his determination of right/wrongness will agree with others who share like-minded values, but differ from the pious priest who believes that appeasing the tribal deity and stoning the insolent child is the ultimate good which rational animals ought to pursue. Again, this is in fact represents the world we find ourselves in.

Your expression of subjective morality only being subjective because the Subjects A and B value different facts.  Does not exclude a subject who defines terms respective to themselves.  Such defintion is very common in our day today activities which is why I used lying as the example.  There are a great many times where we feel we are justified, even right in lying to others.  But we do not feel the same way when others lie to us.  

Most people are not always logically consistent.

Under subjective morality the particular Subject determines the quality of the action.  If we were to argue that the quality of action is determined by the actor we would have to say the act is always moral (no matter how horrible) as the actor considered the action of sufficient rightness to engage in said action.  

No, we wouldn't. We are still free to develop our own values and meanings, and to argue them based on what we conceive to be the most rational virtues based on the evidence of our perceptions... which is exactly what people who argue for objective morality do too.

While not contradictory in regards to the specific Subject it will be rendered contradictory when implemented for multiple Subjects as the single Subject is not the only Subject that exists.

Hence, disagreements such as ours. So, what's the problem with that?

1.  Actually I had more in mind the likes of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Newton, Einstein, and so on. Now if you do not consider what they have said meaningful or novel while other have we must state one of several possible conditions exist. Either it is not meaningful/novel, its meaning/novelty is not being comprehended by you, they are apply meaning/novelty where there is none, or its meaning/novelty is not missed by them. None of which I want to waste time arguing.

Depends on what specifics you're referring to. Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Newton, etc. made some brilliant observations. Their contributions to theology would not be included in that assessment for me.

2.  The threshold of proof or evidence (Chas) being set for the existence of God would classify as analytic apriori (to which only tautologies lie).  Now if God were proved or evidenced tautologically the response would be that it is not sufficient as it is simply begging the question (were the conclusion is assumed in the question).  However, it is stated by Kant that knowledge is predicated upon either analytic apriori (tautologies), synthetic apriori (inferred from logic without experience) or synthetic aposteriori (inferrence from experience).  As such the only proof or evidence, that is not circular, to which anything (including God) may satisfy shall be implicit and circumstantial leading to an inference.  This is a summary of Kant's 500+ page argument.  Thereby I am saying that it is impractical to set a threshold of proof or evidence for God that is beyond a threshold that may be meet by any form of knowledge we have.

God is not inferred from "logic without experience" or "inference from evidence." So, I can allow legitimate knowledge of my surroundings to be ascertained from deduction or induction without conceding that there is any justification for an uber-powerful and wise species of being that pervades all space while simultaneously existing outside of it.

Regarding the Directness of Experience by Kant (bolded):

"Truth is said to consist in the agreement of knowledge with the object. According to this mere verbal definition, then, my knowledge, in order to be true, must agree with the object. Now, I can only compare the object with my knowledge by this means, namely, by taking knowledge of it. My knowledge, then, is to be verified by itself, which is far from being sufficient for truth. For as the object is external to me, and the knowledge is in me, I can only judge whether my knowledge of the object agrees with my knowledge of the object. Such a circle in explanation was called by the ancients Diallelos. And the logicians were accused of this fallacy by the sceptics, who remarked that this account of truth was as if a man before a judicial tribunal should make a statement, and appeal in support of it to a witness whom no one knows, but who defends his own credibility by saying that the man who had called him as a witness is an honourable man." - (Immanuel Kant)

Is this from the CPR? My translation was the Meiklejohn one which I didn't much care for.

So as the physical object is external to your metaphysical consciousness within you it may not act directly upon your person or consciousness, but upon your senses and then your sensibility and consciousness.

My "metaphysical consciousness"? Is this different from my physical consciousness? (You know, that biological circuitry between the ears that Darwin beautifully demonstrated to have evolved from lower life forms over the span of millions of years, roughly seven decades after Kant's magnum opus).

This is to say the object is implicitly inferred (as synthetic aposteriori) by the consciousness. A consciousness itself which may be rejected for lacking in direct empirical proof or evidence.

Maybe my metaphysical consciousness can be rejected... but I think you'll have a hard time rejecting the consciousness that you would be required to use in rejecting consciousness.

Now as a matter of maintaining varying thresholds which people keep bring up. If we are to say that we subject an assertion regarding X to a certain threshold of proof or evidence for the sake of practicality, but we subject another assertion regarding Y to a different threshold of proof or evidence also for the sake of practicality; we are then compelled to ask what is the practicality.

I think Einstein laid it out well:
"Nothing can be said concerning the manner in which the concepts are to be made and connected, and how we are to coordinate them to the experiences. In guiding us in the creation of such an order of sense experiences, success in the result is alone the determining factor. All that is necessary is the statement of a set of rules, since without such rules the acquisition of knowledge in the desired sense would be impossible. One may compare these rules with the rules of a game in which, while the rules themselves are arbitrary, it is their rigidity alone which makes the game possible.”

While argument is then made to probability (which I naturally find hilarious as the probability of any person or thing existing is so astronomical as to be considered impossible) vs possibility.

I assume you know all of the prerequisite conditions that one would need in order to justify a statement regarding the probability of anything existing? Could you share them with us?

However, under that answer is the reality that in order to justify our own bias or desired position we need what is asserted regarding X, but not what is asserted regarding Y. In this manner we set variable thresholds for each by which assertions of X are met by a lower standard than assertion for Y. This is to say while I am ready to say my person exists and accept proof or evidence of it which is implicit and circumstantial I am not as ready to admit that God exists and will not accept proof or evidence of that which is implicit and circumstantial.

That would imply that it is equally necessary or fruitful to propose the existence of deity for the sake of advancing knowledge within any given framework... and in 4,000 years of history it's pretty obvious that isn't really the case. You can deny, for example, that other beings exist, or that objects as they exist in themselves can be known (as Kant did) because you feel that there is no standard of evidence that could convince you that everything is not an illusion or that the interaction between external objects and our knowledge of them is insufficient for telling you anything about reality as it is... but then, besides the fact that it would make no difference to how you actually experience the world (jumping off that skyscraper might be a useful experiment, however), you'd probably find many more difficulties in advancing knowledge related to such conjectures... as experience differentiates between abstract objects and those which seem to be "out there" in an objective world full of other conscious beings, it seems reasonable to proceed from that working assumption until one of these other possibilities show any sort of an advantage.

Any effort to argue around that will ultimately prove futile because decisions to set variable thresholds are of a subjective nature and not objective.

If you think the only two options available are solipsism and belief in supernatural beings, you might want to ask yourself where you could have gone so terribly awry.

Which is why I do not endeavor to make such distinction. I hold all knowledge to the same threshold of proof or evidence which is implicit circumstantial evidence. I do not even require it to be empirical as knowledge may be synthetic apriori (inferred without experience commonly by logic) or synthetic aposteriori (inferred from experience), or analytic aprior (tautological).

Everything about the world in my experience of study and observation has thoroughly substantiated the view that actual knowledge requires a harmony of both the intellect and the senses... an extreme to one is mere speculation which has proven unreliable, and the other just amounts to brute stupidity.

I would not state that circumstantial implicit empirical proof is insufficient for positing something as probable even if only vaguely defined or apprehended. Not at all. But I would have to tell you that God meets this threshold and thus may be posited as something probable even if only vaguely defined or apprehended.

Contrarily, I would state that you're completely wrong. There is no measure for defining the probability of God as there is not a single point of observation or piece of valid reasoning that suggests the existence of eternal, incorporeal, intelligences (assuming those are attributes that your version of deity or deities must possess).

Which is why most, (not all as they are not a monolith) of atheistic thought will not accept circumstantial implicit empirical proof as sufficient. There position is denial of, which they may endeavor to support by argument. Argument which is most easily made regarding the threshold of proof or evidence to posit something as probable as existing (or if more nuanced arguments to redundancy, where if duplicated than superfluous and effectively not existing even if actually existing). Since circumstantial implicit proof or evidence does allow for positing the existence of God a probable the level of proof or evidence is elevated in order to exclude allowing the positing the existence of God as probable. The side effect of this elevation of proof or evidence is the unintended exclusion of all knowledge proven or evidence by the lower level of proof/evidence which is circumstantial and implicit.

Well, believers have been using variants of the same three arguments for God's existence since Plato... and I agree with the majority of philosophers who nowadays find them utterly dubious. You got something different?

Considering that a great many arguments have made utilization of the reactionary meat model of people I woudl disagree that it is unintelligible or useless in discussion. Remember I do not consider people to be reactionary meat. I support that consideration by implicit circumstantial proof/evidence in the same manner that I support god as existing by implicit circumstantial proof/evidence.

If such a level of proof/evidence is in sufficient then it may not be state that consciousness or persons exist. To which a viable explanation for the machinations of people may be described as reactionary meat (see the zombie squid post earlier).

"Reactionary meat," "machinations," "conscious persons," etc., are valid descriptions to whatever extent their applied in appropriate situations. It doesn't mean we need to stop there when seeking the more fundamental natures of things (though I think machinations is fairly accurate on a number of levels).

To true, to true. The only crux being that ingenuity is not solely limited to being cleaver and inventive in regard to factual realization. One may be ingenious in imaginary things as one is in factual things. (Generally factual things have been understood first as an imaginary thing. Also known as Hypothesis).

Unfortunately, far too many people fail to understand critical methods and confuse the imaginations of ancient Greeks and Hebrews with realities discovered by the imaginations of illuminaries such as Darwin or Einstein. Remember, the value of a hypothesis consists in its ability to formulate models by which predictions can in principle be tested.