(June 16, 2015 at 11:16 pm)bennyboy Wrote: The adoption of the schema is the exact definition of the establishment of a subjective system of mores. What you call an "objective proxy" represents the world as one understands it, and as one would like it to be. This naturally represents the complex ideas upon which thoughtful behavior will be mediated.
If you want to argue that all thought, all minds, all experiences are objective because they are products of an apparently determinist universe, then rock and roll. Otherwise, you are necessarily either special pleading one case of "objective" which exactly matches everyone else's definition of "subjective," or you equivocating on it in establishing a part of the mind of the Subject as a virtual object.
I suspect the latter to be the case. If mental function, including the building and reference to ideas and systems of ideas, are "objects," then to what are they objects? The mind either is an entity unto itself, or it is an object of the soul. The only problem with this is that you just fall right away into philosophical issues of cosmogony and psychogony, and you'll find it impossible to make any headway in this conversation. Nobody is seriously going to entertain the idea of a soul as a solution to the "fiction" of the world view, since it is simpler by an order of magnitude simply to see the world view as an important aspect of the agency of the self.
I apologize for my delayed response. I have been out of town on business with limited internet access and just returned late last night. Now in regards to your statements.
1. Concession: I would first state if you proceed to argue along the lines you are going you would be consceeding my initial premise. Which is to say in order for one to engage in moral conduct they must make an appeal to an imaginary friend. Your argument first makes an appeal to your person (who cannot be evidenced as existing) and then a further appeal to a "world view" (an imaginary construct).
2. Objective/Subjective Proxy: Next your argument contends (as Nestor's) that the "world view" operates as an objective proxy. By objective proxy what is meant is upon adoption of the "world view" you are holding the view as independent of subjective influence and unchanging. This objective proxy is then applied as the determinate of the moral conduct. As a question I must ask can this "world view" change over time or is it fixed? If it cannot change or than the "world view" is still being held as an objective proxy. Now if it can change it would be considered a subjective proxy. The "world view" is acting as an alternative to the person (Subject), but may be changed by the person to incorporate any conduct the person so chooses to engage in. (Commonly known as, "To a liar everyone lies", "To a cheater everyone cheats", etcetera). In which case the subjective proxy constructed is no different than Subjective morality by which the Subject determines their conduct to always be correct.
3. Guilt of Innocence: Your argument of "world view" does introduce an interesting dilemma. Under the subjective morality argument all conduct may ultimate be argued as being moral. Under the "world view" argument you are contending once a person adopts this world view and this world view is not malleable (meaning you are taking away the subjectivity of it) than a person acting in opposition is guilty of doing wrong. However, you also argue that when a person is acting in opposition of the world view they are doing so because their reason has been overridden by they passions, instincts, or emotions. This is to say they are not in control of their person, yet they are guilty for the conduct of their person; which they have no control over. That seems rather odd. It seems as if you are arguing they are innocent due to their lack of control, but still guilty as a lack of control over your person does not absolve one of their "world view" which cannot be modified to incorporate the current conduct (or if modified to do so would fall into the subjective morality I am referencing). Needless to say you may simply rectify this Gordian knot by simply incorporating free will rather than trying to contend people are not free in their actions.
4. Soul v. World View: I like the argument that it is simpler to see the "world view" as an important aspect of agency itself. However, such an argument assumes the existence of a soul by which exists our person and the subsequent aspects of view and agency their in. Otherwise we may go back to our reactionary meat argument. By which the meat automaton of people react to the stimuli as if they have agency without any "world view" to speak of. Whereby there is no person, to view, or act with agency.
