Hello, Anyone interested in a debate?

[bennyboy]

1.  Concession:  I would first state if you proceed to argue along the lines you are going you would be consceeding my initial premise.  Which is to say in order for one to engage in moral conduct they must make an appeal to an imaginary friend.  Your argument first makes an appeal to your person (who cannot be evidenced as existing) and then a further appeal to a "world view" (an imaginary construct).

We are talking about the semantics of self, now, and throwing in an implied BOP to boot.

2.  Objective/Subjective Proxy:  Next your argument contends (as Nestor's) that the "world view" operates as an objective proxy.  By objective proxy what is meant is upon adoption of the "world view" you are holding the view as independent of subjective influence and unchanging.  This objective proxy is then applied as the determinate of the moral conduct.  As a question I must ask can this "world view" change over time or is it fixed?  If it cannot change or than the "world view" is still being held as an objective proxy.  Now if it can change it would be considered a subjective proxy.  The "world view" is acting as an alternative to the person (Subject), but may be changed by the person to incorporate any conduct the person so chooses to engage in.  (Commonly known as, "To a liar everyone lies", "To a cheater everyone cheats", etcetera).  In which case the subjective proxy constructed is no different than Subjective morality by which the Subject determines their conduct to always be correct.

You keep talking about the self referring to this implicitly external world view, as though it's a library that must be accessed and obeyed. I contend that the world view is part of the self-- the will, ego, etc. are all intrinsically linked in a person.

3.  Guilt of Innocence:  Your argument of "world view" does introduce an interesting dilemma.  Under the subjective morality argument all conduct may ultimate be argued as being moral.  Under the "world view" argument you are contending once a person adopts this world view and this world view is not malleable (meaning you are taking away the subjectivity of it) than a person acting in opposition is guilty of doing wrong.  However, you also argue that when a person is acting in opposition of the world view they are doing so because their reason has been overridden by they passions, instincts, or emotions.  This is to say they are not in control of their person, yet they are guilty for the conduct of their person; which they have no control over.  That seems rather odd.  It seems as if you are arguing they are innocent due to their lack of control, but still guilty as a lack of control over your person does not absolve one of their "world view" which cannot be modified to incorporate the current conduct (or if modified to do so would fall into the subjective morality I am referencing).  Needless to say you may simply rectify this Gordian knot by simply incorporating free will rather than trying to contend people are not free in their actions.

To say that all conduct is moral is too simple. All conduct may be perceived as moral by the agent conducting it, based on his/her world view: even a murderer or a rapist may see good ends and justified means in what he does, and see his act as one of justice.

But to apply the word "moral" to a behavior is like to apply the word "beauty" to a physical object. No object is intrinsically beautiful, and yet most people can come to the consensus that some things, like sunsets, are beautiful.

The same goes for morality. We each have our moral ideas, based on our world views. The majority of world views overlap greatly, and are objects of consensus. Some ideas are not. We can loosely say that rape is immoral, based on that consensus, and that drinking milk is not, while knowing that a percentage of the population will fall outside that consensus.

4.  Soul v. World View:  I like the argument that it is simpler to see the "world view" as an important aspect of agency itself.  However, such an argument assumes the existence of a soul by which exists our person and the subsequent aspects of view and agency their in.  Otherwise we may go back to our reactionary meat argument.  By which the meat automaton of people react to the stimuli as if they have agency without any "world view" to speak of.  Whereby there is no person, to view, or act with agency.

Who says meat can't have a world view?