Hello, Anyone interested in a debate?

[bennyboy]

Perplexing.  "World view" is a label for the collective ideas one has about the world.  The evidence for world views is that people talk about them all the time, and seem to act on them.  If you want to go solipsism, and argue that we can't prove that other minds exist at all, then I'm with you.  But for me, there's utility in viewing others as minds with ideas, and no utility in viewing the universe as under the control of a goofy God who can create the universe but not save sick babies.

Again your argument is readily adaptable by that of the theist.  And it is paradoxical how you can say the existence of even a fictitious world view of another is of utility, but the the idea there is a goofy God (who has a world view, which includes not saving sick babies and in not killing healthy ones) has no utility.  If there is utility in viewing others as having minds (though they may not) the same argument for that utility suffices to say there is utility in a single authoritative mind (to resolve disputes between all the various fictitious minds).  

No, you are trying to equivocate on two kinds of utility: the utility of an idea which represents actual experience, and the utility of an idea which conveniently solves a philosophical problem, but which doesn't actually represent any actual experience. I've chosen to believe other people have minds because they do ALL the things I'd expect from a mindful being-- get angry or sad, respond in certain ways during conversation, etc.

Now it appears you are saying one's ideas are intrinsically linked to one's life experience (which John Locke would disagree with in accordance with the Tabula Rasa, by which our experience is not intrinsically linked to a world view which has not had sufficient input to exist.  May one have a world view of nothing?).  And one's decision process.  To which I would argue evidence is required in support of your assertion and we are both painfully aware that not all decisions are based on a world view (more implicit evidence in opposition to your assertion).  

Not all behaviors are based on a world view, and I never said they were. However, for one to judge one's actions moral or immoral, they must constitute an intentional reference to a world view.

Let's say, for example, that there's a burning building, and I run in with the intent of saving a baby. However, I don't see a second baby, which I accidentally knock into the heart of the fire. Am I acting morally? Yes-- because my world view includes as "good" the idea that I should save babies from burning, and I was acting with that intent.

As there are not only reactionary decisions (which are of such imminence as to not give rise to rational consideration), subconcious decisions (which may not be said to operate according to a conscious world view), instinctual decisions (which react more according to stimuli of the corporeal than to any world view), emotional decisions (which may be considered simply meta-physical decision in reaction to our sentiments which are not necessarily in consideration of a grandeur world view).  As stated by Desiderius Erasmus:

I'm sorry, but this is all another strawman. I never said that all actions are mediated by the world view, or should be. You're arguing against the wind right now.

My big toe is inherent to my existence, but I wouldn't say person = big toe or that big toe = person.  That's a pretty strange argument.

Your big toe is not inherent to your person.  Your person does not cease to exist with the deprivation of your big toe.  That which is inherent to your person is essential to your person such that your person may not exist without it.  For a world view to be inherent to your person is to state world view is a subset of person such that devoid of that subset there is no person.  Thus it may be argued that your person is your world view.

So you agree, then, that the world view is inherent to the person. Good, because that was what I said. Let's move on.

Which is why subjective morality is untenable and is as useful as a diet that states one may eat as much of whatever they want when they want.  Morality may not be subjective; else we end up stating what is immoral is moral and immoral or what is moral is immoral and moral.

There is no True Scotsman, so a scenario which demands one is a false dilemma.

Once again these paragraphs may readily be converted for the theist who takes the philosophical assumption things are as they seem to them and that God is present, for example.

"He is part of their world view, and his existence (in combination with the ideas of His person associated with Him) affect their acts.  While accepting this thing may be illusory they are willing, on the basis of utility, to make a philosophical/theological assumption those things are as they seem to them:  that god exists...

Their lack of conclusive evidence (by which you mean proof) doesn't matter, because interacting with God as though he is really sentient is central to their experience of life.  The idea of any subjective morality, or of no God who might have created such, is irrelevant, and plays no part in their experience of life."

Is this answer satisfactory for God's utility or existence?  I believe you will say it is not.  

The simple fact is that many people DO believe strongly in God, and for this exact reason: they draw a different philosophical line than I do in attributing experiences to entities.

I see bodies with 10 fingers, and believe them to be people. I see them cry, and therefore believe them capable of experiencing sadness. Christians look at the sunset, and feel that only God could make something so glorious. They are making an extra step of inference, not about what they see, but about the implications of what they see.

Look, you show me something which matches a sensible definition for God, and it won't be hard for me to add that idea to my world view. But I won't hold my breath.

You can see meat.  And that meat seems to have a mind.  You can also see a man who seems to have bitten a quarter in half, a woman who seems to have bent a spoon with the power of her mind, you can see a priest seem to cast out demons by the power of god, and any other number of things which may be, but are not necessarily as they seem.  Since it is useful for you to assume that SEEMS=IS than the man has bitten the quarter in half, the woman did bend the spoon with the power of her mind, and the priest did case out demons by the power of God.  What it seems to be as seen so it is and there is no need to even confront the philosophical question of whether to take seeming as being.

Another straw man. It is in fact NOT of utility for me to believe a spoon has really been bent, or that demons have been cast out. It IS of utility for me to believe that my wife and children are real, or the people I do business with each day, or the people I debate with in online forums.

Indeed I do take your existence pretty compelling.  But for that matter I also take the existence of God as pretty compelling such that I subscribe to a religious view and set of mores in accordance with that belief.  So... does that mean he exists just as your person exists?

If God starts sending me text messages, or shows me a selfie next to Alpha Centauri, then it will be much easier for me to believe that God exists.

Out of curiosity do you have much experience with intangible, immaterial, or metaphysical things?  Thoughts, feelings, a metaphysical world view perhaps?  Would you say those things exist though they are devoid of shape?  If so may one who has an experience with the presence of God (though not necessarily the God-shaped object) say God is as real as the personalities (which are not human shaped) or the other immaterial things you assert as real?  What would you say is a reasonable philosophical position on that?

I've had many religious and spiritual experiences-- more in my youth than these days. I once spent almost an entire summer fasting and reading the Bible, and had many powerful moments of realization, some of which I included in a book.

However, the value of those experiences is in the insights, not in the subscription to a belief about their source. A description of those events is NOT directly descriptive of God, but of my own psychology and emotional state. The Christian cannot see the difference between feelings and their source, and therefore uses as evidence experiences which don't necessarily support his world view.