Hello, Anyone interested in a debate?

[Anima]

No, you are trying to equivocate on two kinds of utility: the utility of an idea which represents actual experience, and the utility of an idea which conveniently solves a philosophical problem, but which doesn't actually represent any actual experience.  I've chosen to believe other people have minds because they do ALL the things I'd expect from a mindful being-- get angry or sad, respond in certain ways during conversation, etc.

Alas you have yet to exhibit an actual experinceor (person to experience), experiencee (fictitious persons or things to be experienced), or experience (the act of). In which case your distinction between utility of an idea of actual experience vs convenience are the same. In order to resolve your philosophical problem, by which you need other persons, you choose to believe other people have minds because you have an actual experience (as determined by you, which is not determinate of the truth) they do all the things you would expect from a mindful being (of course they also do things you would not expect from a mindful being such as act without thinking or act in an irrational way).

Of course I know you recognize this argument is readily available to the theist as well. Who chooses to believe because they have an actual experience (as determined by them, which is again not necessarily determinate of the truth) of Him in which he did ALL the things they expect from Him (even if he does somethings they would not expect from him).

Not all behaviors are based on a world view, and I never said they were.  However, for one to judge one's actions moral or immoral, they must constitute an intentional reference to a world view.

Let's say, for example, that there's a burning building, and I run in with the intent of saving a baby.  However, I don't see a second baby, which I accidentally knock into the heart of the fire.  Am I acting morally?  Yes-- because my world view includes as "good" the idea that I should save babies from burning, and I was acting with that intent.

Determination of an action as moral, amoral, or immoral must give consideration to the intention of the actor (on this we agree) as good, indifferent/nonexistent, or bad. I would even agree this relative intention is to be referenced in accordance to an objective evaluation of the good, indifferent, or bad intention in the scenario.

I once again cannot agree with the subjective evaluation of the world view by which one may state my world view is "I do not risk my ass in the slightest for anyone or anything." Now I do not endeavor to give aid to anyone (including those I can aid with only minimal or nominal risk) and such is "good" as it is in accordance with my world view. Or I may adopt the world view of "Their loss is my gain". In which case any act taken by my person resulting in their loss (without specifying what is lost) is "good" because it is in accordance with my world view of it being my gain (regardless of whether their loss was was deserved or not).

I'm sorry, but this is all another strawman.  I never said that all actions are mediated by the world view, or should be.  You're arguing against the wind right now.

Not really a strawman. Just a listing of examples of actions not based on world view. We may move on.

Your big toe is not inherent to your person.  Your person does not cease to exist with the deprivation of your big toe.  That which is inherent to your person is essential to your person such that your person may not exist without it.  For a world view to be inherent to your person is to state world view is a subset of person such that devoid of that subset there is no person.  Thus it may be argued that your person is your world view.

So you agree, then, that the world view is inherent to the person.  Good, because that was what I said.  Let's move on.

I am not saying your world view is inherent to person (that is for you to argue). I am saying if you want to say your world view is inherent to your person than I would be justified in saying your world view is your person and we may readily drop the pretense of the world view as the determinate of morality as being something other than just subjective morality of the whims.

Which is why subjective morality is untenable and is as useful as a diet that states one may eat as much of whatever they want when they want.  Morality may not be subjective; else we end up stating what is immoral is moral and immoral or what is moral is immoral and moral.

There is no True Scotsman, so a scenario which demands one is a false dilemma.

You have evidence to support this assertion? As I am sure many a Scotsman would disagree with your assertion, based on their experience and determination of what is actual. Clearly validation of your experience or world view must be considered to correlate to some objective reality to gain validity.

1. While you are readily willing to believe in the existence of any number of fictitious relative beings which are uniquely un-unique to endeavor to reach a consensus for moral determination. You may more easily believe in the existence of a single fictitious objective reality by which all subjectives are mere perspectives, that serves to grant validity to your own subjective experiences and judgments while simultaneously providing a means of correlation between any number of subsequent fictitious persons one wishes to believe as to reach consensus.

I fail to see why you are bending over backwards to justify the belief in the former and are not willing to believe in the latter which is of greater utility by means of less effort.

The simple fact is that many people DO believe strongly in God, and for this exact reason: they draw a different philosophical line than I do in attributing experiences to entities.

I see bodies with 10 fingers, and believe them to be people.  I see them cry, and therefore believe them capable of experiencing sadness.  Christians look at the sunset, and feel that only God could make something so glorious.  They are making an extra step of inference, not about what they see, but about the implications of what they see.

2. You believe you see bodies with 10 fingers and those bodies are inhabit by a person. But you have not proven you exist, much less that you have seen anything beyond you. Furthermore if we are to say something exists beyond you and that you "see" it then we are lead to our argument of objective vs. subjective existence beyond you (under the assumption that at least you actually exist).

3. Now if what you "see" beyond you is exactly what you expect to see at all times then I would concede what is beyond you is subjective and determined by your person. If what you "see" beyond you is not exactly what you expect to see at all times then I would contend what is beyond you is not defined by you and thus objective (even if observed by a subjective perspective).

4. I imagine you, like myself, are constantly faced with the observation, judgment, and determination of things not being as we expect them to be. So we may say that which is beyond our un-evidenced person is not defined by our person is thereby objective. We may further say in regards to bullet 1 above that belief in unity of the objective into a single fictitious reality serves the utility of granting my subjective perception of these objective things validity as well as providing me a means by which correlation to other fictitious person may reach a consensus.

Look, you show me something which matches a sensible definition for God, and it won't be hard for me to add that idea to my world view.  But I won't hold my breath.

See 1, 2 ,3 and 4 above.

Another straw man.  It is in fact NOT of utility for me to believe a spoon has really been bent, or that demons have been cast out.  It IS of utility for me to believe that my wife and children are real, or the people I do business with each day, or the people I debate with in online forums.

I am sorry but it was you who argued SEEM = IS. If that is the case than if someone seems to bend a spoon with the power of their mind it is of the utmost utility for you who holds seeming as being to believe they bent the spoon with the power of their mind and take precautionary action therein. The same may be said of one who seems to cast out demons which seemed to have possessed seeming people. If seeming is being than they did cast out actual demons from people who were actually possessed. It is of utility for you to believe this in the event someone you know or yourself seems to be possessed (as seeming is being) so that the demons may be cast out.

In short you cannot argue seeming is being (to say you do not need to determine what seem vs. is) and then start to argue there is utility in recognizing some seeming as being and not others. In doing so your argument becomes hypocritical and special pleading by which one states "seeming is being for what seems that I want to be and seeming is not being for what seems that I do not want to be."

If God starts sending me text messages, or shows me a selfie next to Alpha Centauri, then it will be much easier for me to believe that God exists.

Wait... I have done neither of those things... So it is difficult to believe I exist But we should be honest, even if you received text messages from one identifying themselves as God or a selfie next to Alpha Centuri of the same indentifying themselves as God you would be about as inclined to believe was actually God as you are now. Regardless of what it seems

Out of curiosity do you have much experience with intangible, immaterial, or metaphysical things?  Thoughts, feelings, a metaphysical world view perhaps?  Would you say those things exist though they are devoid of shape?  If so may one who has an experience with the presence of God (though not necessarily the God-shaped object) say God is as real as the personalities (which are not human shaped) or the other immaterial things you assert as real?  What would you say is a reasonable philosophical position on that?

I've had many religious and spiritual experiences-- more in my youth than these days.  I once spent almost an entire summer fasting and reading the Bible, and had many powerful moments of realization, some of which I included in a book.

I would like to read your book! I am writing two books (when I have the time) titled De Ingenium Humanus (The innate character of Humans) and De Iustus Humans (The justice of Humans). I am always looking for some proof readers should you be interested. I will post the Table of Contents after this post.

I was not asking about religious experiences. I was referring to experience with metaphysical things overall. They seem to exist and you are willing to believe they exist without evidence to prove their existence because you determine them to be of utility (which is really a fancy way of saying because you want to since the utility is determined by you and may be for any reason such as it pleases you to do so, though I assume you would argue it is pragmatic to do so. Pragmatism being a sub-branch of idealism and readily lending itself to relativism another sub-branch of idealism).

However, I would like to know a specific answer to my question (bolded above). Not necessarily in terms of your self specifically but generally speaking if you would.

However, the value of those experiences is in the insights, not in the subscription to a belief about their source.  A description of those events is NOT directly descriptive of God, but of my own psychology and emotional state.  The Christian cannot see the difference between feelings and their source, and therefore uses as evidence experiences which don't necessarily support his world view.

Hmm... I does not seem to me that one who is arguing to a world view is capable of separating their feeling from the source; as their feelings are the source (as argued extensively above).

Furthermore the value does not lie in the insights from those experiences alone, but also in the source of those experiences. Otherwise we would be arguing actual and virtual/emotional experiences are of the same value so long as they lead to insights. This would contradict what you are endeavoring to say and would constitute a failing of the ability of the observe to separate their feelings from the reality. By which contention is insights to reality are of utility while insights into feelings are not. Or do we wish to argue seem = is to such a degree that insight derived from reality are on par with insight derived from sentimentality? In which case your actual fictitious people are as real as their sentimental fictitious God.