Hello, Anyone interested in a debate?

[Anima]

I don't think the process is the same. My expectations about things are symbolic representations of experience, which I project onto candidates for same-ness. I experience an actual human sentience, my own, and project that onto ten-fingered, ten-toed beings.

So what of the God idea? Obviously, I cannot have a comprehensive experience of God, since by definition God cannot be comprehended. So if I project God-hood onto events I CAN experience, what am I projecting? Only a very distilled, very incomplete idea. But here's the important part-- the idea is so far removed from the hypothetical "reality" of an actual Deity that it cannot be said to be representative at all: the symbol is personal to me, or to people who have described it to me, and CANNOT exist. In short, you are necessarily stuck trying to project a myth onto a thing.

1. In regards to your expectations being a symbolic representation of experience projected for sameness. I would first point you to the commonly vaunted Nietzche (whom I have not read in 20 years but have been convinced to re-read):

“I shall never tire of emphasizing a small, terse fact, which is unwillingly recognized by these credulous minds--namely, that a thought comes when "it" wishes, and not when "I" wish; so that it is a PERVERSION of the facts of the
case to say that the subject "I" is the condition of the predicate "think." ONE thinks; but that this "one" is precisely the famous old "ego," is, to put it mildly, only a supposition, an assertion, and assuredly not an "immediate certainty." After all, one has even gone too far with this "one thinks"--even the "one" contains an INTERPRETATION of the process, and does not belong to the process itself. One infers here according to the usual grammatical formula--"To think is an activity; every activity requires an agency that is active; consequently"... It was pretty much on the same lines that the older atomism sought, besides the operating "power," the material particle wherein it resides and out of which it operates--the atom. More rigorous minds, however, learnt at last to get along without this "earth-residuum," and perhaps someday we shall accustom ourselves, even from the logician's point of view, to get along without the little "one" (to which the worthy old "ego" has refined itself).” (Beyond Good and Evil 17.)

It may thus be stated you have not experienced anything. You further allude to this in your final quote by which you say in reference to God, "add your suspicion of the reality of people, and you are just shooting yourself in the foot, because now, other people are not real, and so I'm deriving my God idea from something that is itself unreal." You are correct in this regard which further extends to say in like manner you would be deriving your symbolic representation of experience from something which itself is unreal.

As stated in the beginning of this thread this is a resultant of the general (though not monolithic) position stating God does not exist for want of evidence. By which inquiry into what constitutes evidence resulted in a general definition of evidence for God that when applied to knowledge as a whole (to avoid special pleading on the part of Atheists) would result in our person, experience, other persons, and all knowledge not existing for want of this same evidence. No point to the contrary has been presented to this initial stipulation beyond special pleading where existence desired is held to a lower threshold of proof than existence not so desired.

While it may be said the theist special pleads to anthropomorphize the God of philosophy, which may be derived by means of synthetic apriori and aposteriori under a uniform threshold of evidence as applied to our person, experience, other persons, God, and all other knowledge; the atheist special pleads the existence of self, experience, other persons, and all they consider knowledge at a lower threshold than the strenuous threshold for proof imposed on the existence of a particular displeasing existence (God). Thus, as untenable as the theist position may be for want of proof of a particular thing it seems the atheist position is even more untenable for want of same proof for numerous things.

As a matter of utility one should apply the same threshold of proof to God as they do to their own person and knowledge, in which case sufficient experience exists to infer the existence of any number of metaphysical things which may be consolidated into the readily inferable single proactive cause without cause as the objective existence to which all existence bears relation to. Thereby giving validity and allowing for correlation of particular subjective observations. Furthermore, it is of greater utility to simply special plead a single end that implies the beginning (as the theist) rather than to have to special plead the beginning/foundation and all that is built upon it (as is done by the atheist in regards their person, experience, and other persons) to reach some desired end.

2. I like your introduction of a comprehensive experience to then state by definition God cannot be comprehended. I take this to mean God may not be comprehended in full though God may be comprehended in part as neither our own person, the person of others, time and space, or existence itself may be comprehended in the entirety. Thus, I take your statement to mean comprehension as comprehension in part and not in the entirety.

I further take your statement in relation to a metaphysical thing such as experience to be in the same regard as to God; which is to say in no way may you experience directly, but may only do so indirectly by means of sentimentality. To paraphrase Neitzche:

“So let us for once be more cautious, let us be "unphilosophical": let
us say that in all experience there is firstly a plurality of sensations, namely, the sensation of the condition "AWAY FROM WHICH we go," the sensation of the condition "TOWARDS WHICH we go," the sensation of this
"FROM" and "TOWARDS" itself, and then besides, an accompanying muscular
sensation, which, even without our putting in motion "arms and legs,"
commences its action by force of habit, directly we “experience” anything. Therefore, just as sensations (and indeed many kinds of sensations) are to be recognized as ingredients of the experience, so, in the second place, thinking is also to be recognized; in every act of the experience there is a ruling thought;--and let us not imagine it possible to sever this thought from the "experiencing," as if the experience would then remain over! In the third place, the experience is not only a complex of sensation and thinking, but it is above all an EMOTION, and in fact the emotion of the change. That which is termed "experience" is essentially the emotion of change in respect to him who claims: "I experienced, 'what' must be"--this consciousness is inherent in every experience; and equally so the straining of the attention, the straight look which fixes itself exclusively on one thing, the unconditional judgment that "this and nothing else is necessary now," the inward certainty that reality is rendered--and whatever else pertains to the position of the sentiment...

on the other hand, we are accustomed to disregard this duality, and to deceive ourselves about it by means of the synthetic term "I": a whole series
of erroneous conclusions, and consequently of false judgments about the
experience itself, has become attached to the act of experiencing--to such a degree that he who experiences believes firmly that experiencing SUFFICES for being. Since in the majority of cases there has only been exercise of experience when the effect of the sentiment--consequently change, and therefore being--was to be EXPECTED, the APPEARANCE has translated itself into the sentiment, as if there were a NECESSITY OF EFFECT; in a word, he who
experiences believes with a fair amount of certainty that experience and being are somehow one; he ascribes the sentiment, the carrying out of the experiencing, to the experience itself, and thereby enjoys an increase of the sensation of change which accompanies all success.” (Beyond Good and Evil 19.)

While Neitzche limits his argument to the will the same argument serves readily in regards to personal experience, by which we deceives ourselves by means of the “I” that experiencing suffices for being. The same was said of Descartes in his cognition ergo sum (which is merely a tautology of if I then I). In truth nearly all of Neitzche’s diatribe regarding freewill is applicable to personal experience. It is funny he would denigrate the former while vaunting the latter.

The Biblical God takes this position constantly. The commandments, which are supposed to be good, says "Thou shalt not kill," and yet he kills. He also counsels his followers to kill, at least sometimes, as the loss of non-Judaic people represents a gain for the Jews. Is this moral? How about the laying to waste of whole towns, or the killing of the first-born in Egypt? Had all those first-born boys committed sins worthy of death?

2. First I was not making reference to the biblical God. Again I do not subscribe to sola scriptura. But; is your argument we should be as vicious as the Tyrant in the great book of fairytales? Or because it is okay for the fictitious God to act in such a manner we are justified in acting in such a manner? Or do you want to argue that a God is bound by the same rules as a man and subsequently that a man is bound by the same rules as animal?

This is non sequitur. The love of chocolate is inherent to my person, but I am not my love of chocolate.

Correction, your statement is non sequitur. Love of chocolate is not inherent to your person. That which is inherent to your person is that which is essential to your person. If your person may exist without said thing than it is not inherent to it. I believe you may be confusing the terms inherent (essential to) and inherited (derived from or related to).

You could say that in my world view, there's a kind of archetypal man, from which everyone else deviates in small ways, and that whatever I think this being's mores would be represent my moral views-- so long as we recognize that we are still just talking about my ideas, not projecting this archetypal man onto an actual being which we are positing.

I would say if we are willing to say all of the above in regards to your archetypical man there is no reason why we should refrain from anthropomorphizing this archetypical man as being an actual being. As stated many posts ago sufficient implicit circumstantial evidence exists (which is sufficient for the theist) for the inference of said man as possible; and if possible than possibly actual (since we may not limit actuality to probability given the probability of all that is currently actual.) We have as much evidence of him existing as an actual entity as we do as an effective entity. If desired we may constrain this by saying the objective archetypical man should effectuate its self in multiple persons, but this may only be state if and only if there is an objective archetypical man to which the myriad world views have a subjective perspective of, but may not necessarily be a complete and accurate depiction of.

However, if the threshold of this archetypical man is to be in accordance with the argument (to avoid special pleading) of evidence required by very diverse atheistic community of explicit direct evidence you would be correct in stating we may not reasonably anthropomorphize it. However, under such a requirement we cannot concede it exists as part of a world view of a personality we cannot evidence as existing by explicit direct evidence.

I think we're on the third trip around the merry-go-round, now. This will be my last time restating this line.

If I'm living in the Matrix, then I am OF the Matrix, and the apparent existence of other Matrix people is sufficiently convincing that I take the philosophical position that they are real. If I'm in the mind of God or a brain in a jar, little matter: I still talk to (apparent) people all the time, and believing them to be real is necessary in order for any of my social behaviors to make sense.

In ANY of these contexts, the idea of God is irrelevant, because it isn't founded on any of the observations I'm able to make, and comes FROM OTHERS. Best case scenario, other people are real, and their God ideas represent truth-- but I have means of establishing the other as representing truth. Next best, other people are real, and their God idea is mythological-- not representing truth. But add your suspicion of the reality of people, and you are just shooting yourself in the foot, because now, other people are not real, and so I'm deriving my God idea from something that is itself unreal.

I'm sorry, but the posts are getting tl;dr. I'll have to stop there, and I may attempt to take up the rest of your post later.

To try to keep this answer short:
1. What do you mean you have means of establishing others as representing truth? You do not have means of establishing others much less what those other know/experience or the truth of those experiences therein. How would you establish the truth of these others, their knowledge/experience, and the truth of that knowledge/experience in such a manner as to stipulate the previous other’s knowledge/experience is not true?

2. Above you argue these fictitious persons are simply projections of you on what is around you. So they are not essential to your social conduct. There is no need for the projection as your social conduct is simply determine by your subjective ethical determinations (since social is not moral but ethical). So why do you waste your time arguing their existence as if it grants any support to your argument? At best their person is just your person and is thereby superfluous.

3. Furthermore I fail to see how God is irrelevant. If the belief of the existence of any number of fictitious persons is of utility to your argument (which I do not think it is) than the person of God is relevant for the same reason of granting your social behavior validity. Above it seems you were trying to say it cannot be because you can project yourself upon the other humans, but not upon God. An idea I find humorous as most people project themselves upon God quite readily (so I have the utmost faith you will be capable of doing so as well). Thus there is no reason why belief in the fictitious person of God, as a projection of your person, does not serve the same utility as the fictitious person of people, as projections of your person. You could say it is ridiculous and pointless to which I would agree as it is equally ridiculous and pointless to do for all the fictitious people your are positing.