Philosophical zombies

[polymath257]

Philosophers like to talk about the 'hard problem of consciousness', but I have to admit I have never grasped the fundamental difficulty.

Just think about it. :-)

Oh, I have. Extensively. I just don't see the problem. If we have physical correlates for all conscious experiences, and can predict from the physical correlates what the conscious experience is, how is that NOT an explanation for consciousness?

The hard problem seems to claim that more is required and I just don't see it.

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The hard problem of consciousness is the fact that philosophical zombies are indeed very possible, and our brain didn't need to produce consciousness in order to produce intelligent and well functioning beings that respond to threats and rewards as if they were conscious. "Why is anyone conscious at all?" is the hard problem of consciousness.

Dennett side steps this by saying that P-Zeds aren't possible. And he is wrong because he never actually addresses consciousness.

I think his multiple drafts theory and the notion that consciousness is fame in the brain makes sense. But to then say that it all makes sense from a third person perspective, and that there is no first person perspective, and that consciousness is an illusion, and philosophical zombies are impossible.... none of that makes any sense.

If consciousness is just the workings of the brain (as I believe they are) then the consciousness we experience from the first person perspective is those workings of the brain from our first person perspective. That qualia is very real, and in fact it's the only thing we know for sure to be real..... we can't know for certain that when we investigate the brain scientifically that investigation isn't as unreal as the rest of reality. But even if reality is an illusion the fact we are experiencing that illusion is NOT an illusion. Phenomena are the only things in the universe that we know for sure are real, it's objective reality that there is a possibility of not existing.  Science itself, after all, studies phenomena. The third person perspective may be an illusion.... but the first person isn't. So he has theories about how the brain works that I agree with.... but then he concludes a complete non-sequitur from it and talks a load of spooky nonsense like "we're all zombies" and "consciousness is an illusion."

Actually, none of us who are conscious are zombies. Because zombies aren't conscious. And consciousness isn't an illusion.... because seeming to seem... is seeming.

Dennett argues that things merely seem to seem and don't really seem. And that... makes no sense whatsoever.

OK, here is a problem: If you ask a zombie if they are conscious, they will say yes. If you ask them if they have experiences and seem to be something, they will say yes. They will wax eloquent about sunrises and the feelings of the ocean, but not actually have those feelings.

Doesn't that just sound contradictory?

If they say they have all these experiences and show every indication of having them, in what sense do they not have them?