Philosophical zombies

[polymath257]

So basically we're not zombies but philosophical zombies are not impossible, lol.

The difference is... a philosophical zombie wouldn't actually feel anything or be conscious. But it would seem to everyone else that they would.  The crucial and very real difference is that there would be no seeming to THEM. Daniel Dennett thinks this is impossible. Because he likes to use his own definitions and equivocate a lot. God, Daniel Dennett is annoying. He doesn't even have a first-person version of consciousness. To take the third person perspective of consciousness to such an extent that he denies the first person is as nutty as you can get when it comes to consciousness. Consciousness is as first person as it gets.

But I think Dennett is exactly right here. P-Zombies are just flat-out an incoherent concept. Anything physically identical would have experiences that are exactly the same. The first person is produced because the processing happens in one brain and not another. If they are *identical*, then they would have feelings and experiences.

I don't deny the first person experiences. I just don't see how physicalism is destroyed by such. It happens in my brain, so I am the one with the experiences.