Philosophical zombies

[polymath257]

When we're talking about logical possibility, logic is relevant. Which type of possibility are you talking about?

There's no reason to believe that we can't just apply the anthropic principle to our own consciousness and consciousness might actually be incredibly rare for intelligent creatures just as life might be incredibly rare for the universe, and the fact we're here/conscious doesn't make it common.

Once again, how would it be possible for something physically identical to NOT be conscious?

Because we're not talking about physically identical. We're talking about the brain being identical in every way as far as the intelligence and every other part of the brain goes, apart from the parts that produce the epiphenomenon of consciousness... which may be irrelevant and a useless by product of evolution just like a moth that suicides itself on a lightbulb is a useless by product of evolution.

The first person aspect is produced from the information processing in the brain. So anything physically identical will have that same processing and thereby the same internal experiences.

If the parts of the brain that produced consciousness didn't exist they wouldn't exist to produce consciousness. Bravo, duh, clap clap. That's not the point. The point is that the parts that evolved that produce consciousness may be utterly useless by products that have nothing to do with all the useful parts of the brain including intelligence. In this case, intelligence and the rest of the brain lead to the useless side effect of consciousness.... but given enough evolutionary path it might not have. And when applying the anthropic principle it may be very rare just like life is and the fact we're here and conscious and know it doesn't make consciousness any more common than the fact we're alive makes life any more common.

No, this is NOT the argument! The claim is that a *physically identical* zombie is possible. That is what is claimed shows that physicalism is wrong.

There are two aspects: if something physically identical (including the consciousness producing centers of the brain) is automatically conscious, then the p-zombies are impossible.

Second: the claim that the *possibility* of p-zombies shows physicalism is false. I disagree here also. What is physical in some 'possible world' is irrelevant to what happens in *this* one. And in *this* one, consciousness is a physical phenomenon.